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Abstract 
Finn entry and exit has been shown to strongly influence productivity 
growth. Productivity has been identified as the key driver of long-run 
economic growth. This thesis strives to understand the causes of entry and 
exit and the role played by globalisation in this process of creative 
destruction. 
2 
Acknowledgements 
I am especially grateful to my supervisors Dr. Richard Kneller and 
Professor David Greenaway whose excellent advice guided me so well. 
Without them I would never have been able to complete this work. I also 
thank Professor Chris Milner for his helpful advice which greatly 
improved Chapter Four. I thank all my colleagues and friends from B51, 
the surrounding offices and elsewhere who made this such a memorable 
and enjoyable experience. Many thanks to Christoph Gortz and Paul 
Atherton for all the banter. 
I thank the Economic, Social Research Council for funding my studies and 
my parents and family for their support and for encouraging me to always 
pursue what interests me. 
3 
Contents 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Literature Review 
1.1 Review of the Theoretical Literature on Entry and Exit 
1.1.2 Review of the Empirical Literature on Entry and Exit 
7 
30 
30 
36 
2 Entrepreneurship Dynamics, Market Size and Country-Specific Factors 
40 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Data Description 
2.2.1 Summary Statistics - Churning Rates 
2.3 Regression Results 
2.3.1 Globalisation, Entry and Exit 
2.3.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage 
2.4 Robustness Tests - Country Factors 
2.5 Robustness Tests - Industry Factors 
2.6 Conclusions 
2.7 Appendix 2 
3 Closure within Multi-Plant Firms: Evidence from Japan 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Data and Summary 
41 
44 
46 
55 
57 
67 
71 
81 
84 
85 
89 
90 
95 
3.3 What is the Magnitude of the 'Footloose' Effect? 102 
3.4 Exit within Multiplant Finns 110 
3.5 'Footloose'Multinationals? 115 
3.6 Conclusions 120 
3.7 Appendix 3 122 
4 Trade Costs: A Source of Comparative Advantage 128 
4.1 Introduction 129 
4.2 Literature Review 133 
4.3 Theoretical Foundations - The Gravity Model 136 
4.4 Trade Costs through Time 139 
4.4.1 Sensitivity of Trade Costs to the Elasticity of Substitution 148 
4.4.2 Correlation between Aggregate Trade Costs and 
Existing Measures 150 
4.5 Trade Costs: A Source of Comparative Advantage 151 
4.5.1 Do Infonnation and Infrastructure Underlie the Results 158 
4.6 Robustness Testing - Alternative Model Specification 160 
4.6.1 Robustness Testing - Comparative Advantage at a 
Local Level 161 
4.7 Endogeneity 164 
4.8 Conclusions 167 
4.9 Appendix 4 168 
5 
5 Globalisation, Hollowing Out, Multinationals and Productivity in 
Japan's Lost Decade 171 
5.1 Introduction 172 
5.2 A Brief History of Japanese Manufacturing 178 
5.2.1 The Ascent of Manufacturing 179 
5.2.2 The Impact of Globalisation on Japanese Firms 182 
5.2.3 A Hollow Giant? 185 
5.3 Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity 188 
5.4 Empirical Results 192 
Question 1: What Causes the Closure of Japanese Plants? 192 
Question 2: What are the Causes of Exit within Multiplant Firms? 205 
Question 3: How does Multinational Concentration within 
the Industry Affect Exit? 210 
5.5 Employment Growth 219 
5.6 Why has the rate ofTFP Growth within Firms been so Low? 229 
5.7 Conclusions 235 
5.8 Appendix 5 237 
6 Conclusions 246 
7 Bibliography 254 
6 
Chapter One 
7 
Introduction 
In the wake of the technological discoveries that prompted the industrial 
revolution, the largely agrarian economies of Western Europe were 
gradually transformed as mechanisation led to agriculture being replaced 
by manufacturing as the bedrock of these countries' economies. The 
textile, mining and iron founding industries that these innovations gave 
birth to have themselves over time been supplanted by service sectors. 
This is perhaps best exemplified in England by the death of Lancastrian 
linen mills and the shifting of the country's economic heartland towards 
the financial institutions located in the City of London. In part due to 
environmental considerations, but also because of concerns about current 
industries' competitiveness, policy makers have begun to call for the 
development of the industries of the future. During the 2008 u.s. 
Presidential Election Barrak Obama pledged to assist in the creation of 
green industries which would employ some 5 million people and enable 
the United States to remain at the fore front of international technological 
developments. The European Union has adopted a similar approach with 
the Lisbon Treaty containing a clause demanding that her members strive 
to create an integrated, knowledge-based economy. 
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Central to these transitions has been the entry and exit of finns. 
Innovation's relentless march has stimulated the development of new 
machinery and industries. These advancements have led to the creation of 
new products and services which often use the same inputs. For example, 
the iron oxide rocks which were once the crayon of choice used by our 
prehistoric ancestors in cave paintings have since been utilised to produce 
audio cassettes, video tapes and floppy disks. Through time these 
products have in turn been made obsolete as innovation and entrepreneurs 
have contrived to produce superior products which dramatically improve 
upon their predecessors. Often new products and ideas are embodied 
within new finns. They create competition within the market place which 
forces the exit of less efficient finns and products. This Darwinian 
process has been shown to impact upon productivity growth which has 
been identified as the key driver of economic growth (Hulten, 2000). 
Given the close relationship between productivity and entry and exit, the 
process of finn creation and death is also allied with long-run economic 
growth. 
Empirical research has shown that the entry of new finns, and death 
among incumbents, has important implications for aggregate and industry 
productivity (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Bernard and Jensen 
(2004) highlight that in the United States this accounts for 35% of 
aggregate productivity gains over a five year period. Similar conclusions 
have been reached for other countries. For example, Baldwin and Gu 
(2002) show that plant turnover contributes between 15-25 per cent of 
9 
labour productivity improvements over the periods 1973-79, 1979-88 and 
1988-97. In their study a very large fraction of this contribution is due to 
foreign-owned and multi-plant firms. For the United Kingdom multi-plant 
firms are also found to playa pivotal role: Disney, Haskell and Heden 
(2003a) show that 'external restructuring' accounts for 50% of labour 
productivity growth and 90% of TFP growth over the years 1980-1992.1 
This source of competition is also found by Disney et al. (2003a) to affect 
'internal restructuring,.2 In their study of Taiwan Aw, Chen and Roberts 
(1997) reach similar conclusions while Hahn (2000) finds that between 45 
and 65 per cent of productivity growth in Korean manufacturing industries 
is due to entry and exit. Finally, net entry is found to play a supporting 
role to reallocations of output in causing productivity growth by 
Haltiwanger (1997) though it still accounts for 18% of changes in industry 
productivity. 
In parallel with the studies mentioned several others have found firm or 
plant turnover to have a more limited effect on productivity growth for 
manufacturing industries in the United States (Baily, Hulten and 
Campbell, 1992), Israel (Griliches and Regev, 1995), Chile, Columbia and 
Morocco (Liu, 1993; Tybout, 2000; Liu and Tybout, 1996; Roberts and 
Tybout, 1997). In part these findings reflect the fact that on average 
entering plants have lower productivity than incumbents and that it is only 
through time that they begin to make a contribution. However, 
I 'External restructuring' refers to the process by which less efficient plants exit and more 
efficient plants enter and increase their market share. 
2 'Internal restructuring' refers to technology upgrading, innovation and organisational 
change. 
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unsuccessful firms play a crucial role. Their presence stimulates 
competition for market share and forces incumbents to improve 
(Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1994; Griliches and Regev, 1995; Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan, 1998, 2002; Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and 
Kugler, 2004). 
While entering and exiting firms play a key role in determining 
productivity and economic growth, their contribution to employment is 
substantial. Leonard (1987) reports that between 1978 and 1979 job gains 
through plant deaths corresponded to 11 % of total job gains while plant 
death was responsible for 11 % of total job losses. Where entrants are 
successful they expand rapidly (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 
2005). However, there is also evidence that even where the firm survives, 
the jobs it creates may not. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989b) for 
example find that five years after entering the average plant had a 
workforce between 84.3% and 87.7% ofits entering size. 
Much of the theoretical literature on entry and exit concentrates on the 
Schumpeterian idea of 'creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1943), by 
which many new firms enter the market introducing new (improved) 
products and new technologies and processes that replace old ones, 
resulting in firm closures. Chum has therefore largely been positively 
viewed for its role as the driving force behind improvements in 
productivity. 3 However, the effect of chum is also linked to the impact of 
3 Churn is defined as the rate of entry plus exit. 
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competition on corporate performance, that is, the pressure chum creates 
acts as a form of market discipline, ensuring that the market operates 
efficiently. 
One may view technology as defining the boundary of what may be 
created, while globalisation dictates the markets in which ideas may be 
sold. Ultimately, however, it is entrepreneurs that fill this space. In 
tandem with research on entry and exit a literature studying 
entrepreneurship has evolved seeking to understand why some are 
successful and others less so. At heart the work in this area has sought to 
encourage the formation of localised economies as well as encourage 
governments to assist small and medium sized enterprises by providing 
research on policy measures. The importance of this area can be seen by 
the litany of, often country-specific, reports published by the OEeD 
Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development which include 
some 8 manuals on the subject. 
However, this literature on entrepreneurship is far from complete. This is 
in part due to the spotlight having been mainly directed at small and 
medium sized enterprises but is also attributable to difficulties in 
quantifying entrepreneurship. Nonetheless Bloom and van Reenan (201 0) 
have shown that the managerial practices adopted in different countries 
partly explain firm productivity. Extrapolating this to each individual 
entrepreneur would be difficult and prohibitively costly. However, entry 
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and exit represent one of the few avenues through which we can base 
judgement. 
From entry rates we can infer whether one country is more entrepreneurial 
than another. For example, people in the United States appear more 
willing to set-up businesses than elsewhere. Japan represents an 
interesting case where entry and exit rates are among the lowest of 
developed countries. Typically the rate of chum is less than 5% in Japan. 
This holds across industries and organisation structure as shown in Table 
1.1. 
Table 1.1: Entry and Exit Rates in Japanese Manufacturing 
Sample 
Variable 
Rate 
Economy Average 
Ent Exit 
.01 .02 
MNE 
Ent Exit 
.01 .02 
Multi (ex. MNE) Single Plant 
Ent Exit Ent Exit 
.01 .02 .01 .02 
In part this reflects differences in attitudes towards risk and the stigma 
attached to failure. However, cross-country differences in entry and exit 
allow us to study the reasons for these differences and whether this is due 
to specific institutions which distort entry incentives. On the other hand 
survival rates of new firms allow us to gauge the success of entrepreneurs. 
It may be that a lack of competition insulates entrants while growing 
markets have also been found to be more hospitable environments for 
entrants (Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes, 1995). Analysing exit provides a 
window into entrepreneurs' capabilities. However, high exit rates do not 
necessarily imply that entrepreneurs are low quality since entry begets exit 
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but it remains possible to judge whether exit rates are due to industry 
declines (Olley and Pakes, 1996) or other reasons such as increased 
competition from abroad (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006). 
The Darwinian selection of firms makes it difficult for entrants to succeed 
but the probability of success is neither uniform across entrants nor 
industries. The sunk costs of entry playa large part in that they shape the 
productivity distribution of the industry and, by extension, the competition 
within it (Asplund and Nocke, 2000; Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2002). 
Firms entering growing industries are also less likely to fail but the type of 
entrant also matters. 
Much of the theoretical literature starts with the underlying presumption 
that entry is through start-up but the way in which entry takes place is 
largely determined by market conditions and is not limited solely to start-
ups. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), in their study for US 
manufacturing, identify three modes of entry: 
a) The creation of a new plant 
b) A change in product mix produced by an existing plant 
c) Buying a plant from an existing producer in the same industry. 
An additional distinction not made by Dunne et al. (1988) is entry and exit 
by a firm from another industry (diversification). In his consideration of 
the definitional issues, Mueller (1991) distinguishes plant openings from 
firm openings and splits this fonner category into two: 
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a) Entry by a newly created finn 
b) Entry by an existing finn that builds a new plant in the industry. 
In addition to the domestic aspect, entry and exit by foreign finns also 
matters both in tenns of exporting and location. Often this process is not 
without its detractors. As outlined by Scheve and Slaughter (2004, 2007) 
and Rodrik (1991) increased globalisation is not always welcomed. For 
the United Kingdom Scheve and Slaughter (2004) find that owing to 
multinationals' more elastic labour demand schedules employees become 
more uncertain about their future employment prospects and less 
favourable towards globalisation.4 Market integration has also been 
blamed for the rise of greater inequality (Scheve and Slaughter, 2007). 
Recently Blinder (2007) has argued that the offshoring of tasks by firms 
may have profound implications upon employment of even the most 
skilled workers as finns look to reduce their production costs. 
However, entry by foreign finns introduces new products and ideas. This 
is perhaps best exemplified by the productivity improvements that have 
been found to occur through technological spillovers from multinationals 
to domestic finns. Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) identify movements of 
highly skilled staff from multinationals to domestic finns, arm's-length 
relationships through which domestic finns learn about superior 
production technologies and processes and competition from 
multinationals as the fundamental channels through which spillovers 
4 Robrik (1991) shows this theoretically. 
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occur. Although empirical evidence on spillover effects is mixed (Gorg 
and Strobl, 2001) some studies do find positive effects both through 
multinational presence and imports (Javorcik, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 
2003). Often imports and the goods sold by foreign firms increase the 
variety of goods available to consumers and capture market share at the 
expense of those produced domestically (Melitz, 2003, Bernard et aI., 
2003, Bernard et aI., 2007). This further source of competition also serves 
to discipline domestic firms and force them to raise their productivity or 
face decline and death. 5 
In the same way as entry does not simply entail start-up there are several 
means of exit other than closure. In their study of Swedish manufacturing 
firms Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller (2008) find that death is the least 
common mode of exit. Substantially more firms are found to switch 
industries in part due to import competition. This has also been found for 
the United States by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) who find that 
when confronted by low-wage imports firms switch into more capital 
intensive industries. In Sweden mergers and acquisitions are the most 
common form of exit accounting for approximately 56% of exits. There 
are reasons to believe that exit is not limited to these forms. At the same 
time as globalisation has stimulated the integration of world markets, 
production has become increasingly fragmented. This has led firms to 
S The lack of competition in economies that lay behind the Iron Curtain is one reason why 
companies located there struggled to compete with entrants after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Their products were shunned by the West with only double-decker trains, 
Rotldippchen Champagne and Caro Landkaffee among the few that gained market share 
post-1990. The success of the latter is peculiar given the uniform derision it receives 
throughout Germany. 
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outsource non-core activities (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996), or those that 
can be performed more cost effectively outside the firm, both domestically 
and abroad. The sustained fall in trade costs has also led to the rise of 
offshore production as firms look for further cost synergies. For example 
labour intensive tasks can be performed more cheaply in countries with 
large labour endowments which has resulted in UK manufacturers moving 
production of those goods abroad (Simpson, 2009). In both instances the 
decision of the firms to either outsource or offshore production has 
repercussions for plants in the domestic economy. There may be 
downsizing as activities that were previously performed inhouse are sub-
contracted to an outside firm or outright death. 
In most countries entrants play a large role in shaping the business 
environment. For example, between 15 and 20 per cent of all Canadian 
firms are 'small' (Baldwin, Beckstead and Girard, 2002). However, as 
demonstrated by changes in employment due to failure, entrants often face 
bleak survival prospects. Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes (1995) show that 
more than 20 per cent of Portuguese plants die during their first year and 
more than 50 per cent do not survive for 4 years. Only 30 per cent of the 
entering cohort survived for seven years. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 
(1989) report that 39.7% of new firms in the United States die before 
reaching their sixth birthday. In another Anglo-Saxon economy, the 
United Kingdom, Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003b) report that 65 per 
cent of entrants have exited after 5 years. The survival prospects of 
Canadian entrants are particularly low with between 5 and 6 per cent 
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surviving for 5 years. In their survey of 25 countries Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005) find that between 20 and 40 percent of 
entering firms fail within 2 years of life. Similar results have been found 
for other industrial economies which show that the hazard rate faced by 
this type of firm is higher than for older incumbents (Caves, 1998). Even 
when new plants have similar productivity compared with incumbents they 
face greater uncertainty in their evolution (Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 
1994). 
The role of dynamic adjustment in reallocating resources through the entry 
and exit of firms is a crucial element of the capitalist system. This 
turbulent process is thought to impact on industry productivity through 
increased competition leading to greater cost efficiency. It can also 
facilitate creative destruction whereby more innovative firms enter the 
market, replacing incumbent firms using current technologies. Through 
the chum process, firms and markets are thought to grow, resulting in 
increased employment, productivity and welfare. Understanding what 
drives entry and exit is therefore important since the underlying factors 
contribute indirectly to societal outcomes. 
Aims of the Thesis 
In this thesis we investigate the causes of entry and exit. In particular, we 
build on a recent strand of literature that deals with how globalisation 
affects entry and exit. For example, import competition from low-wage 
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countries (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006), trade liberalisation 
(Pavcnik, 2002), foreign direct investment (Yeaple, 2003) and intra-
industry trade (Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller, 2008) have been 
found to raise the probability that a plant will exit. Quantitative evidence 
on the role of these factors in determining entry is more limited but 
exporting opportunities (Melitz, 2003) and profits accruing from foreign 
direct investment (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004) are central to 
stimulating entry in recent theoretical models. However, it is not 
necessarily apparent that the same factors that cause plants to die will 
simultaneously foster entry. We build on this literature by considering 
how globalisation affects entry and exit. We consider three aspects of this 
broader question: the role of globalisation in causing exit in a cross-
country setting, the death of large multinational plants and the role of trade 
costs in shaping export decisions. 
The literature on globalisation and firm performance has generated a raft 
of stylised facts that have been shown to be robust in myriad countries (for 
a review see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007), but their reliance upon 
country-specific microdatasets is not without limitations.6 The World 
Bank's Doing Business (2010) report shows clear differences between 
countries in terms of starting and closing a business. The evidence in 
Figure 1.1 confirms that policy environments are important and that they 
shape firm creation and survival: even in the same sector (machinery and 
6 Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005) is an exception to this in that they use 
data on entry and exit rates from 2-digit sectors across 24 countries. However, their focus 
is primarily on the productivity effects of creative destruction and they do not use formal 
econometric techniques to explain the differences in entry and exit across countries and 
industries. 
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equipment) there are markedly different net entry rates across countries. 
In some countries the policy environment fosters more entry than exit. 
For others the opposite is true. 
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Figure 1.2 shows that there is more chum in the Anglo-Saxon economies 
relative to Switzerland, Sweden and other continental countries from 'old' 
Europe. Understanding why this is the case is important. If creative 
destruction is so crucial in causing productivity improvements, how can 
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the Swiss economy grow at similar rates as other Western countries 
despite having considerably lower entry and exit rates?7 
Chapter Two considers the role of globalisation in causing entry and exit 
across countries and industries between the years 1995-2005. Specific 
measures of globalisation have been found to cause exit and are a 
fundamental source of entry in theoretical models such as Melitz (2003), 
Helpman et al. (2004) and Bernard et al. (2007). In light of this 
globalisation may be seen to speed up the process of creative destruction, 
cause reallocations of output and affect aggregate productivity by 
eliminating the weakest firms through increased competition while 
affording the best with commercial opportunities beyond the country' s 
borders. 
Figure 1.3: Globalisation and Creative Destruction f1 the UK 
1-- Churning Rate -- 0 penness I 
7 The Swiss and wedi h economies tend to be open and con equently have a high share 
of exporters (80% of firm in Sweden according to Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller, 
2008). Since these flrm are con i tently found to he les likely to exit the countrie have 
a left truncation of their productivity distribution and lower rates of chum. 
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Source: Data on churning rates comes from the GEeD SBDS and Eurostat FEED 
datasets. Openness is defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports relative to 
GDP. This data is taken from the Penn World Tables version 6.3. 
Studies on finns and international trade have uncovered a profusion of 
stylised facts about how survival is related to exit. Characteristics of the 
plant, the finn it belongs to as well as the industry it operates in have been 
shown to be important detenninants of survival. A key advantage of the 
dataset employed in Chapter Two is that the cross-country dimension 
allows us to investigate how the aforementioned country-specific factors 
influence entry and exit. Consequently factors such as the size of 
government as well as institutional factors are considered. It is also 
possible to measure the role of globalisation in each process and to test its 
importance relative to country characteristics. We are able to discern the 
effect of globalisation as a whole using the Harris (1954) measure of 
globalisation and to evaluate the impact of globalisation on entry as well 
as exit. 
Another contribution of the work in Chapter Two is the analysis of 
globalisation's impact on entry and death over the short and long run 
which has been neglected in recent studies. Despite globalisation being 
found to influence chum it is unknown whether this effect is pennanent. 
As shown in Figure 1.3 globalisation has increased through time but the 
rate of chum in the United Kingdom has remained within a narrow range. 
Most other measures show increased interdependencies and market 
integration between countries through time but entry and exit rates have 
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remained fairly constant across countries. The chapter therefore sheds 
light on whether increases in competition as a result of more globalisation 
are temporary or sustained. 
Typically the business landscape in most developed countries tends to be 
populated by small firms. Within the European Union Eurostat (2001) 
estimates that 93% of the 19,370,000 non-primary enterprises listed were 
classified as being 'small' (that is, they employ less than 50 workers). 
Only 38,000 were deemed to be 'large' (more than 250 employees) and a 
further 160,000 were recorded as employing between 50 and 249 persons. 
Similar figures are reported for the United States (Scarpetta, Hemmings, 
Tressel and Woo, 2002). Another striking fact is the pre-eminence of 
single-plant firms. In the United Kingdom approximately 95% of 
manufacturing firms are single-plant operations (Kneller, Riegler and 
Upward, forthcoming). The comparable figures for the tradable and non-
tradable parts of the service sectors are 98.4% and 96%. However, the 
contribution single-plant firms make to aggregate output tends not to 
reflect their presence in the economy as a whole; for the UK the figure is 
reported to be 38%. For the United States Dunne et al. (1988) report 
figures that are more skewed towards multi-plant firms with these 
accounting for 85% of manufacturing output in 1982 despite comprising 
7.3% of the business population. 
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Figure 1.3: Proportion of Exiting firms that are Small 
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Figure 1.4 reveals that a significant population of exiting finns are • small' 
(defined as having less than 5 employees). In some countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Sweden and Luxembourg this pattern is more apparent 
than in others such as the United Kingdom and France. However, most 
visible and possibly damaging in terms output, employment and 
productivity is the death of large plants. Chapter Three addresses what 
causes the death of large plants using Japanese microdata. This approach 
is necessary since we focus upon the reasons why organisational design 
affects plant exit within multi-plant finns. 
We first investigate what causes the death of plants belonging to multi-
plant finns that only have operations within Japan and multinationals. 
Exit in the Japanese context contrasts markedly with other countries in 
that most exiting plants are large. Japan represents a unique setting in that 
49% of plants belong to a multi-plant finn. Their impact upon the 
economy is substantially greater than in other countries since they 
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contribute 77% of total output and a similarly disproportionate share of 
employment. The size of plants is dramatically different compared with 
other countries. The average continuing plant employs 227 workers while 
the average entering and exiting plants have 150 and 132 workers 
respectively. The country is therefore heavily dependent on large plants 
and those belonging to multi-plant firms, 78% of which belong to 
multinationals. Multiplant ownership has frequently been found to raise 
the probability a plant will die (Bernard and Jensen, 2007; Bandick, 2007; 
Kimura and Kiyota, 2006) but although widely recognised the reasons for 
this effect are far from understood. Lieberman (1990), for example, 
shows that larger multiplant firms are more likely to close plants in 
declining industries. Alternatively large diversified firms may encounter 
fewer agency problems when deciding upon plant closure, making their 
plants less likely to survive relative to standalone plants (Harrigan, 1980; 
Baden-Fuller, 1989). Related to this is the idea that strategic interactions 
within multi-plant firms may be the source of the higher failure rates. 
Where a multi-plant firm expands output or cuts price to improve the 
profit of one of its plants, it generates a negative externality for the other 
plants within the group (Sutton, 1997). 
In addition to this effect multinationals have been shown to be 'footloose' 
which raises the hazard rate further. They have often been perceived as 
having shallow roots in the host economy (Hood and Young, 1997); 
exemplified by their higher elasticity of demand for labour (Rodrik, 1997). 
The regularity of these findings has been impressive with results for 
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Sweden (Bandick, 2007), Japan (Kimura and Kiyota, 2006), Chile 
(Alvarez and Gorg, 2005) and the United States (Bernard and Jensen, 
2007) contributing to the idea of multinationals being 'footloose'. The 
loss of a large manufacturing plant has often been cited anecdotally as 
having an acute, localised impact associated with both deleterious 
economic and social consequences due to unemployment. 
Creative destruction is often ascribed a positive role since it causes 
productivity growth. This plays a key role in recent theoretical models of 
international trade such as Melitz (2003) where increased globalisation 
leads to more competition and forces the exit of the least productive firms. 
Aggregate productivity increases as the output these firms produced is 
reallocated towards more productive firms. However, where plants exit 
within multi-plant firms creative destruction may not be welfare 
enhancing. For example, a firm may decide to shutdown a plant because it 
is relatively unproductive relative to other plants within the group but if it 
is productive relative to the industry aggregate productivity will fall. In 
light of the consequences on both productivity and employment in the 
wake of multinational plant closure we study why multinationals are 
'footloose'. This contributes to the wider literature on globalisation which 
seeks to understand the role of multinationals in fostering productivity 
improvements and development. 
The recent empirical literature has heavily emphasised the role of firm 
productivity in determining internalisation status. The arguments in 
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favour of self-selection are most powerfully put by Bernard and Jensen 
(1999, 2004) whereby high productivity firms enter the export market 
because they are best equipped to cover the high fixed costs of entry. 
However, as shown by Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) there is a high degree 
of overlap between the productivity distributions of firms irrespective of 
their intemationalisation status. A potential explanation for this 
discrepancy is that trade costs affect goods differently: some goods are 
more affected by trade costs than others. 
In Chapter Four we investigate the role played by trade costs in shaping 
entry into foreign markets. Foreign firms are important since they 
introduce new ideas and products. The insights generated are fundamental 
to the broader question of creative destruction since export market 
opportunities have implications for entry and exit alike. Where bilateral 
trade costs are low firms can more easily enter export markets where they 
earn greater profits relative to selling in the domestic market (Melitz, 
2003; Bernard et aI., 2003; Helpman et aI., 2004). This stirs up 
competition in the foreign market as incumbents there must now compete 
for market share with domestic rivals and foreign firms. However, the 
opportunity to export also has repercussions for chum in the domestic 
market. Exporting raises the expected profits of entry which attracts new 
firms into the industry which in tum generates exit (Meltiz, 2003). 
Existing studies by Romalis (2004), Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) 
have shown that countries with large 'traditional' endowments tend to 
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specialise in producing goods that use them intensively. In Chapter Four 
we investigate whether trade costs can be viewed as an endowment in 
similar fashion. The analysis is conducted at the industry level owing to 
the predictions of theoretical models. The variation in trade costs across 
countries and trade cost intensity across industries is necessary since this 
provides variation in a way that would not be possible in a dataset 
confined to the domestic market. The work demonstrates that firm's entry 
into export markets may be affected by the both the trade cost endowment 
of the country as well as the trade cost intensity of the good it sells. 
As noted previously, the creation and destruction of firms has productivity 
implications accounting for as much as 35% of aggregate productivity 
growth in the United States over a five year period (Bernard and Jensen, 
2004). Chapter Five represents a departure from the previous chapters in 
that it looks at the consequences when the Schumpeterian process grinds 
to a halt. Japan's 'Lost Decade' constitutes a unique case study where this 
has taken place. The chapter attempts to answer several questions. In 
particular, the spotlight falls upon aggregate productivity growth; both in 
terms of the extent to which the low rates of entry and exit have 
contributed to this as well as whether productivity has been harmed by 
multinationals off shoring their best plants to low cost sites elsewhere. 
Given that we are able to utilise the large panel dataset covering the 
manufacturing sector, Japan's economic bedrock, described above in 
relation to Chapter Three, it is also possible to make inferences regarding 
the role of plant exit in causing and perpetuating other elements of the 
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long recession such as employment falls. Multinationals have been cited 
by the media as being culpable for the economic malaise despite their 
importance in generating economic growth during the post-WW2 epoch. 
Hence, we pay attention to the role they have played with regards to plant 
death and employment during the crisis. 
Generally, we find that globalisation causes entry and exit. However, 
upon further inspection the results are more nuanced. For example, 
market integration raises entry and survival prospects as well but only 
during the short run. Plants belonging to multinationals face higher 
hazard rates but when we analyse the process of closure within multi-plant 
multinational firms there is a residual effect of multinational ownership 
that insulates plants from death. Trade costs are found to affect entry into 
foreign markets but the effect is not uniform across firms: it depends upon 
the type of good the firm produces. We also find that the Schumpeterian 
process is influenced by institutional factors. For example, country-
specific factors such as the size of government and macroeconomic 
stability are found to have a much greater effect on churn relative to 
globalisation. In other cases institutions serve to mitigate the effect of 
globalisation: keiretsu networks are part of the reason why import 
penetration does not affect plant closure in Japan as in other countries. 
Finally, we conclude this thesis in Chapter Six which draws together the 
main results and insights. We also offer possible improvements to the 
methodologies and data as well as directions for future research. 
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1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 Theoretical Literature on Entry and Exit 
Before we can fully explore the causes of chum we need to consider the 
detenninants of entry. Standard neoclassical economic theory states that 
finns will enter a competitive industry in which positive profits act a signal 
for entry. The threat of competition drives finns in the industry to produce 
at the lowest point on their average cost curve, which then constrains long 
run profits to zero (Nicholson, 1989). This theory is based on the following 
assumptions: 
a) Rational preferences by individuals and finns 
b) Individuals choose to maximise utility and finns maximise 
profits 
c) People act independently of one another and have all relevant 
infonnation. 
In the real world, these assumptions are not always realistic. For example, 
markets may be incomplete with missing or inaccurate infonnation and/or 
there may be incentive problems. In addition, there may be increasing 
returns to scale, or natural monopoly conditions which favour one single 
finn to supply the market. In these circumstances, the assumption of a 
competitive equilibrium solution does not hold and perfect competition is 
unlikely to be reflective of the market structure. Given this, we have to 
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consider theories that move beyond the simple perfectly competitive 
framework and consider firm behaviour under imperfect conditions. 
Taking a macroeconomic perspective, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
Romer (1990) develop models of creative destruction that consider 
technological progress directly affecting economic growth. Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) show that monopoly profits motivate businesses to innovate 
(and make improvements in product quality) but this causes obsolescence 
of existing goods. Chum in the sense of creative destruction is then related 
to the amount of research and development (R&D) that is undertaken. 
'Too much' R&D can be a deterrent to new firm entry because monopoly 
profits are lost too quickly. This balance may be affected by government 
policy towards protecting intellectual property rights through patents, as 
these give firms a chance to eam profits from their innovations before the 
patent expires. 
Progress in research and development may be associated with higher 
demand for skilled labour and higher wages demanded by workers. This 
will reduce the profits derived from innovation and reduce the likelihood 
of businesses carrying out innovation. Where research projects are a 
choice between current costs and future benefits, the level of innovation 
will be sensitive to the interest rate (Romer 1990). Therefore, the 
macroeconomic environment directly affects the propensity for businesses 
to innovate, and will also affect the level of churn observed. 
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Consideration also needs to be given to business chum at the industry 
level. Chum is substantially detennined by product life cycle factors. 
Mature, traditional manufacturing industries have seen substantial 
contraction and downsizing in recent years, at the same time as major 
growth in the service sector. Thus we can see the importance of taking an 
industry perspective in the analysis of chum and its impact. 
A model of the relationship between (monopolistic) competition and 
product diversity developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) identifies the 
difference between market competitive solutions and socially optimum 
solutions. Innovation takes the fonn of diversifying products; firms create 
new ideas within an industry that reduce the profits of existing finns with 
old ideas (following Schumpeter, 1943). The model recognises that there 
is a trade-off between quantity and diversity, combining the benefits of 
scale economies (larger quantities of fewer goods) with the demand for 
variety of products which increases consumers' welfare. The competitive 
solution will be based on the profit criterion while achieving the socially 
optimal requires maximizing consumer welfare. 
Asplund and Nocke (2002) suggest that industry-specific characteristics 
(such as sunk costs and market size) offer causal explanations as to why 
some industries have higher firm turnover than others.8 Finn profits are 
dependent on market size, cost and their relative position in the industry 
distribution of costs. Entry decreases with the existence of sunk costs so 
8 This has shown to be the case empirically for Taiwan and Korea by Aw, Chung and 
Roberts (2002). 
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that once a finn has entered a market it will choose to remain if the value 
of investing for another period is greater than zero. Sunk costs are costs 
that are irrecoverable after entry such as specialised assets that have no 
alternative economic use. An increase in market size results in higher 
sales and profits for finns, but when associated with a wide distribution of 
finns, the least efficient finns (or those with highest costs) will have lower 
price cost margins and will exit. 
The level of concentration in an industry is also thought to have significant 
bearing on entry and exit decisions. Arnel and Liang (1992) suggest that 
market structure and concentration have an ambiguous effect on finn's 
decision to enter. This is because concentration will have a positive effect 
on new entry if high market concentration results in high observable 
profits, making the market look relatively attractive. On the other hand, a 
negative effect may be seen so that market concentration is accompanied 
by collusive behaviour of the incumbents which restricts new entry. Iffinn 
entry is declining with market concentration, this may indicate the 
existence of implicit barriers to entry and anti-competitive behaviour by 
the incumbent finns. 
When considering entry and exit at the industry level, the behaviour of 
existing finns in the market is crucial to the impact chum has on aggregate 
indicators such as employment and productivity growth. Incumbents are 
affected by new entry through an immediate effect on profits and also by 
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long run adjustments in finn behaviour and strategy in response to the 
increased competition (Hines 1957). 
Turning to finn level models of entry and exit, Jovanovic (1982) made an 
early contribution to the literature on finn entry and learning processes 
through his passive or learning by doing model. Jovanovic puts forward a 
model of 'noisy selection' where finns enter with incomplete infonnation 
about their efficiency and learn about their potential profitability from 
realised profits. Uncertainty is recognised as occurring at the individual 
level but not at the aggregate level. That is, all finns know output prices 
and the equilibrium product price but not their own productivity 
capabilities and cost functions. In this model, finns fail when they are not 
efficient enough to maintain positive profits. Within an industry, finns 
differ in size because some are more efficient than others. The Jovanovic 
model predicts that finn size and concentration are positively related to 
rates of return and that the correlation over time of rates of return is higher 
for larger finns and in concentrated industries. 
Developing from the Jovanovic model, Ericsson and Pakes (1995) put 
forward the active learning model, whereby the finn explores actively the 
economic environment and makes investment decisions to increase its 
capability to earn profits under competitive pressure from both within and 
outside an industry. A finn's potential and actual profitability changes 
over time in response to unpredictable outcomes generated by the finn's 
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own investment and those of other firms in the market. Firms will grow if 
they are successful but will shrink and/or exit if unsuccessful. 
In these firm-level models of learning (Jovanovic 1982; Ericsson and 
Pakes 1995), exit rates are related to the age of the firm. Young firms are 
less familiar with their attributes and capabilities, and so it is more likely 
that learning about the cost structure will induce exit. Hazard rates, which 
calculate the probability of exit, will be lower for older and larger firms 
(Hopenhayn 1992). These selection models predict that the size and the 
age of a plant will determine the failure and growth rate distribution. In 
these models, firms are assumed to be single plant establishments and the 
relationship between survival and size or age may be different for already 
established firms seeking to diversify. Firms can however benefit from 
experiences in other establishments or other lines of products, and do not 
have to rely completely on learning from the market (Disney, Haskel and 
Heden 2003b). 
Following the empirical insights of Bernard and Jensen (1995) there has 
been a proliferation of theoretical models that have built upon the existing 
literature on firm entry and exit. However, the departure between these 
models and those outlined above is that they incorporate measures of 
globalisation. The framework in Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) 
rely heavily upon the monopolistic trade model of Krugman (1979) but 
incorporate the idea of firm heterogeneity which has been prevalent in 
industrial organisation circles (see for example Hopenhayn, 1992). The 
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insights produced by these models have aligned many of the stylised facts 
generated by recent empirical investigations. Exporting raises the 
expected profits of entry but also intensifies competition within the 
industry and makes survival more difficult. Extensions of the models 
have shown similar effects for other forms of globalisation such as foreign 
direct investment (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). 
1.1.2 Empirical Literature on Entry and Exit 
Extensive empirical research on entry and exit has blossomed since the 
late 1980s. This is chiefly due to the emergence oflarge microdatasets and 
advancements in computing technology. In this short time span however 
the literature has grown and produced many stylised facts which have been 
shown to hold regardless of the country context. 
The plants and firms found to be most vulnerable to exit tend to be small 
(Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989a; Schwalbach, 1991; Disney, 
Haskel and Heden, 2003b; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2005; 
Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes, 1995), old (Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson, 1989a) and have low productivity (Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Krizan, 2002). As predicted by theoretical models sunk costs are also 
found to exert a key influence. Kessides (1991) shows that sunk costs 
stifle competition as entrants are less able to challenge incumbents. In a 
more rigorous study Aw, Chung and Roberts (2002) examine how sunk 
costs influence the productivity distribution of an industry. They find that 
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Korean manufacturing sectors typically have higher entry barriers relative 
to Taiwan. Consequently incumbents are subjected to less intense 
competition and there is greater variance in Korean productivity than in 
Taiwan. 
It has also been recognised that in addition to plant characteristics, the 
ownership structure of the firm that plant belongs to affects plant survival. 
Multiplant ownership has been found to affect the probability of plant 
death (Bernard and Jensen, 2007; Bernard and Wagner, 2001). The 
reasons behind the ownership effect are far from understood. Lieberman 
(1990), for example, shows that larger multiplant firms are more likely to 
close plants in declining industries. Alternatively large diversified firms 
may encounter fewer agency problems when deciding upon plant closure, 
making their plants less likely to survive relative to standalone plants 
(Harrigan, 1980; Baden-Fuller, 1989). Related to this is the idea that 
strategic interactions within multi-plant firms may be the source of the 
higher failure rates. Where multi-plant firms expand output or cuts price 
to improve the profit of one of its plants, it generates a negative externality 
for the other plants within the group (Sutton, 1997). 
Recently there has been an explosion of research on entry and exit related 
to international trade. As with the previous revolution in international 
trade this was prompted by empirical insights. Bernard and Jensen (1995) 
drew attention to the fact that contrary to existing models of international 
trade there were clear differences between exporters and non-exporting 
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finns. A wave of studies have attempted to discern whether 
internationalisation status affects finn and plant survival as well as what 
detennines entry and exit into export markets. 
Exporting has been found to lower the probability that a finn will die (for a 
review see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). This is attributed to exporting 
finns being, on average, more productive relative to non-exporters. 
Similar evidence has accrued which shows firms that undertake foreign 
direct investment are also less vulnerable to death. However, while there 
is a clear ordering of productivity according to internationalisation status 
there is a high degree of overlap of the productivity distributions of 
domestic-only finns, exporters and those engaging in foreign direct 
investment (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). This indicates that 
internationalisation status may be capturing unobservable factors such as 
managerial quality or that there are firm-specific exporting sunk costs. 
Enquiries have also been made into how other measures of globalisation 
affect firm survival. The firm's import status for example has been found 
to act in a similar manner to exporting status (Castellani, Serti and Tomasi, 
2008; Muuls and Pisu, 2009). However, more attention has been focussed 
on various aspects of globalisation. Generally integration has been shown 
to raise the probability of failure since it generates more competition with 
trade liberalisation (Pavcnik, 2002), low-wage imports (Bernard, Jensen 
and Schott, 2006) and intra-industry trade (Greenaway, Gullstrand and 
Kneller, 2008) found to raise hazard rates. Multinational ownership has 
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also been shown to affect plant death. Numerous reasons for this effect 
have been proposed but most centre upon the idea that multinational firms 
have shallow roots in the host economy and are willing to relocate 
production elsewhere should the costs of production be lower (Hood and 
Young, 1997). Taxation has been proposed by Devereux and Griffith 
(1998) as a possible explanation of multinationals' location decisions. 
Overall the literature has established many stylised facts. Exiting plants 
tend to be small and generally have low productivity relative to incumbent 
firms. Ownership has also been shown to affect survival though there is a 
lack of consensus on the direction of the effect with respect to multiplant 
ownership. On the other hand firms that are engaged in foreign markets 
tend to have a lower likelihood of exit which in part reflects their 
productivity advantages that enable them to enter these markets. Finally 
globalisation has been identified as raising the hazard rate a plant or firm 
faces through increasing competition for market share 
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Chapter Two 
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Entrepreneurship Dynamics, Market Size 
and Country-Specific Factors 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent theoretical models of heterogenous firms and international trade 
such as Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) make 
predictions about how trade liberalisation affects firm entry and survival. 
Empirical evidence has frequently shown myriad measures of 
globalisation to reduce the probability that a firm will survive. For 
example, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) find that imports from low-
wage countries raise the probability that a U.S. manufacturing plant will 
die. Similar results are found for Sweden by Greenaway, Gullstrand and 
Kneller (2008) using aggregate imports. Other forms of globalisation such 
as trade liberalisation (Pavcnik, 2002), foreign direct investment (Yeaple, 
2003) and intra-industry trade (Greenaway, Kneller and Gullstrand, 2008) 
have also been shown to impact upon survival. 
A feature of existing studies has been the use of country-specific datasets. 
However, the World Bank's doing business report shows clear differences 
in the ease of opening and closing a business according to where it is 
located. The evidence in Figure 2.1 illustrates the profound impact that 
policy environments may have on entry and exit rates. For example, the 
policy environments in New Zealand, Germany and Lithuania foster 
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approximately 3% more entry relative to the U.S. while firms located in 
Belgium are 3% more vulnerable to death. The figure also shows that 
globalisation (measured as market access) appears to playa muted role 
relative to country-specific factors. 
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Notes: Entry and exit are calculated as the coefficient on the country dummy in Table 2.4. 
MA entry and MA exit refer to the coefficient estimate on the interaction between market 
access and the country dummies in Table 2.4. All coefficient estimates are measured 
relative to the United States. 
Using a unique dataset that draws observations from 29 industries across 
21 DEeD countries this chapter addresses the extent to which 
globalisation influences the process of creative destruction. In contrast to 
previous studies we construct a measure that captures both the 
opportunities and threats of globalisation. We find that globalisation has a 
positive effect on net entry rates but only in the short run. Moreover, the 
effect is small and confined to service sectors. However, industries with a 
comparative advantage in exporting and the production of value added 
goods have significantly higher net entry rates. 
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When country-specific variables are included in the model we find that 
government intervention reduces the incentive to enter and makes it more 
difficult for incumbents to survive. Sound monetary policy is found to 
cause net entry by providing entrepreneurs with stable economic 
environments to form profit expectations. Despite the inclusion of such 
broad measures, the country fixed effects remain large which suggests that 
a number of omitted country-level factors are important determinants of 
firm creation and death. Industry characteristics such as human capital 
intensity and ICT expenditure per worker have little impact on the results. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we outline the dataset and 
present descriptive statistics on the rate of chum across countries and 
industries. Section 2.3 provides formal econometric analysis on the role 
of globalisation in affecting entry and exit rates, the source through which 
this is mitigated and the extent to which globalisation influences different 
sectors and countries. Section 2.4 considers how country factors affect 
entry and exit rates and Section 2.5 addresses industry characteristics. 
Conclusions are drawn in Section 2.6. 
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2.2 Data Description 
Two separate cross-country, cross-industry and cross-time datasets have 
been used to construct measures of chuming9: the OECD Structural and 
Demographic Business Statistics Database (SDBS) and the Eurostat Firm 
Entry and Exit Data Dimensions dataset (FEED). We have information on 
entry and exit rates for 21 countries across both manufacturing and service 
sectors. Studies of firm entry and exit customarily focus on a single 
country. Colantone and Sleuwaegen (2008) represents a departure from 
this in that they address entry and exit in nine European Union countries. 
In contrast to that study we include both manufacturing and service sectors 
for a wider range of countries, use a measure of globalisation that 
incorporates outward and inward components and use an econometric 
framework that includes both short- and long-run components. 
A list of the countries and years during which they are present in each of 
the datasets is provided in Table 2.1. Observations are also separated 
according to whether entry and exit data is available for both 
manufacturing and services. Across the datasets all countries are listed as 
having data for the manufacturing sector and 17 for services. In the 
manufacturing sector 12 have information in each of the main datasets 
while for service industries, 17 countries have data available for the 
SBDS. 
9 Churning is defined as the sum of the entry and exit rates. 
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The time spans during which churning data is available differs 
substantially by country. For example, there are only two years of Belgian 
data are available in SOBS (1998 & 1999) and New Zealand only appears 
for 2002 in both datasets. In contrast Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom are present between 1998 and 2005 in both datasets and the 
United States features from 1995 until 2004. We pool the data across the 
datasets to provide the longest possible time series and to maximise the 
country and sectoral coverage. This appears possible for the SDBS and 
Eurostat FEED datasets since the correlation between entry and exit in the 
two is 99.92 percent. Combining the data means we can extend the 
coverage to 21 countries and include the service sector. 
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Table 2.1: Countries in the Data Sets 
Manufacturing Services 
Country/Data set DECO E.Stat DECO E.Stat 
SOBS FEED SOBS FEED 
Belgium 98-99 98-99 
Czech Republic 01- 01- 01-
Estonia 00-05 
Finland 98-04 98-04 98-04 
France 03- 03- 03-
Germany 00-02 
Hungary 00-04 00-05 00-04 
Italy 98-04 98-05 98-04 
Latvia 00-05 
Lithuania 00-02 
Luxembourg 98-04 98-04 98-04 
Netherlands 00-04 99-04 00-04 
New Zealand 02- 02-
Norway 99-01 99-01 
Portugal 98-04 98-05 98-04 
Slovakia 00-04 00-04 00-04 
Slovenia 00-04 00-05 00-04 
Spain 98-05 98-05 98-05 
Sweden 98-05 98-05 98-05 
United Kingdom 98-05 98-05 98-05 
United States 95-04 95-04 
2.2.1 Summary Statistics - Churning Rates 
Figure 2.2: Average Churning Rates Across Countries 
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Figure 2.2 displays information on the average rate of churn for countries 
in the merged dataset. Although there are differences in churning across 
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industries and years there is a clear country dimension. The churning rates 
lie in the range 11.02% (Sweden) to 21.23% (United Kingdom). To 
provide some perspective on these figures, assuming equal balance 
between entry and exit, at a rate of churn of 11 per cent per annum it 
would take 6.3 years before half of an initial stock of firms would have 
exited the market (the remainder of the industry being made up of new 
firms that replaced them). At a rate of churn of 21.23 per cent the half-life 
of the initial cohort of firms is just over 3 years. The opportunities and 
threats of entrepreneurship differ markedly across countries with some 
offering better survival prospects than others. 
A pattern in the country churning rates is that the transition economies 
from Central and Easter Europe tend to have higher rates of chum than 
established OECD members. In Figure 2.2 the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Latvia feature among the group of countries with the highest churning 
rates though they are notably lower than the Anglo-Saxon economies. A 
possible explanation for this is that countries which have been engaged in 
world markets for longer have already undergone a period of. Those with 
the lowest include Sweden and Slovenia. A potential explanation for why 
small, open integrated economies such as these have lower churning rates 
is that their productivity distributions are left truncated. to Under these 
circumstances a high percentage of firms export. The survival rate of 
exporting firms has been shown to be higher than for non-exporters 
10 According to the Penn World Tables version 6.3 for 2005 openness in theses countries 
(defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP) 126.63 (Slovenia) and 89.73 
(Sweden). 
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meaning that churning rates will be lower in such countries (Bernard and 
Jensen, 1997; Wagner, 2005). Given the size advantage of exporters this 
may lead to a lower industry-level chum rate because they gain a first 
mover advantage in response to market opportunities similar to what 
Appelbaoum and Katz (1996) describe in oligopolistic sectors. This is 
considerably different to what Melitz (2003) would predict. In that model 
industry-level rates of churning would not change following an increase in 
market size (through access to foreign markets) because the probability of 
exiting is exogenous. However, as the empirical literature has 
demonstrated the probability of exit is shaped to a large degree by firm 
characteristics (Dunn et aI., 1988). Recent evidence shows that exporters 
are significantly less susceptible to exit meaning that where self-selection 
into export markets occurs the reduction in trade costs in Melitz (2003) 
could lead to a lower rate of chum due to a greater share of exporting 
firms within the industry. 
The country churning rates mask substantial variation across industries 
within the country. For example, an Italian industry has a churning rate of 
1.28 percent while the highest, at 57 percent, comes from Latvia. These 
are equivalent to half-lives of 108 and 2.4 years for the initial stock of 
firms. In Table 2.2 we present data on the average rate of chum according 
to country and broad 2-digit sector definitions. A general observation 
would be that for all countries for which manufacturing and service sector 
data is available, churning rates are higher for services. A t-test of the 
48 
mean manufacturing and service sector rates of churn confirms this with 
services having significantly higher values. 
Table 2.2: Average Rate of Churn by Country - Manufacturing and Service Sectors 
Count ISector Manufacturin Services 
Belgium 10.57 17.63 
Czech Republic 16.82 21.49 
Estonia 15.95 
Finland 10.69 15.12 
France 11.08 17.18 
Germany 14.77 24.22 
Hungary 14.51 22.99 
Italy 11.15 17.25 
Latvia 18.48 
Lithuania 17.06 
Luxembourg 10.58 21.92 
Netherlands 11.75 19.74 
New Zealand 14.52 25.09 
Norway 12.09 21.92 
Portugal 13.2 15.91 
Slovakia 15.94 19.87 
Slovenia 9.65 15.52 
Spain 12.55 16.9 
Sweden 9.29 12.22 
UK 18.19 23.37 
US 17.82 22.16 
In some countries the gap in churning rates between manufacturing and 
services is pronounced. The largest is for New Zealand where the gap is 
10.57 percent per annum. This implies a half-life of 4.77 years for 
manufacturing firms compared with 2.76 years in services within New 
Zealand. Portugal records the smallest difference with an annual gap of 
2.71 percent. The manufacturing sector is often perceived to be more 
exposed to global competition with imports often being found to decrease 
the probability of survival (see Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006; 
Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller, 2008) while exporting opportunities 
provide entry incentives. However, the differences in churning rates 
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reflect differences in the sunk costs of entry. Despite lacking formal 
evidence these are generally believed to be lower in services than for 
manufacturing industries making it easier for prospective entrants to 
participate in the market. Consequently there is a higher degree of 
competition as a greater number of firms compete for market share. As 
each firm's share of the market falls survival becomes more difficult and 
exit rates increase. 
Figure 2.3: Average Rate of Net Entry 
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A second fact that emerges is that most countries have consistently higher 
levels of net entry (defined as gross entry minus gross exit). Melitz (2003) 
predicts that entry and exit should offset one another in the steady state. 
However, with the exception of the Netherlands, all countries in the 
dataset record varying degrees of net entry. In some instances such as the 
UK and Germany this is marginal but twelve countries have net entry rates 
exceeding 1 percent per annum. The highest rate of net entry is 3.05 
percent per annum for Norway. A potential explanation of the persistently 
positive net entry rates is that these countries have witnessed increasing 
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market size, either domestically or abroad, or that they have been subject 
to similar business cycle conditions. 
Contrary to the predictions of models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
market size (measured using ODP) appears to have little influence on 
churning rates. That paper predicts that larger markets attract more entry 
and subsequently have higher exit rates. However, despite being of 
roughly similar size the United Kingdom and France have substantially 
different churning rates. The United Kingdom also has a similar rate of 
churn despite being smaller and less wealthy than the United States. 
Similar discrepancies are borne out in Table 2.3 with New Zealand 
recording an almost identical rate of chum with the United States in spite 
of its market size being several orders of magnitude smaller. In later 
sections we investigate the role of country-specific factors in shaping 
churning rates. 
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Table 2.3: Market Size and the Average Rate of Churn 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
New Zealand 
Hungary 
Finland 
Norway 
Czech Republic 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Italy 
UK 
France 
Germany 
US 
Churning GDP 
15.95 
18.48 
17.46 
17.06 
12.83 
18.25 
20.72 
13.29 
18.8 
19.56 
14.68 
17.91 
11.02 
14.93 
16.08 
15.04 
14.5 
14.36 
21.23 
19.49 
20.14 
21.06 
27.75 
33.37 
44.87 
45.96 
80.03 
99.39 
155.46 
162.28 
198.89 
206.69 
209.88 
275.97 
329.07 
535.51 
1175.97 
1614.97 
1810.55 
1829.91 
2435.66 
12376.2 
Note: GDP data comes from Penn World Tables 6.3 and is defined as 
billions of u.s. dollars in 2005 prices. 
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Figure 2.5: Average Rate of Net Entry across Industries 
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Earlier we highlighted differences between churning rates in broadly 
defined manufacturing and service sectors. In Figures 2.4 and 2.5 we 
present evidence on the rate of chum and net entry in each 2-digit industry 
in the dataset. There are clear differences between entry and exit in each 
sector with churning ranging between 11.3 percent per annum in the paper 
industry to 29.4 percent for post and telecommunications. Another 
observation would be that service sectors dominate the upper end of the 
distribution. From Figure 2.5 we can see that this is due to net entry. 
Manufacturing sectors record significantly lower rates of chum with 
leather, textiles, wood and the food industry experiencing net exit. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that competition from low-wage countries 
has played a large role in causing these declines, particularly for leather 
and textile sectors. The only service sector that records net exit is retail 
though the annual rate of net exit is low at 0.11 percent. 
2.3 Regression Results 
In this section we develop the analysis to control for a range of 
entrepreneurial determinants. To reflect the possibility that these 
determinants may have different effects in the short and long run we 
specify the regression equation to allow for this. Specifically we estimate 
an error correction model of the following form 
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where Yijl is the rate of entry (exit) in industry i of country j at time t, Xijl 
represents a vector of explanatory variables and Uijl is a random error term. 
The long run effects are given by the parameter vector P2 while f33 
captures short run effects. To control for time invariant country and 
industry factors we include country and industry fixed effects denoted by 
rp; and rp j. We control for business cycle effects that are common to all 
industries through time fixed effects denoted rpt. The use of an error 
correction model is also valid given that Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
argue for different effects in the short and long run. 
One of the central assumptions underlying theoretical models such as 
Melitz (2003), and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) is that in the 
steady-state entry and exit rates move together. To test for this we 
estimate equation (2.1) for entry controlling for lagged exit. To test the 
hypothesis we then test whether the long run parameter on exit (p2/1 - PI) 
is equal to I. The coefficient estimates in regression 1 of Table 2.4 
(below) show the long run parameter to be 0.12. An F-test decisively 
rejects the hypothesis that this is equal to I [F(I, 2272) = 555.84, p-
value=O.OO].11 The main implication of this result is that entry and exit 
rates are not equal over the long run. Rather, as the descriptive statistics 
show, there is net entry which may arise through increases in market size. 
Consequently, regressions using churning rates, as suggested by 
II We reach a similar conclusion when exit is used as the dependent variable. In that case 
the test statistic is 1018.06 (p-value = 0.00). 
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theoretical models, would be inappropriate and we report regressions of 
entry and exit alongside those of net entry to ascertain long-run effects. 
2.3.1 Market Access, Entry and Exit 
The key variable of interest in our regressions is market access. This is 
measured following Harris (1954). This yields a measure of market size 
which weights the sum of domestic and foreign market size where the 
distance between the countries provides the weights. Large countries, or 
those situated in close proximity to large markets, have a greater number 
of consumers to sell their goods too. However, they also offer better 
survival prospects to foreign competitor firms. Market access therefore 
captures both the opportunities and threats globalisation offers. According 
to this measure Belgium and the Netherlands rank as the countries with 
access to the largest markets due to their proximity with considerably 
larger economies while New Zealand is the least. 
Results for the baseline regressions of entry, exit and net entry are 
reported in Table 2.4. Market access is found to only affect these over the 
short run. A one standard deviation increase in market access is found to 
cause a 0.64 percentage point increase in entry and a 0.16 percentage point 
decline in the exit rate. These results resemble those found elsewhere in 
the theoretical literature: improved access to foreign markets raise 
expected profits and cause entry (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; 
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Globalisation is also found to ameliorate the 
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likelihood of death, at least in the short-run. The empirical literature has 
frequently found that measures of globalisation such as import penetration 
(Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006), intra-industry trade (Greenaway, 
Gullstrand and Kneller, 2008) and trade liberalisation (Pavcnik, 2002) 
raise the probability that a plant or firm will die. A possible explanation 
for the differences between those and our findings is that traditional 
globalisation measures predominantly capture the threats of foreign 
competition while our market access measure also incorporates exporting 
opportunities. In regression 3 we constrain the model to investigate net 
entry. This allows us to study the long-run predictions of theoretical 
models of heterogenous firms in international trade. 
Although a positive and significant correlation is found between market 
access and net entry over short-run horizons there is no effect in the long 
run. This confirms what theory predicts: in the steady state entry and exit 
are equal. Indeed this result is not entirely surprising. Anecdotal 
evidence, and most measures of globalisation, suggests that market 
integration has been increasing through time while entry and exit rates 
however have remained fairly constant. In regressions 4 to 6 of Table 2.4 
we consider how import penetration and intra-industry trade, traditional 
measures of globalisation, perform relative to our market access variable. 
Owing to data limitations we are forced to use a considerably smaller 
dataset but in no instance do we find a significant correlation between 
these and the dependent variables. 
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Table 2.4: Base Regressions for Entrepreneurship and Globalisation 
Indicator 2 3 4 5 6 
Ent Exit Extt Net Ent 
Long run effect of .26 .12 .11 
Market Access (1.40) (.88) (1.08) 
Short run effect of 3.84** -2.75** .07*** 
Market Access (2.45) (-2.08) (2.85) 
Long run effect of .00 .00 -.00 
Import Penetration (.01) (.24) (-.17) 
Short run effect of .00 -.01 .01 
Import Penetration (.42) (-1.22) (1.09) 
Long run effect of .00 .00 .00 
Intra-Industry Trade (.32) (.32) (.02) 
Short run effect of -.01 -.02 .01 
Intra-Industry Trade (-.60) (-1.16) (.39) 
Lagged entry -.50*** .31*** -.26*** .04 
(-8.91 ) (8.94) (-3.79) (.86) 
Lagged extt .47*** -.44*** -.01 -.31*** 
(4.82) (-9.81) (-.14) (-6.20) 
Change in exit .29*** .02 
(3.75) (.23) 
Change in entry .14*** .02 
(5.16) (.22) 
Lagged net entry -.68*** -.29*** 
(-13.14) (-4.12) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 2382 2382 2334 523 523 523 
R2 
.32 .27 .39 .42 .33 0.31 
Notes: ., •• and ••• indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. All equations are estimated using OLS. 
However, these effects are small, especially when one considers that the 
average entry and exit rates over the sample are 9.31% and 8.02% 
respectively. The standardised coefficient of 0.06 implies that raising 
market access by one standard deviation (equivalent to increasing it from 
the U.S. level (4.2) to the level in the Netherlands (6.0» would have 
essentially no effect on the rate of entry. Indeed such large changes in 
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market access are rare in the data. In fact the average increase in market 
access across the sample is approximately 8%. There are some notable 
instances such as Slovenia, Hungary, Portugal and Italy where market 
access does increase by a value close to one standard deviation. 12 In Table 
2.5 we compute the implied change in entry and exit using the results in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 and the observed change in each country's 
market access. The effects tend to be small with an average increase in 
the entry rate of 0.216 percentage points and a decrease of 0.194 
percentage points for exit. Even for the most extreme case, Italy, the 
effect is small at 1.262 percentage points for entry and -1.13 for exit. 
12 The reason for the perceived decline in market access in the Netherlands is due to 
service sectors entering the sample in 2000. For the Netherlands these sectors are less 
globalised than Dutch manufacturing industries. When we look at the period 2000-04 
market access increases by 0.024 percent of a standard deviation in the Netherlands 
implying a minute increase in entry and exit. 
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Table 2.5: Market Access through time and Implied Change in Churning 
First Year Last Year Change in Implied Change Implied Change 
Country Year MA Year MA MA in Entry in Exit 
Netherlands 1999 7.224 2004 5.976 -1.248 -0.691 0.619 
New Zealand 2002 1.897 2003 1.822 -0.075 -0.041 0.037 
Latvia 2000 6.204 2005 6.146 -0.058 -0.032 0.029 
Estonia 2001 6.311 2005 6.254 -0.057 -0.032 0.028 
Lithuania 2000 6.179 2002 6.144 -0.036 -0.020 0.018 
Germany 2003 5.891 2005 5.929 0.038 0.021 -0.019 
Belgium 1998 5.810 1999 5.868 0.059 0.033 -0.029 
Czech Rep. 2001 4.928 2004 4.990 0.062 0.034 -0.031 
Slovakia 2000 5.035 2004 5.102 0.067 0.037 -0.033 
France 2003 5.524 2005 5.632 0.108 0.060 -0.054 
Sweden 1998 4.385 2005 4.512 0.127 0.070 -0.063 
Finland 1998 4.147 2004 4.335 0.189 0.105 -0.094 
UK 1998 5.408 2005 5.618 0.210 0.116 -0.104 
Luxembourg 1998 5.635 2004 5.858 0.223 0.124 -0.111 
Spain 1998 4.516 2005 4.769 0.253 0.140 -0.125 
Norway 1999 3.951 2001 4.227 0.276 0.153 -0.137 
US 1995 4.035 2004 4.343 0.308 0.170 -0.152 
Slovenia 2004 4.783 2005 6.512 1.730 0.958 -0.857 
Hungary 2000 4.596 2005 6.399 1.804 0.999 -0.894 
Portugal 1998 4.232 2005 6.174 1.942 1.075 -0.962 
Italy 1998 4.357 2005 6.636 2.279 1.262 -1.130 
Average 5.002 5.393 0.390 0.216 -0.194 
Note: The figures reported for the implied changes in entry and exit are calculated using 
standardised coefficients from regressions 1 and 2 in Table 2.4. They therefore constitute 
percentage point estimates. 
The literature on finn heterogeneity has shown that a finn's reaction to 
globalisation may depend on its source or nature (for a review of this 
literature see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). For example, imports from 
low-wage countries are found to have a greater impact on finn death in the 
United States than imports from more developed countries (Bernard, 
Redding and Schott, 2006). Swedish finns are found to be more likely to 
switch industries when they are foreign owned (Greenaway, Gullstrand 
and Kneller, 2008). A key question then is how the source of access to 
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markets affects finn entry and survival. For example, if export profits are 
relatively larger than those earned in domestic markets an increase in 
foreign market access may stimulate more entry. Equivalently where 
foreign finns are more productive than domestic rivals then increased 
competition from abroad may cause more exit than an equal increase in 
the domestic market. A unique feature of our globalisation measure is that 
it can be dis aggregated into domestic and foreign components to assess 
whether the source of market access has differential effects. The data 
reveal that domestic market access has grown at an average annual rate of 
4.1 % compared with 2.3% for foreign market access over the sample. 
We can then discern whether access to the foreign or domestic market 
underlie the results in Table 2.4. The results in Table 2.6 suggest that 
while access to foreign markets has grown more slowly, trading in these 
markets is more lucrative than selling domestically. In columns 2 and 3 a 
one standard deviation increase in foreign market access raises the short-
run entry rate by 0.16 and 0.23 percentage points respectively. 
Conditional upon domestic market access, access to foreign markets has 
no effect on the exit rate. In none of the regressions do we find that 
domestic markets affect the birth or death of finns. The results suggest 
that the expected value of exporting is responsible for attracting entrants. 
However, the small magnitude of the effect may indicate that only the 
'better' (or more productive) finns are drawn in since they are most likely 
to succeed in overcoming the fixed costs of internationalisation. 
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Table 2.6: Domestic and Foreign Market Access 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sample All All All All All All 
Indicator Exit Exit Exit 
Long run effect of .07 .09 -.00 -.05 
Domestic Market Access (.58) (.67) (-.02) (-.35) 
Short run effect of 1.04 .91 .50 .54 
Domestic Market Access (.88) (.75) (.55) (.60) 
Long run effect of .02 -.14 .16 .31 
Foreign Market Access (.08) (-.52) (.92) (1.38) 
Short run effect of 2.85* 4.00** -3.13** -1.49 
Foreign Market Access (1.80) (2.56) (-2.17) (-1.17) 
Lagged entry -.46*** -.50*** -.47*** .29*** .31*** .29*** 
(-7.23) (-8.88) (-7.27) (7.87) (8.99) (7.88) 
Lagged exit .43*** .47*** .44*" -.42*** -.44*** -.42"* 
(4.26) (4.81 ) (4.26) (-8.61 ) (-9.82) (-8.62) 
Change in entry .11*** .14*" .11"* 
(3.42) (5.16) (3.45) 
Change in exit .23** .29*** .23** 
(2.56) (3.75) (2.57) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 2115 2382 2115 2115 2382 2115 
R2 
.29 .31 .29 .28 .27 .28 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. All equations are estimated using OLS. 
The raw data reveals that manufacturing industries are approximately 
twice as 'globalised' relative to services. To investigate the extent to 
which the source of competition drive the results in Table 2.6 we split 
market access into domestic and foreign components. The results reported 
in Appendix Table A2.1 point towards foreign market access tending to be 
more important in affecting entry and exit across the sectors. For services 
foreign market access is estimated to raise the exit rate by 1.68% over the 
long-run. However, during the short run foreign market access increases 
63 
entry rates by 4.4% while the value for domestic market access is 
approximately half this. A potential explanation for this could be that the 
short-run effects are capturing the entry of domestic firms attracted by 
foreign market opportunities as well as entry by foreign competitors. 
Through time sorting occurs leading only the best firms to remain. During 
this period they capture market share from weaker competitors leading the 
latter to exit. In contrast opportunities in foreign markets lead to entry in 
manufacturing over both horizons but in each instance the results are only 
weakly significant. 
We next test the robustness of the results to splitting the sample into 
manufacturing and service sectors and re-run the entry and exit 
regressions. We find that there is some sensitivity of the results across the 
sectors. For example, market access increases exit in manufacturing 
industries over the long run but no effect is found for service sectors. In 
the short run more globalisation causes more entry but fewer exits in 
services. 
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Table 2.7: Entry and Exit in Maniuacturing and Service Sectors 
2 3 4 5 6 
Sample Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services Manufacturing 
Indicator En Exit Ent ExH Net En 
Long run effect of .39 .68* .45* -.07 -.20 .48 
Market Access (.91) (1.84) (1.71) (-.45) (-.35) (1.58) 
Short run effect of 2.99 -1.37 4.55** -3.28* 3.71 5.90*** 
Market Access (1.38) (-.69) (2.31) (-1.85) (1.26) (2.66) 
Lagged entry -.80'" .16*** -.44*** .29*** 
(-9.41) (3.23) (-9.03) (6.03) 
Lagged exH .10 -.71*** .41*** -.41-
(1.30) (-11.57) (4.52) (-6.48) 
Change in exit .21* .18" 
(1.70) (2.26) 
Change in entry .09" .10" 
(2.58) (2.17) 
Lagged net entry -.81*** -.63*** 
(-8.67) (-11.97) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1115 1115 1267 1267 1091 1243 
~ ~ .44 .40 .33 .26 .42 .39 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. All equations are estimated using OLS. 
Over time the market access variable grows at different rates in both the 
cross-country and cross-industry dimensions_ For example, the emergence 
of the Eastern European bloc has resulted in rapid integration with the 
world economy_ In contrast the western European countries were already 
highly globalised. The effect of different rates of integration would be 
expected to translate into variations in churning rates. Countries which 
undergo rapid integration with world markets would be expected to have 
more sorting as firms are drawn into markets through the expectation of 
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export profits. On the other hand, one would expect this sorting process to 
have occurred in highly integrated economies. 
Table 2.8: Transition and non-Transition Economies 
2 3 4 5 6 
Sample T r a n s ~ i o n n Transition T r a n s ~ i o n n Other Other 
Indicator Ent E x ~ ~ Net Ent Exit Net Ent 
Long run effect of -2.06 -.73 -1.18 .25 .15 .20 
Market Access (-1.52) (-.85) (-.81) (1.40) (1.14) (.97) 
Short run effect of 5.92 -5.10 7.54 4.10·** -1.08 4.41** 
Market Access (1.09) (-.97) (1.13) (2.87) (-.85) (2.49) 
Lagged entry -.85*** .25*** -.34*** .28*** 
(-12.35) (6.74) (-7.58) (5.72) 
Lagged e x ~ ~ .26** -.78*** .30*** -.39·*· 
(2.43) (-11.91) (3.59) (-6.40) 
Change in exit .40**· .04 
(3.48) (.46) 
Change in entry .15·** .03 
(6.17) (.46) 
Lagged net entry -.89*** -.58·** 
(-12.57) (-9.98) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 596 596 596 1786 1267 1738 
R2 
.51 .44 .51 .30 .26 .35 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and I % levels respectively. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. All equations are estimated using OLS. 
Previously we speculated that a possible reason for high churning rates 
among eastern European countries could be due to the pace of global 
integration proceeding fastest there. Where the pace of globalisation is 
quicker entry and exit rates would be higher due to foreign market 
opportunities and competition from abroad causing exit of previously 
sheltered firms. To examine this issue we split the sample into transition 
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and non-transition economies. \3 In contrast to our prior, the results in 
Table 2.8 show that globalisation has played a larger role in the process of 
creative destruction in non-transition countries. Again market access only 
enters significantly in the short run where it raises the entry rate by 0.35 
percentage points. For the non-transition countries globalisation does not 
affect the exit of firms during the short run but owing to the entry effect 
there is net entry during this horizon. A potential explanation for these 
findings is that our dataset has a fairly limited time series dimension. This 
is more acute in some instances than others, for example, New Zealand, 
the Czech Republic, Belgium and Norway. A consequence of this is that 
we rely upon variation in the between group dimension for identification. 
2.3.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage 
In Melitz (2003) trade liberalisation spurs market entry as the expected 
profits from exporting increase firms' profit expectations. In an extension 
of this model Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) take the Melitz 
framework and weld it to a Heckscher-Ohlin model. The introduction of a 
second sector into the model produces some novel insights and yields 
testable empirical predictions. Among these is the response of entry and 
exit rates which are found to be higher in comparative advantage sectors. 
13 The transition economies are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. 
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Figure 2.6: Productivity Thresholds pre- and post- Trade Liberalisation 
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Figure 2.6 illustrates the central tenets of the model. As in the underlying 
Melitz framework trade liberalisation causes reallocations of output in 
both industries as the most productive firms take advantage of exporting 
opportunities. However, these opportunities are relatively greater in 
comparative advantage industries meaning that entry incentives are greater 
relative to the comparative disadvantage sector. The entry of 
disproportionately more firms into the comparative advantage industry 
results in more intense competition between incumbents and more exit. 
The threshold productivity required for survival increases by relatively 
more in comparative advantage industries. 
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We take the prediction regarding how comparative advantage affects entry 
and exit rates to the data. Comparative advantage is measured using the 
technique of Balassa (1965) which computes 'revealed' comparative 
advantage (RCA). In addition to exports we also consider an industry's 
revealed comparative advantage in terms of producing value added and 
R&D intensive goods. These variables are included since high value 
added and R&D intensive sectors may be associated with higher expected 
profits. Since data on service sector exports do not exist we set revealed 
comparative advantage in exporting in these sectors equal to 1.14 That is, 
they are neither comparative advantage nor disadvantage industries. For 
summary statistics see Appendix Table A2.3. 
Table 2.9: Revealed Comparative Advantage 
Regression 1 2 3 4 
Indicator Entry Exit Churn Net Entry 
Exporting .18*** -.02 .19* .15** 
(2.91) (-.26) (1.92) (2.08) 
Number of Observations 2324 2324 2324 2276 
R2 
.31 .27 .17 .37 
Value Added .95*** -.31 .74* 1.15*** 
(2.76) (-1.56) (1.65) (3.16) 
Number of Observations 2266 2266 2266 1357 
R2 
.35 .34 .29 .39 
R&D .02 .00 .02 .01 
(1.01 ) (.15) (1.29) (.70) 
Number of Observations 1476 1476 1476 1432 
R2 
.35 .30 .24 .38 
Note: Unreported regressors are Identical to those in Table 2.4. 
14 A series of robustness tests were conducted where distance played a significantly greater role among 
service sectors. For example, when the distance coefficient is set to -2 for the hotels and 
restaurants and retail and wholesale trade sectors the results remain robust. Equally, when 
the service sector is excluded from the analysis the results remain robust. 
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The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2.9. We find that 
comparative advantage in exporting and the production of high value 
added goods results in more entry. The magnitudes of the effects are 
substantially different, however, with a one standard deviation increase in 
exporting RCA causing a 0.13 percentage points increase in the entry rate 
compared with a 3.61 percentage point increase for value added RCA. 
The same variables are also found to be positively and significantly 
correlated with net entry. This suggests that sectors with a comparative 
advantage in exporting or value added goods production have higher 
expected profits. Comparative advantage in R&D is not found to affect 
any of the left hand side variables. This may be due to only a limited 
number of firms undertaking R&D investments. For example, Haskel 
(2007) reports that over 80 per cent is conducted by just a dozen large 
companies while Harris and Li (2009) find that 13 per cent of UK firms 
are engaged (18 per cent in manufacturing and lOin non-manufacturing). 
However, perhaps the cleanest test of the Bernard, Redding and Schott 
(2007) hypothesis is to use the churning rate as the dependent variable. 
Since the model's predictions relate to the response of firm entry and exit 
over the long run churning is the most appropriate measure. In column 3 
of the table we find some tacit support for the hypothesis when exporting 
and value added RCA are used. The point estimates of 0.19 and 0.74 
imply that increasing a sector's comparative advantage in exporting and 
value added production causes an increase in the churning rate albeit at the 
10% level of significance. From this we conclude that comparative 
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advantage is also an important industry determinant of entry and exit rates 
in a cross-country context. 
2.4 Robustness Tests - Country Factors 
The analysis suggests that globalisation has had a positive effect on net 
entry though primarily during the short run. Typically the effects are 
found to be small. Figure 2.1 illustrated that the magnitude of the 
importance of time invariant country-specific factors and market access in 
affecting churning rates across the sample. Most striking is the 
prominence of country factors in shaping the rate of churn. For example, 
the policy environments in New Zealand and Germany result in churning 
being 2.3% and 2.8% higher relative to the United States. In contrast, for 
the Czech Republic and Norway the policy regime serves to reduce entry 
and exit rates by 2.6% and 2.1 % respectively. 
To examme how policy environments affect our entrepreneurship 
indicators we include broad measures of the policy environment within 
countries in the regressions reported in Table 2.10.15 Our policy variables 
are from the economic freedom (EFI) data assembled by the Canadian 
Fraser Institute and published annually in Gwartney and Lawson (2005). 
Summary statistics of the following measures are provided in Appendix 
Table A2.2: 
IS For regression results with each policy variable included individually see Appendix 
Table A2.4. 
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1. Size of Government: EFI index with values between 0-10 capturing the 
size of general government consumption in total consumption, transfers 
and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, government enterprises and 
investment as a percentage of GDP and the top marginal income tax rate. 
2. Legal and Property Rights: EFI index with values between 0-10 
capturing judicial independence, impartiality of courts, protection of 
intellectual property, military interference in the rule of low and political 
progress and the integrity of the legal system. 
3. Monetary Policy: EFI index with values between 0-10 capturing 
excess growth in the money supply above GDP growth, the standard 
deviation of inflation variability (last 5 years), the recent inflation rate and 
the freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and 
abroad. 
4. Regulatory Burden: EFI index with values between 0-10 capturing the 
administrative burden on new business. 
5. Competition in Domestic Banking: EFI index with values between 0-
10 capturing the extent of competition from foreign banks. 
These variables were chosen based on evidence from existing literature. 
For example, Cullen and Gordon (2007), Ba Rin et a1. (2011) and Gentry 
and Hubbard (2000) find that taxation influences entry rates although they 
only consider either entry by incorporation or self-employment. This 
literature has also considered the impact of regulatory burdens upon 
entrepreneurship decisions while legal quality is found by Nunn (2007) to 
affect entry although that paper only deals with entry into export markets. 
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Introducing the policy variables into the regression reduces globalisation's 
role in affecting entry and death. Market access now only significantly 
affects entry and net entry over the short run though in the fonner the 
effect now only holds at the 10% level. The results suggest that in 
countries with large governments, high regulatory burdens and good 
protection of legal and property rights there is net exit while sound 
monetary policy causes net entry. 
Table 2.10: Policy Variables 
1 2 3 
Sample Entry Exit Net Entry 
Indicator 
Long run effect of -.20 .18 -.16 
Market Access (-.85) (1.06) (-.59) 
Short run effect of 3.54* -2.09 4.83** 
Market Access (1.84) (-1.42) (2.25) 
Size of Government -.92** .67** -1.11** 
(-2.21) (2.17) (-2.32) 
Legal and Property Rights -.07 .84*** -.68** 
(-.28) (4.12) (-2.22) 
Monetary Policy 2.18*** -.31 1.86*** 
(4.02) (-.76) (3.09) 
Regulatory Burden -.33 .37*** -.53** 
(-1.36) (2.61) (-2.14) 
Competition in Domestic Banking .07 .40*** -.20 
(.31 ) (2.88) (-.79) 
Lagged entry -.53*** .32*** 
(-6.71) (7.90) 
lagged exit .62*** -.49*** 
(6.15) (-9.27) 
Change in entry .19*** 
(6.27) 
Change in exit .43*** 
(4.31) 
Lagged net entry -.73*** 
(-12.02) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1702 1702 1678 
R2 
.32 .33 .42 
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Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and I % level. Robust t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
Higher values of the first measure, the size of government, indicate a 
greater presence of the government in economic activity. This variable is 
significantly correlated with both the rate of entry and exit, moving them 
in opposite directions. Increases in the size of government appear to blunt 
entrepreneurial incentives with s one standard deviation increase in the 
size of government (roughly equivalent from moving from the United 
States (2.9) to the United Kingdom (4.2» reducing entry by 1.18 
percentage points and causing the exit rate to increase by 1.29 percentage 
points. It is worth noting that these regressions include country fixed 
effects and consequently these changes in government size abstract from 
changes that occur within the data across time. In the constrained 
regression of net entry we find that larger governments are associated with 
persistent declines in net entry either through crowding out of investment 
or taxation effects. We investigate this in further detail in Table 2.11. 
Somewhat surprisingly we find that better legal and property right 
protection results in higher exit rates and persistent declines in net entry. 
One would expect that superior contract enforcement and transparency 
would foster more entry. A possible explanation for the result is that the 
variable is correlated with the other policy measures in the regression. 
Indeed the correlation with monetary policy and competition in domestic 
banking is 56% and 55% respectively. We investigate the effect of legal 
and property rights variable by excluding the other policy factors. The 
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results reported in Appendix Table A2.4 no longer exhibit a significant 
effect on net entry while the entry variable is now positively signed though 
it remains insignificant at conventional levels. However, the points 
estimate in the exit regression of 0.39 remains. 
Financial factors might also influence firm birth and survival. Access to 
credit has been shown to reduce the barriers to export market entry 
(Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller, 2007). To capture similar effects on 
domestic market entry we include an index of the degree of competition in 
domestic banking. We anticipate that greater competition among banks 
leads to firms being able to secure cheaper finance. However, our results 
suggest the contrary. In regression 2 we find that greater competition in 
the domestic banking sector is significantly associated with higher exit 
rates. Again we investigate whether this result is caused by collinearity 
with the other variables by excluding the other policy factors in the results 
in Appendix Table A2.4, the result persists. 
As with Slze of government, the monetary policy index is also 
significantly correlated with entry. The positive coefficient on entry and 
churn suggest that stable monetary environments ameliorate to a certain 
degree some of the uncertainties surrounding investment and allow 
entrepreneurs to form more accurate forecasts of future profits. A one 
standard deviation increase in regulatory burdens raises the exit rate by 
0.58 percentage points as the higher compliance costs firms must bear 
reduce their profitability. 
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Table 2.11: Size of Government 
1 2 3 4 
Sample All All All All 
Indicator Ent Exit Churn Net En 
Long run effect of -.41 .12 -.31 -.35 
Market Access (-1.06) (.46) (-.61 ) (-.80) 
Short run effect of 3.78 -3.17 -.99 5.70* 
Market Access (1.32) (-1.24) (-.22) (1.75) 
Government consumption -1.50* .57 -1.09 -1.56* 
(-1.72) (1.33) (-.99) (-1.78) 
Share of government enterprises -.25 -.03 -.40 -.13 
and investment in GOP (-1.29) (-.18) (-1.48) (-.58) 
Top income tax rate .08 .32*** .60*** -.12* 
(1.25) (7.37) (6.62) (-1.70) 
Legal and Property Rights -.30 .68 .74 -.82 
(-.54) (1.48) (.95) (-1.24) 
Monetary Policy 2.93*** 1.39*** 6.17*** 1.38* 
(4.33) (3.37) (6.11 ) (1.93) 
Regulatory Burden -.98 -.09 -1.52 -.76 
(-1.45) (-.29) (-1.61) (-1.14) 
Competition in Domestic Banking -.07 .55*** .79* -.39 
( -.18) (2.79) (1.87) (-1.02) 
Lagged entry -.58*** .33*** 
(-6.74) (7.20) 
Lagged exit .68*** -.50*** 
(6.34) (-8.35) 
Change in entry .21*** 
(6.58) 
Change in exit .49*** 
(4.31 ) 
Lagged churn -.09 
(-1.46) 
Lagged net entry -.77*** 
(-11.63) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1140 1140 1140 1116 
R2 
.36 .40 .18 .45 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level. Robust t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
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Studies of the effect of government on the entry and exit decision of firms 
are relatively sparse. Where such enquiries do exist they often focus on 
one country (the United States) and multinationals (see Devereux and 
Griffith, 2003). Existing studies also fail to account for the inter-
dependence between entry and exit rates (for extensive evidence on this 
see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). The existing evidence does not allow us 
to understand whether the effects of taxation, and by extension other forms 
of government intervention, on entry are symmetric to those on exit. To 
understand better which characteristics of government are correlated with 
entry and exit in Table 2.11 we decompose the size of government 
variable into the share of government consumption in total consumption, 
the share of government enterprises and investment in GDP and the top 
marginal income tax rate. An observation would be that crowding out and 
taxation are the main drivers of the government effect. Crowding out of 
private investment appears to reduce the entry rate and a 1 % increase in 
the top marginal income tax rate results in 0.32% more exit. It may be 
that income and corporate tax rates are highly correlated meaning that the 
effect on exit may also capture the effect of corporation taxation. 
As a further test of the importance of the policy variables we consider 
whether the interaction between policy environments and globalisation 
affects entry and exit rates. This might also explain some of the confusing 
results we found for how legal institutions and competition in domestic 
banking affect birth and survival. Some of the results for the regressions 
with the interaction terms are striking. For example, increasing market 
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access in countries with good legal and property rights causes an increase 
in the entry rate and a decrease in the probability of exit. The net effect is 
to cause persistent net entry over the long run; perhaps a signal that good 
legal institutions lead to reductions in trade costs and broaden exporting 
opportunities for goods requiring relationship-specific investments as 
documented by Nunn (2007). 
Financial factors are no longer found to significantly affect any of the 
dependent variables either through the competition in domestic banking 
variable or its interaction with market access. However, in countries with 
stable monetary policies the point estimate of 0.21 implies that more 
globalisation raises the exit rate. It may be that foreign firms target stable 
markets. Where they are drawn towards such countries the level of 
competition domestic incumbents face rises and more indigenous firms 
die. Although entry rates are lower and exit rates are higher in countries 
with more regulatory burdens the interaction between this variable and 
market access produces some perverse results. Increasing globalisation is 
associated with more entry and less exit in countries with more regulation. 
It could also be that the increase in expected profits from exporting or FDI 
that arise from global integration ameliorate to a certain extent the 
negative influence regulations have on entrepreneurship. 
Our results show many interesting relationships between policy variables 
and entry and exit and cast light on a topic that has hitherto received little 
attention in the international trade literature. However, it is worth noting 
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that the inclusion of the policy variables does little to reduce the 
magnitude of the country fixed effects. These remain large and, relative to 
the United States, range between 3.1 % and 7.2% in the entry regression 
and -4.6% and 0.22% for the regressions using exit as the dependent 
variable. There are two implications of this. First, there are myriad 
country-specific factors that influence firm survival and death most of 
which even our broad policy measures do not capture. Second, 
conditional on the measures of policy the United States is not as 
entrepreneurial a country as is often presumed as evidenced by the fixed 
effects from the entry regressions. 
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Table 2.12: Interaction Effects between Policy and Globalisation 
1 2 3 
Sample All All All 
Indicator Ent Exit Net Ent 
Long run effect of .70 -1.49* 1.52 
Market Access (.37) (-1.72) (.87) 
Short run effect of 4.54* -4.05** 6.81*** 
Market Access (1.92) (-2.34) (2.68) 
Size of Government -.68 .43 -.77 
(-1.51) (1.31) (-1.46) 
Legal and Property Rights -.59* 1.27*** -1.48*** 
(-1.71) (4.64) (-3.77) 
Monetary Policy 3.19** -1.45** 3.43*** 
(2.40) (-2.36) (2.75) 
Regulatory Burden -.64** .57*** -.93*** 
(-2.28) (3.10) (-3.20) 
Competition in Domestic Banking -.06 .22 -.14 
(-.20) (1.07) (-.42) 
Market access 
x Size of Government -.04 .04 -.06* 
(-1.35) (2.01 ) (-1.65) 
x Legal and Property Rights .10** -.08*** .15*** 
(2.17) (-2.60) (3.14) 
x Monetary Policy -.19 .21** -.29* 
(-1.02) (2.48) (-1.68) 
x Regulatory Burden .05** -.03** .07*** 
(2.53) (-2.15) (2.89) 
x Competition in Domestic Banking .03 .03 -.00 
(.87) (1.12) (-.09) 
Lagged entry -.53*** .32*** 
(-6.74) (7.90) 
Lagged exit .62*** -.49*** 
(6.19) (-9.29) 
Change in entry 
Change in exit .44*** .19*** 
(4.33) (6.39) 
Lagged net entry -.73*** 
(-12.06) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1702 1702 1678 
R2 
.32 .34 .42 
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2.5 Robustness Tests - Industry Factors 
Figure 2.7: Industry Fixed Effects and Net Entry 
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In Figure 2.7 we present estimated industry fixed effects from the net 
entry regression as well as the effect of market access in each sector. As 
was the case with country specific factors, the industry fixed effects are 
often large. For example, the electrical and optical sector has 
approximately 19% net exit relative to the machinery and equipment 
industry. However, the general tendency is for entry rates to be higher and 
exit rates lower in most industries relative to the benchmark. Market 
access has the effect of stimulating net entry in all sectors. While the 
magnitude of the effect varies it ranges between 4.05 percent (insurance) 
and 7.63 percent (electrical and optical). Another observation would be 
that at the industry level globalisation is considerably more important than 
at the country level. 
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The implication of Figure 2.7 is that in addition to globalisation and 
country factors industry-specific variables also determine the rate of firm 
birth and death. The effect of such factors appears to be particularly acute 
among service sectors where these persistently higher rates of entry are 
mirrored by similarly high exit rates. A possible explanation for this is 
that entry and exit costs are lower in service industries. However, since 
most sectors are characterised by net entry, entry and exit costs only offer 
a partial explanation. 
To try to explain this we append equation (1.1) with three industry 
variables sequentially. To allow for differences in human capital intensity 
across countries and industries we use data on the share of total hours 
worked by high skill workers from the EUKLEMS database. 
Unfortunately data is not available for all countries and industries in the 
data set (data is missing for Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the U.S.). To account for this we 
group industries (industry codes 15-19; 20-26; 27-36; 50-59; 60-69; 70-
74) and use instead the average for that group of industries in that country 
and year. Industry-level measures of information and computer 
technology (leT) expenditure per worker and R&D intensity are also 
taken from the same source. 16 Summary statistics are detailed in 
Appendix Table A2.3. 
16 Although sunk costs have been found to be an important detenninant of entry and exit rates (Bernard 
and Jensen, 1995; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1997; Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller, 2008) we do 
not include them in the regressions because fmding an appropriate measure for both manufacturing and 
services proved impossible. 
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Table 2.13: Industry Specific Factors 
Regression 1 2 3 
Sample All All All 
Indicator Entry Exit Net Entry 
Human capital intensity .02* -.02* .03** 
(1.B7) (-1.B7) (2.36) 
Number of Observations 1858 1858 1858 
R2 
.33 .35 .38 
leT expenditure per worker -.00 -.00 -.00 
(-1.49) (-.31) (-1.02) 
Number of Observations 2002 2002 2002 
R2 
.30 .32 .35 
R&D intensity .01 .01 -.00 
(.95) (1.63) (-.OB) 
Number of Observations 1998 1998 1998 
Rl 
.31 .32 .26 
Notes: The regressions include the same controls as in Table 2.5 but we do not report 
these. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. 
The results in Table 2.13 show that the human capital intensity of an 
industry significantly affects entry and exit rates although the results only 
hold at the 10% level of significance. The standardised effects are not 
identical however with the standardised effect estimated at 0.26 for entry 
and -0.15 for exit. However, increasing a sector's human capital intensity 
has a persistently positive effect on that sector's rate of net entry. This 
may partly explain the net entry observed in service sectors previously. 
leT expenditure per worker and R&D intensity are not found to be 
significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter provides cross-country evidence on the role played by 
globalisation, country characteristics and industry characteristics in 
determining entry and exit. We find that globalisation opportunities make 
entry more favourable and, in contrast with many previous studies, also 
reduce the likelihood that a plant will die. However, the effects are small 
and confined to the short run. By comparison policy environments appear 
to have a greater influence upon churning rates. Countries with small 
governments, good legal institutions, low regulatory burdens and 
macroeconomic stability have, on average, net entry. In some cases these 
effects are mitigated through the interaction between policy and 
globalisation. 
Other tests reveal industry-specific factors to also be important 
determinants of the process of creative destruction. A comparative 
advantage in exporting and the production of value added goods generates 
positive net entry by raising the expected profits of entry. This result 
confirms one of the core predictions of the Bernard, Redding and Schott 
(2007) model. In contrast to the country dimension, globalisation plays a 
more important role at the industry level although this may obscure cross-
country differences in market access. 
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2.7 Appendix 2 
Table A2.1: Source of Market Access, Entry and E x ~ ~
Regression 2 3 4 
Sample Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services 
Indicator Ent Exit Ent E x ~ ~
Long run effect of .15 .09 .25 -.14 
Domestic Market Access (.69) (.60) (1.40) (-.86) 
Short run effect of -.69 1.38 2.31* -.33 
Domestic Market Access (-.38) (1.34) (1.70) (-.31) 
Long run effect of .79* .46 -.32 1.68** 
Foreign Market Access (1.73) (1.05) (-.38) (2.40) 
Short run effect of 5.53* -3.64 4.40** -.18 
Foreign Market Access (1.65) (-1.54) (2.37) (-.11 ) 
Lagged entry -.82*** .12** -.37*** .28'" 
(-9.66) (2.43) (-7.51) (4.92) 
Lagged exit .03 -.67*** .34*** -.40*** 
(.44) (-10.41) (3.79) (-5.36) 
Change in exit .17 .08 
(1.12) (.88) 
Change in entry .06 .05 
(1.56) (.84) 
Lagged net entry 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1043 1043 1072 1072 
R2 
.44 .41 .31 .28 
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Discussion of the industry and country variables 
Appendix Table A2.2: Country Variables 
CountryNariable Size of Legal Monetary Regulatory Competition in 
overnment institutions olic burden domestic bankin 
Belgium 6.00 7.50 9.70 
Czech Republic 5.75 6.59 9.07 7.22 8.73 
Estonia 3.62 6.57 9.33 4.35 6.60 
Finland 6.01 9.17 9.61 2.84 8.10 
France 6.60 7.67 9.60 7.72 6.70 
Germany 5.41 8.89 9.60 5.56 8.00 
Hungary 5.06 6.86 7.75 3.86 6.90 
Italy 5.79 6.48 9.60 4.70 5.88 
Latvia 4.07 5.87 9.03 5.68 5.10 
Lithuania 4.40 5.40 8.13 5.57 5.80 
Luxembourg 5.51 8.96 9.68 5.78 10.00 
Netherlands 5.26 9.26 9.61 3.78 8.08 
New Zealand 3.43 8.97 9.42 6.89 10.00 
Norway 6.26 9.10 9.39 4.02 6.20 
Portugal 
Slovakia 6.27 6.16 8.01 3.57 5.30 
Slovenia 7.41 6.53 8.46 6.29 6.72 
Spain 5.59 7.24 9.58 3.76 6.04 
Sweden 6.89 8.77 9.59 3.69 7.40 
United Kingdom 4.16 8.88 9.55 3.33 7.40 
United States 2.86 8.59 9.78 3.20 7.92 
Notes: The values in the indexes range between 0 and 10. Mean values reported in the 
table. 
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Appendix Table A2.3: Industry Variables 
Revealed Comparative Advantage in: 
CountryNariable Exporting Value Added R&D High Skill ICT expenditure 
Belgium 1.00 0.99 10.76 6.92 
Czech Republic 1.09 1.00 1.89 10.90 7.05 
Estonia 0.64 2.17 
Finland 1.05 1.01 1.87 28.40 2.90 
France 0.89 1.13 12.16 2.24 
Germany 0.95 0.54 
Hungary 1.04 0.97 1.62 14.20 1.14 
Italy 1.08 0.97 1.48 4.31 2.45 
Latvia 0.80 2.16 
Lithuania 0.45 2.27 
Luxembourg 1.00 1.00 6.03 8.63 4.97 
Netherlands 0.92 1.02 1.39 7.91 4.67 
New Zealand 1.22 11.06 
Norway 1.16 2.87 
Portugal 1.34 0.97 3.68 7.44 3.43 
Slovakia 1.27 1.00 1.69 11.18 
Slovenia 0.84 1.04 15.08 2.72 
Spain 0.89 1.03 3.50 19.26 2.96 
Sweden 1.00 1.04 0.70 9.16 4.68 
United Kingdom 0.83 1.04 13.60 
United States 0.80 1.00 0.56 6.84 
Notes: For service sectors exporting RCA is assumed to be I due to lack of data on 
exporting. Hi9gh skill refers to the total number of hours worked by high skilled 
workers. ICT expenditure is defined as the share ofICT in total consumption in millions 
of euros measured in 2005 prices. 
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Appendix Table A2.4: Policy Variables 
1 2 3 4 
Sample All All All All 
Indicator Entry Exit Churn Net Entry 
Size of Government -1.82**'* .80-* -1.21*** -2.19* ...... 
(-5.50) (3.04) (-2.65) (-5.65) 
Number of Observations 2254 2254 2254 2254 
R2 
.33 .28 .16 .40 
Legal and Property Rights .18 .39 ...... * .77** -.10 
(.83) (2.75) (2.49) (-.43) 
Number of Observations 2254 2254 2254 2206 
R2 
.32 .28 .16 .39 
Monetary Policy 2.09*** .21 2.76-* 1.66**'* 
(4.33) (.55) (4.10) (2.93) 
Number of Observations 2254 2254 2254 2206 
R2 
.33 .27 .17 .40 
Regulatory Burden .14 -.08 .06 .17 
(1.06) (-.78) (.34) (1.05) 
Number of Observations 2227 2227 2227 2179 
R2 
.32 .27 .16 .39 
Competition in Domestic Banking -.02 .29- .41* -.18 
(-.10) (2.32) (1.89) (-.81 ) 
Number of Observations 1702 1702 1702 1678 
R2 
.30 .32 .11 .40 
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Chapter Three 
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Closure within Multi-Plant Firms: 
Evidence from Japan 
3.1 Introduction 
Plants owned by multinational finns are known to possess characteristics 
that reduce their likelihood of closure compared to non-multinationals. 
Their plants are generally larger more capital intensive and more 
productive, all factors shown in numerous contexts to be negatively 
associated with the probability of exit. Conditional on these superior 
characteristics, multinational finns are however more likely to shut their 
plants. Bernard and Jensen (2007) find for example that in the United 
States multinational ownership increases the probability of plant death by 
4.5%, controlling for a wide ranging set of plant and finn characteristics. 
Similar evidence has been found for manufacturing plants in Belgium by 
van Beveren (2007), Sweden by Bandick (2007), Japan by Kimura and 
Kiyota (2006) and Chile by Alvarez and Gorg (2005). As a consequence 
of evidence such as this multinationals have become labelled as 
'footloose' . 
A similar effect has also been found for multiplant finns without overseas 
affiliates (Bandick, 2007; Bernard and Jensen, 2007). The tendency for 
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multiplant finns to be more likely to close plants is widely recognised but 
far from understood. Liebennan (1990), for example, shows that larger 
multiplant finns are more likely to close plants in declining industries. 
Alternatively large diversified finns may encounter fewer agency 
problems when deciding upon plant closure, making their plants less likely 
to survive relative to standalone plants (Harrigan, 1980; Baden-Fuller, 
1989). Related to this is the idea that strategic interactions within multi-
plant finns may be the source of the higher failure rates. Where multi-
plant finns expand output or cuts price to improve the profit of one of its 
plants, it generates a negative externality for the other plants within the 
group (Sutton, 1997). 
The theories used to explain the 'footloose' nature of multinational finns 
emphasise vertical over horizontal FDI motives. 17 Under vertical FDI 
multinational firms change the geography of their production plants in 
response to changes in local costs (as in for example Antras and Helpman, 
2004). They relocate low skill intensive activities for example, in 
countries that are low-skill abundant. ls Empirically much of the literature 
has focused on the factors that make locations relatively attractive, either 
generally or specific determinants, rather than linking those FDI decisions 
and the closure of production units in a different location. 19 Cowling and 
Sugden (1999) argue that wage costs, labour unrest, tax incentives and 
17 Under horizontal FDI all stages of the production process are replicated in a different 
location. Models of this type include Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997). 
18 In practice FDI decisions often contain elements of both horizontal and vertical 
motives. For theoretical models consistent with this view see Helpman (1984) Venables 
(1999) and Yeaple (2003). 
19 A more comprehensive review of this literature can be found in Blonigen (2005). 
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governmental subsidies are pivotal to the multinational location decision. 
This view is echoed by Hood and Young (1997) who stress that 
multinationals in the United Kingdom only have 'shallow roots' and are 
not fully integrated into the local economy.20 Or more narrowly Devereux 
and Griffith (1998) alternatively focus on the roles of taxation and 
agglomeration. They find that conditional on producing in Europe, 
industries with lower effective tax rates attract more U.s. multinationals. 
Finally, recent theories of economic geography suggest that firms within 
the same industry may be drawn together through spillovers created by 
agglomeration effects. Evidence in support of these models can be found 
in Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head et a1. (1995). 
A smaller number of papers have focused on the consequences of outward 
FDI decisions for other aspects of the firm. Head and Ries (2002), 
Brainard and Riker (I 997a,b ) and Braconier and Ekholm (2000) all find 
that firms undertaking outward FDI is associated with changes in 
employment levels and the skill-mix of workers at home. Most closely 
associated with this paper is the work of Simpson (2008). Using data for 
the UK she finds that overseas investment in low-wage economies leads to 
changes in the structure of firms; the closure of plants. These effects are 
found to be strongest for multinationals operating in low-skilled industries 
with affiliates located in low-skill abundant countries compared to firms in 
the same industry not investing in low wage countries. 
20 Similarly. the ability of multinationals to shift production across borders is emphasised 
by Rodrik (1997) as an explanation for multinational's relatively higher elasticity of 
demand for labour. 
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Another prominent finding in the literature has been the tendency for 
multi-plant firms to close plants. This has been found for Sweden 
(Bandick, 2007), the United States (Bernard and Jensen, 2007) and in 
numerous other contexts. A possible explanation of the 'footloose' effect 
could be that a high proportion of multinationals own more than one plant 
and hence the negative effect on survival could simply be capturing part of 
the multiplant effect. 
We build on this literature to investigate additional aspects of the 
adjustment process made by multinational firms. Using data for Japan 
from 1994 to 2005 we firstly confirm that domestic multinationals are 
footloose. Plants belonging to a single-plant multinational face a 62% 
higher hazard rate while for those owned by multi-plant multinationals the 
value is 292%. We next explore the type of plants that are shut by multi-
plant multinationals, their relative characteristics compared to the rest of 
the firm, but also the behaviour of multinationals with respect to other 
multi-plant firms that do not have overseas affiliates. The data on plants 
are sufficiently rich that we can do this for a wide range of characteristics 
including their size, capital intensity, average wage bill and material 
intensity. We find from this a certain degree of similarity in the type of 
pants that are shut. Plants are more likely to be closed if they are small. 
However, domestic multi-plant firms are more likely to keep open plants 
that are capital intensive and high wage relative to the rest of the firm, an 
indication that multi-plant firms without foreign affiliates are more 
concerned with closing the weakest parts of their operations. Finally, we 
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explore whether it is this process of plant closure that explains why MNEs 
have been described as footloose. We find support for this view, indeed 
once we control for the characteristics of plants relative to the rest of the 
finn multinationals are actually significantly more likely to retain 
production in the home country. This also indicates that the footloose 
effect is not purely attributable to a high percentage of multinationals 
being multi-plant finns rather it is due to multinationals closing plants due 
to reasons related to their production chain. We also find that the 
tendency for domestic multi-plant ownership to increase the probability of 
exit is caused by the closure of the weakest plants within the group. 
The rest of the paper is proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
dataset we use. In Section 3.3 we investigate the magnitude of the 
"footloose" effect. Section 3.4 studies the detenninants of exit within 
multi-plant finns. In Section 3.5 we address why multinationals are 
"footloose". Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 3.6. 
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3.2 Data and Summary 
Our primary data sources are the linked longitudinal data sets of the 
Census of Manufactures (COM) and the Basic Survey of Japanese 
Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) for the period 1994-2005. 
The COM data is an establishment-level dataset administered by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The COM data covers 
all plants with more than 3 employees located in Japan and includes 
information on plant characteristics, such as their location, number of 
employees, tangible assets, and value of shipments. Summary statistics of 
the main plant variables are provided in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Plant Variables across the Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Plant size 169590 225 489 10 21309 
Number of employees 
Capital 169590 5119 23240 .07 1052705 
Millions of Japanese yen 
TFP 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36 
Total factor productivity 
Wages 169590 4.84 1.79 .03 90.55 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Intermediate inputs 169590 6669 39879 .10 4276681 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Sales 169590 11321 54454 2.88 5855928 
Millions of Japanese yen 
The plant data is linked to the BSJBSA, a firm-level survey also conducted 
by METI. The survey includes all firms with more than 50 employees or 
with capital in excess of 30 million yen. This data source provides 
information on corporate characteristics such as R&D activity, exports, 
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imports, the foreign ownership ratio, foreign direct investment, and 
financial details. The use of the BSJBSA restricts our regression analysis 
to include only firms with more than 50 employees, while the lack of data 
on intangible assets, necessary in the construction of TFP, means we are 
also forced to exclude plants with less than 10 employees. Given our 
interest in the behaviour of multi-plant firms these are not thought to be 
serious exclusion restrictions. The average size of multi-plant firms within 
our dataset is 514, while for multinationals this figure is even higher at 
2,549. In comparison single plant firms are approximately 7% of this size. 
There are 23,100 observations of multinational firms within the data, 
16,970 of mUlti-plant firms that are not multinational and 74,264 
observations of single plant firms. These multinationals are mostly 
Japanese owned; foreign owned firms represent around 1 percent of all 
firms.21 Summary statistics of the firm variables are shown in Table 3.2. 
21 Gorg and Strobl (2003) also use the 50% criteria. The value rises (but remains low) to 
1.8% if we define foreign ownership according to the International Monetary Fund's 
definition as being when a foreign fum holds in excess of 25% of capital. 
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Table 3.2: Firm-level Variables by Type of Firm 
Variable/Sample 
MNE 
Observations 23100 16970 74264 
Age 49 45 41 
In years 
Size 1490 514 190 
Number of workers 
Capital per worker 20.92 15.36 14.22 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Firm TFP 1.01 .96 .95 
Total factor productivity 
R&D complexity .02 .01 .01 
R&D divided by firm sales 
Intermediate inputs 71924 15410 5052 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Foreign ownership dummy .01 .01 .01 
1 if a foreign firm holds more than 50% of equity 
Export dummy .78 .24 .18 
1 if the firm exports 
Import dummy .65 .19 .15 
1 if the firm imports 
Notes: The MNE group comprises both single- and multi-plant multinationals. 'Multi-
plant' refers to domestic multi-plant finns. 
In addition to the differences in average size multinationals and multi-
plant finns are shown to be different in Table 3.2 across a number of 
dimensions. There is for example a clear decline in productivity and 
capital intensity from multinationals to multi-plant finns and standalone 
enterprises. Japanese finns appear to be highly globalised: 29% export, 
25% import and 18% conduct FDI. However, these patterns are far from 
unifonn across finn type. Some 78% of multinational finns export while 
only 18% of single plant finns have any sales abroad. Overall it would 
seem that Japanese MNEs display characteristics relative to other types of 
finn that are consistent with those found elsewhere in the literature (see 
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for example the reviews in Greenaway and Kneller, 2007, and Wagner, 
2007). 
To identify plant entry and exit, we use a unique identification number 
given to each plant. A plant is deemed to have entered where it is observed 
at time I but was not observed in the dataset in the previous period, 1-1. 
Equivalently, an exiting plant is one that was observed at 1-1 but not at 
time I. A limitation of the data is that it is not possible to identify finn 
closure separately from employment falling below 3 and therefore exit 
from the sample.22 
In Table 3.3 we report the entry and exit rates for each year of our sample 
and by the type of finn. A general observation would be that the 
percentage of finns that either enter or exit in the sample is low in Japan. 
Throughout the sample there are 2,230 instances of entry and 3,392 
observations of exit. This feature of Japanese manufacturing has been 
previously commented on by Caballero et al. (2003), Peek and Rosengren 
(2003) and Aheame and Shinada (2005). It is however consistent with the 
high average age of finns reported in Table 3.2, which even for single 
plant finns is over 40 years. We conclude from this average age that the 
low rate of exit is not likely explained by the size threshold imposed on 
the Japanese census data of 3 employees.23 This rate of exit is much lower 
22 Weare more confident that we are not misclassifying mergers and acquisition as exit. 
The number of mergers in Japan is low. Shimizu (2001) (cited in Kimura and Fujii, 
2003) reports that of all companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1949 
and 1998 of 1273 only 78 have conducted mergers. 
23 Indeed the average exiting plant employs 131 workers and depending upon firm type 
employment at exiting plants ranges from 96 to 217 workers. 
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than that found for other developed countries such as the US, where 
Bernard and Jensen (2004) calculate 32 per cent of plants are shut over a 5 
year period. Finally, the table also reveals that the rate of plant exit is 
similar amongst single, multi-plant firms and MNEs. 
Table 3.3: Annual Entry and Exit Rates 
Sample Sample MNE Multiplant Single Plant 
Year/Indicator Ent Exit En Exit Ent Exit Ent Exit 
1994 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1995 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1996 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1997 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
1998 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 
1999 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .04 .01 .03 
2000 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 
2001 .02 .03 .01 .03 .02 .03 .02 .03 
2002 .01 .03 .02 .03 .01 .02 .01 .03 
2003 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
2004 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
2005 .02 .02 .02 .02 
In Table 3.4 we compare the characteristics of continuing, entering and 
exiting plants, again separated by their organisational form. In general the 
table shows that continuing plants are on average larger, have higher 
capital intensities, have greater sales, use more intermediate inputs and are 
more productive than exiting or entering plants. They pay higher wages 
than entering plants, but lower wages than exiting plants. On average, 
continuing plants are the most productive. Exiting plants are smaller, use 
fewer intermediate inputs and have fewer sales than either continuing or 
entering plants. They also pay higher wages. On average Table 3.4 
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suggests that these plants are not as productive as continuing plants, but 
are more productive than entrants. 
Ownership also appears to matter. There is considerable heterogeneity in 
the size, productivity and capital intensity of plants depending on their 
owners and whether they enter, exit or continue. Multinationals' plants 
pay higher wages, have higher sales and use more intermediate inputs, 
regardless of whether they are an entering, exiting or continuing plant. T-
tests reveal that non-MNE owned plants are significantly smaller, less 
capital intensive and have lower TFP and wages than multinational owned 
plants?4 
24 T -tests are computed by subtracting the mean of group j from the mean value of group i 
to find the difference. A t-test is then run where the null hypothesis is that the differences 
between the means are zero. 
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of Continuing, Entering and Exiting Plants by Firm Type 
Variable/Firm Type 
Sam Ie MNE 
Continue 
Observations 51381 40013 72699 
Plant size 423 144 136 
Number of employees 
Capital per worker 25.59 14.41 12.23 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Plant TFP 1.03 .94 .92 
Total factor productivity 
Plant wages 5.57 4.51 5.51 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Intermediate inputs 15558 3156 2530 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Plant sales 26275 5478 4320 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Exit 
Observations 1316 1237 839 
Plant size 207 76 97 
Number of employees 
Capital per worker 28.22 14.77 11.76 
Millions of Japanese yen 
PlantTFP 1.02 .88 .90 
Total factor productivity 
Plant wages 6.16 4.56 4.53 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Intermediate inputs 6819 1678 1721 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Plant sales 11678 2904 3004 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Enter 
Observations 680 798 752 
Plant size 244 112 107 
Number of employees 
Capital per worker 30.79 19.37 15.90 
Millions of Japanese yen 
PlantTFP .95 .86 .89 
Total factor productivity 
Plant wages 4.94 3.86 4.35 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Intermediate inputs 8205 2513 2197 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Plant sales 14447 4285 3480 
Millions of Japanese yen 
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Notes: The MNE group comprises both single- and multi-plant multinationals. 'Multi-
plant' refers to domestic multi-plant ftnns. 
3.3 What is the Magnitude of the' Footloose' Effect? 
To investigate the 'footloose' effect we employ survival analysis. The 
hazard function, h(t), is defined as the rate at which plants exit in the 
interval between t and t+ 1 conditional upon having survived until t. 
Failure is defined as when a plant exits and survival is the number of years 
the plant is present in the dataset. The hazard rate is specified as 
h{t)= ho{t )exp (3.1) 
where ho is the baseline hazard. X is a vector containing plant, firm and 
industry variables. Throughout the analysis a Cox proportional hazards 
model is used due to its flexibility though we also use duration models to 
ensure our results are not a product of unobserved heterogeneity. Using a 
Cox model also implicitly incorporates entry into the model. A hazard 
ratio less than 1 indicates that an explanatory variable reduces the 
probability of exit while values in excess of 1 imply a greater risk of 
failure. 
A range of plant, firm and industry variables such as plant size, firm 
export status and measures of import penetration are included in the 
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regression to capture factors that have been shown to affect survival in 
other contexts. In order that we capture time-varying industry 
characteristics we measure the plant variables relative to the industry. For 
example, plant size is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of 
workers in plant i divided by the average number of plant employees in 
plant i's industry. We construct similar measures for productivity, wages 
and capital and material intensity?5 
Generally we find that the plants that are most vulnerable to closure in 
Japan are similar to those studied in other countries by Dunne et al. 
(1989), Gorg and Strobl (2003), Mata and Portugal (1994), Bernard and 
Sjoholm (2003) and Bernard and Jensen (2007). Plants that are large, 
productive and capital intensive are less likely to exit. Of the plant 
characteristics it is size that has the strongest effect on reducing the hazard 
rate by 72.3% while the point estimates on the capital intensity and TFP 
variables are closer to one at 0.81 and 0.57. Contrary to Bernard and 
Jensen's (2007) findings for the United States, high-wage Japanese plants 
are more likely to exit. To capture the how the plant's position in the 
production chain affects its survival we also include a measure of the input 
intensity (or material intensity) of the plant relative to the firm. Input 
intensity is defined as the ratio of intermediate inputs to sales. We 
interpret higher values as indicating upstream production. The results 
suggest that firms are more likely to close plants producing intermediate 
inputs rather than final goods. 
25 When the plant variables are included by themselves, rather than relative to the 
industry, the results remain robust. 
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Unlike in studies of other countries we do not find finn exporting status to 
affect survival. Elsewhere in the literature exporters have been found to 
be less likely to close due to their superior characteristics (see The 
International Study Group on Exports and Productivity, (2007) for a cross-
country comparison). Although exporters are often believed to be less 
vulnerable to closure, the reason why this should be is not necessarily 
apparent. However, international engagement matters when the finn 
imports. In this case a plant faces a hazard 23.2 percent above the 
baseline, a first indication that off shoring may be a motive behind the 
decision to shut plants. We also find that the finn's R&D intensity has 
little effect upon a plant's survival. However, when the plant 
characteristics are excluded in regression 3 R&D intensity becomes 
significantly negatively correlated with failure. This indicates that finns 
with high R&D intensities tend to own 'better' plants. 
Conditional on these plant characteristics we also find evidence that 
multinational finns are 'footloose'. Within regression 1 we find than 
plants belonging to multinational finns face a hazard ratio that is 
approximately twice as high as that faced by plants owned by finns that 
operate exclusively in the domestic market. When the base category is set 
to domestic single plant finns in regression 2 we see that multinational 
ownership raises the risk of failure by 224%. Part of the explanation for 
this inflation in the hazard ratio is that we are now considering domestic 
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multi-plant finns as a separate entity. We observe that multiplant status 
has the traditional effect of increasing the probability a plant will exit. 
Across the sample there are 53,338 observations of multinational owned 
plants. Although 78% of this group are also multi-plant finns this means 
that there are still a large number of single-plant multinational firms. In 
later regressions we exploit this variation to investigate whether the 
'footloose' effect is attributable to multinationals being predominantly 
multi-plant finns. A clear ordering of the probability of plant exit is found 
in regression 3 according to multiplant and MNE status. Relative to 
domestic single-plant finns we find that multiplant multinationals are the 
most likely to shutdown their plants followed by domestic multi-plant 
firms and then single-plant multinationals. The premium upon plant 
survival within the multinational category differs substantially according 
to whether the firm owns more than one plant: multiplant MNEs raise the 
hazard by 292% compared with 62% for single-plant multinationals. The 
existing evidence on the link between survival and multiplant ownership is 
ambiguous. After controlling for plant features, Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) find that there is no difference in the likelihood of exit for plants 
owned by a multiplant firm in the United States, while Mata and Portugal 
(1994) and Bandick (2007) find the contrary results for Portugal and 
Sweden respectively. For Japan we find that belonging to a domestic 
multiplant firm increases the hazard by approximately 134%. This 
indicates that patterns of exit are similar across multi-plant firms 
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regardless of whether they have foreign affiliates and that the footloose 
effect is not confined to multinationals alone. 
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Table 3.5: Magnitude of the 'Footloose' Effect 
Variable/Regression 2 3 4 5 6 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio 
MNEdummy 2.036 3.236 
(11.70)** (17.19)** 
Muttiplant MNE dummy 3.92 3.911 3.19 4.086 
(18.33)** (17.56)** (16.26)** (14.21 )** 
Single plant MNE dummy 1.623 1.647 1.391 1.498 
(4.60)** (4.62)** (3.16)** (3.21)** 
DomestiC multiplant dummy 2.296 2.338 2.308 3.149 4.216 
(14.58)** (14.86)** (14.17)** (20.83)** (16.53)** 
Plant Variables 
Size 0.277 0.297 0.3 0.284 
(28.46)** (27.86)** (28.13)** (27.54)** 
Capttal intenstty 0.817 0.821 0.812 0.805 
(8.81 )** (8.66)** (9.15)** (9.10)** 
TFP 0.542 0.561 0.568 0.55 
(8.75)** (8.17)** (8.04)** (8.22)** 
Wages 2.194 2.264 2.22 2.23 
(9.31)** (9.82)** (9.60)** (9.18)** 
Material intenstty 0.72 0.732 0.745 0.732 
(7.45)** (7.18)** (6.78)** (6.86)** 
Finn Variables 
Export dummy 1.038 1.008 0.993 0.99 0.929 0.906 
(0.58) -0.13 (0.11) (0.14) (1.11 ) (1.18) 
Import dummy 1.232 1.213 1.223 1.236 1.162 1.205 
(3.23)** (3.01)** (3.09)** (3.14)** (2.39)* (2.35)* 
R&D intenstty 1.012 1.005 1.002 1.001 0.979 0.972 
(4.18)** (1.77)+ (0.65) (0.46) (7.39)** (7.69)** 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index 0.882 0.884 0.885 0.879 0.91 0.868 
(0.90) -0.89 (0.88) (0.93) (0.67) (0.79) 
LWPEN 1.036 1.043 1.05 1.049 1.045 1.044 
(0.33) -0.4 (0.46) (0.45) (0.41) (0.33) 
OTHPEN 0.914 0.904 0.897 0.911 0.96 0.959 
(0.52) -0.58 (0.62) (0.53) (0.23) (0.18) 
Sunk costs 0.959 0.959 0.958 0.959 0.96 0.952 
(2.85)** (2.86)** (2.89)** (2.88)** (2.76)** (2.63)** 
Theta 0.00 16.72 
(0.39) (3.66) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Number of observations 131669 131669 131669 131669 131669 131669 
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Notes: Cox Proportional hazards model is used in regressions 1, 2, 3 and 5. A duration 
model is used in regressions 4 and 6 with the hazard parameterised using a Weibull 
distribution and unobserved heterogeneity assumed to be gamma distributed. Z-scores 
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The multinational dummy 
includes domestic and foreign multinationals. The industry dummies include controls for 
the both the plant and firm's industry. **, * and + indicate significance at the 1,5 and 10 
percent level of confidence. 
Of the remaining industry level control variables included in regression 3 
of Table 3.5, only industry sunk costs are found to have a significant effect 
on exit. This supports evidence from Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) and 
Bernard and Jensen (2007) for the US, Geroski (1991 a, 1991 b) for the UK 
and Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden. For Japan we do not find 
industry measures of globalisation to affect exit. This contrasts with the 
evidence from Bernard et al. (2006) who found that imports from both 
low-wage and other countries increase the probability that a plant will die 
in the United States, and is a feature of the results discussed in greater 
detail in the previous chapter. 
In regression 5 we test the extent to which the evidence for multinationals 
being more likely to close plants is conditional on the inclusion of other 
plant controls. We test this by excluding the other plant controls. We 
continue to observe that domestic multi-plant firms, multinationals and 
importers are significantly more likely to shutdown their plants. In 
contrast with Bernard and Jensen's (2002) findings for the United States 
we find that this view of multinationals as footloose is unconditional. 
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More generally multinationals are more likely to closedown their plants 
than single-plant domestic firms. 
In the remaining regressions of the table we consider the robustness of our 
findings to different estimation techniques. A particular concern is that 
the results may be a product of unobserved heterogeneity. To control for 
this we estimate the model using a duration model with the hazard rate 
assumed to follow a Weibull distribution and unobserved heterogeneity 
parameterised by a gamma distribution. The results in regression 4 of 
Table 3.5 are robust to this change. We continue to find that large, capital 
intensive, productive plants with low wage costs are less likely to exit as 
are materially intensive plants. The firm-level variables are also 
unchanged. Importers and domestic multi-plant firms remain more likely 
to close plants, as are both types of multinationals. Sunk costs continue to 
be the sole significant industry-level determinant of exit. The duration 
parameter, theta, is found to be insignificant with a t-statistic of 0.39. 
Unreported cumulative hazard plots also show our model to be correctly 
specified. When we exclude the plant variables from the model in 
regression 6 the duration parameter becomes significant. However, the 
following regressions include the variables used in regression 3 which 
leads us to conclude the results are not an artefact of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
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3.4 Exit within Multi-plant firms 
Given that multinational firms have been shown to be more likely to shut 
their plants, an interesting question that follows from this is, can we 
identify the characteristics of those plants and the possible motives behind 
their closure. In Table 3.6 we consider these questions separately for 
multi-plant firms that only have operations domestically and those with 
foreign affiliates. In the following regressions in addition to the existing 
plant variables the plant variables are measured relative to the firm. For 
example, the relative size ratio is the natural logarithm of the number of 
plant employees divided by the number of workers employed by the firm. 
Similar measures are constructed for wages, capital and input intensity. 
Difficulties in comparing productivity across possibly different industries 
of the firm lead us to exclude this variable from this part of the analysis. 
A feature of the results in Table 3.6 is the high degree of similarity 
between the type of plants that are closed by multinationals and domestic 
multi-plant firms. For example, regardless of whether the firm has 
affiliates abroad or not, plants that are large, high productivity and 
materially intensive are less vulnerable to closure. Moreover, plants that 
are large relative to the firm face significantly lower hazard rates although 
the effect is stronger for plants with domestic only owners. Plants that are 
capital intense relative to the firm are more likely to survive but only 
among domestic multi-plant firms. For both domestic multi-plant firms 
we continue to observe that plants paying high wages relative to the 
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industry are approximately twice as vulnerable to close; an indication of 
outsourcing. However, conditional upon this plants which pay relatively 
high wages within domestic multi-plant firms face lower hazard rates. 
This may be an indication that domestic multi-plant firms tend to 
concentrate production among their best plants. 
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Table 3.6: Exit within Multiplant Firms 
Sample MNE Multi Both 
Variable/Re ression 1 2 3 
Relative size 0.804 0.738 1.202 
(1.71)+ (3.32)** (1.67)+ 
Relative capital intensity 0.871 0.729 1.168 
(1.50) (5.04)** (1.61) 
Relative wage 1.001 0.719 1.534 
(0.01) (2.01 )* (1.90)+ 
Relative material intensity 0.922 1.011 0.9 
(1.52) (0.32) (2.28)* 
Plant Variables 
Size 0.382 0.312 1.155 
(7.49)** (11.75)** (1.34) 
Capital intensity 0.811 1.032 0.815 
(2.20)* (0.51) (2.06)* 
TFP 0.599 0.601 1.002 
(4.37)** (4.92)** (0.01 ) 
Wages 2.306 2.056 1.028 
(4.34)** (4.63)** (0.12) 
Material intensity 0.741 0.845 0.896 
(3.19)** (2.53)* (1.06) 
Firm Variables 
Export dummy 0.965 0.878 1.186 
(0.27) (1.27) (1.04) 
Import dummy 1.042 1.153 0.868 
(0.37) (1.31 ) (0.93) 
R&D intensity 0.996 0.986 1.016 
(0.49) (2.92)** (1.82)+ 
Same industry dummy 0.938 0.931 0.925 
(0.69) (0.90) (0.68) 
Multinational dummy 0.332 
(1.26) 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index 1.032 0.848 1.099 
(0.12) (0.73) (1.10) 
LWPEN 1.152 1.094 1.052 
(0.74) (0.52) (1.04) 
OTHPEN 1.029 0.602 1.021 
(0.10) (1.54) (0.26) 
Sunk costs 0.934 0.983 0.951 
(2.66)** (0.70) (1.66)+ 
Theta 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Number of observations 131669 131669 131669 
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Notes: Z-scores are clustered at the finn level and reported in parentheses. The 
multinational dummy includes domestic and foreign multinationals. 'Multi' refers to 
domestic multiplant finns. The industry dummies include controls for the both the plant 
and finn's industry. **, * and + indicate significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level of 
confidence. 
We also include in the regression a variable indicating whether the plant 
operates in the same 3 digit industry as the finn itself. Kimura and Fujii 
(2003) have previously suggested that plant closure in Japan was 
attributable to finn's expansion into industries outside their core 
competencies in the 1980s. We do not find this to be the case. Similarly 
exporting status continues to be an insignificant determinant of exit but 
now so too is the import dummy. This suggests differences in hazard rates 
between multiplant and single-plant finns were driving this relationship in 
Table 3.5. Finally there are reasons to believe that that a finn's R&D 
expenditure may affect the markets in which a finn operates. Baldwin and 
Gu (2004) find Canadian exporters to perfonn more R&D than non-
exporters. For Spain, Perez et a1. (2004) find that R&D intensity lowers 
the hazard rate. Kimura and Kiyota (2003) also find Japanese finns which 
conduct R&D face lower hazard rates. R&D intensity lowers the 
probability of exit only among domestic multi-plant finns but the effect is 
small. 
The effect of the industry-level variables remains similar to those found in 
Table 3.5, in particular the globalisation variables are again not found to 
affect closure among multi-plant finns. The sunk cost variable remains 
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significant but only for multinational owned plants suggesting they tend to 
operate in more competitive industries. 
In regression 3 we test whether the behaviour of MNEs and non-MNEs 
can be more formally accepted as different. We pool the observations on 
all multi-plant firms and then include a multinational dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm is either a domestic or foreign 
multiplant multinational and zero if the owner is a domestic multiplant 
firm and then interact this variable with the plant, firm and industry 
variables. For reasons of space we report the coefficient estimates for the 
interactions between the multinational variable and the plant, firm and 
industry variables only. 
The results from this regression confirm that multinationals and multi-
plant non-MNEs behave similarly in their choice about which plants to 
shut. In this sense domestic MNEs are no more likely to shutdown plants 
than domestic multi-plant firms. The interactions only show a few 
significant differences between the criteria used to close plants across 
these firms. Specifically, multinationals are significantly more likely to 
close relatively large plants and those that are capital un-intensive. 
Likewise the R&D intensity interaction shows domestic multi-plant firms 
with high R&D intensities are significantly less likely to close plants than 
similar multinationals. We also find that industry sunk costs are more 
important within multinationals. 
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3.5 'Footloose' Multinationals? 
The results in the previous section showed that multinationals are more 
likely to close relatively small plants; a traditional indication of weakness. 
Given that on average MNEs plants display superior performance 
characteristics compared to non-MNEs, in this section of the paper we 
consider two hypotheses. First, whether the footloose nature of 
multinationals can be explained by the attributes of the plants they close. 
The second test builds on the evidence in Table 3.6 and asks whether it is 
this process of closing plants that are weaker relative to the rest of the firm 
that explains why MNEs were found to be footloose in Table 3.5. 
The introduction of interactions between the plant variables and the multi-
plant MNE, single-plant MNE and domestic multi-plant firm indicators in 
regression 1 of Table 3.7 is capable of explaining the footloose nature of 
single-plant multinationals. Conditional on plant, firm and industry 
characteristics single-plant MNEs, it is the material intensity of plants 
closed by single-plant multinationals that explains their footloose nature. 
Specifically, exit is decreasing in the plant's material intensity. We also 
find that large plants face higher hazards when owned by single-plant 
firms but this result is conditional and due to the inclusion of the plant size 
variable. 
While plant characteristics are capable of explaining why single-plant 
multinationals are found to raise the probability of plant death the same 
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cannot be said for multi-plant MNEs and domestic multi-plant firms. 
However, we do see that the plant characteristics do affect survival. For 
example, conditional upon plant characteristics, larger, productive and 
high wage plants face higher hazard ratios when owned by multi-plant 
multinationals. Among domestic multi-plant firms more productive plants 
are more liable to closure. However, these results largely reflect the 
absolute differences between plants owned by these firm types relative to 
the base category, domestic single-plant firms. 
We return to the issue of whether it is the characteristics of plants relative 
to their parent that explains why multi-plant firms in general are 
associated with lower survival rates. To examine whether there is a 
specific footloose effect or whether this is attributable to the multiplant 
characteristics of many MNEs we introduce an interaction term between 
the multiplant MNE (011) indicator and the plant relative to firm variables 
from Table 3.6. If multinationals are inherently footloose then we would 
expect to observe similar hazard ratios for the multiplant and single-plant 
MNE variables when we control for the type of plants that are closed 
within multiplant multinationals. Similar interaction effects are included 
for domestic multi-plant firms as well. 
A comment on the results in column 2 of Table 3.7 would be that multi-
plant multinationals appear to be concerned with their production chain 
while domestic multi-plant firms close their weakest plants. For example, 
plants that are large and capital intensive relative to the firm are less 
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vulnerable to exit when owned by a domestic multi-plant finn. However, 
among multi-plant MNEs these variables are insignificant but plants that 
are relatively material intensive within the group have higher survival 
rates. Given that one motive for closing upstream plants producing 
intermediate inputs is to take advantage of lower production costs abroad 
it would seem that this has predominantly affected multinational firms 
within Japan. 
When the relative plant variables are included in the regression multiplant 
multinationals are no longer footloose. Rather plants belonging to 
multiplant MNEs face a hazard 89.2% lower than the baseline. Hence, 
when we condition upon the process of plant closure among multiplant 
multinational firms we find that rather than being footloose they are 
significantly less likely to close their plants. This residual impact may be 
due to superior organisational characteristics. For example, pan-national 
organisations possess managerial capabilities to enable the coordination of 
production across borders. Alternatively, where a multinational decides to 
locate more than one plant in a country may be an indication of the 
importance of that market to the MNE or that it is favourable to produce in 
that country. Finally, the characteristics of plants relative to their parents 
render the domestic multi-plant dummy insignificant. The literature 
suggests that multi-plant ownership raises the probability that a plant will 
die. Our results suggest that this trait of multi-plant ownership is due to 
the closure of the weakest plants by domestic multi-plant firms and 
changes in production chains by multi-plant multinationals. 
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Table 3.7: Differences in Hazard Rates between Groups 
Base category SDOM SMNE 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio 
Multiplant MNE dummy 3.813 .108 
(5.93)** (3.27)** 
Singleplant MNE dummy 1.926 2.057 
(1.54) (1.66)+ 
Domestic multiplant dummy 1.546 .578 
(2.04)* (.98) 
Plant relative to firm variables interacted with multi-plant MNE dummy 
Relative size 
Relative capital intensity 
Relative wages 
Relative material intensity 
.993 
(.08) 
.926 
(.96) 
1.165 
(.99) 
.847 
(4.44)** 
Plant relative to firm variables interacted with domestic multi-plant dummy 
Relative size .833 
(2.27)* 
Relative capital intensity .778 
(4.23)** 
Relative wages .782 
(1.61) 
Relative material intensity .955 
(1.41) 
Multiplant MNE dummy interacted with 
Size 1.421 1.241 
(4.05)** (2.13)* 
Capital intensity 1.025 .984 
(.42) (.17) 
TFP 1.543 1.353 
(2.20)* (1.51) 
Wages 2.069 1.325 
(3.32)** (1.07) 
Material intensity .942 1.021 
(.52) (.18) 
Singleplant MNE dummy interacted with 
Size 1.302 1.319 
(1.66)+ (1.71)+ 
Capital intensity 1.116 1.119 
(1.02) (1.02) 
TFP 1.165 1.148 
(.40) (.35) 
Wages 1.190 1.212 
(.48) (.53) 
Material intensity .582 .569 
(2.41 )* (2.43)* 
Domestic multiplant dummy interacted with 
Size .945 1.008 
(.67) (.09) 
Capital intensity 1.030 1.225 
(.56) (2.88)** 
TFP 1.530 1.419 
(2.22)* (1.78)+ 
Wages 1.174 1.199 
(.71) (.77) 
Material Intensity 1.184 1.167 
(1.64) (1.47) 
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Table 3.7 continued 
Base category SOOM SMNE 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio 
Plant Variables 
Size .255 .254 
(18.53)** (17.66)** 
Capital intensity .788 .790 
(5.59)** (5.51 )** 
TFP .399 .417 
(5.63)** (5.18)** 
Wage 1.543 1.559 
(2.35)* (2.39)* 
Material intensity .722 .755 
(3.84)** (3.22)** 
Firm Variables 
Export dummy .994 .980 
(.10) (.31) 
Import dummy 1.222 1.174 
(3.06)** (2.48)* 
Firm R&D intensity 1.002 .992 
(.73) (2.57)* 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index .897 .906 
(.78) (.71) 
LWPEN 1.056 1.056 
(.51) (.51) 
OTHPEN .913 .925 
(.52) (.45) 
Sunk costs .958 .955 
(2.91)** (3.11)** 
Log pseudo likelihood -31035 -30857 
Number of observations 131669 131648 
Notes: Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The 
multinational dummy includes domestic and foreign multinationals. 'Multi' refers to 
domestic multiplant firms. The industry dummies include controls for the both the plant 
and firm's industry .•• , • and + indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
confidence. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to understand why MNE and domestic multiplant 
ownership are associated with lower plant survival despite the superior 
characteristics of their plants. Using unique Japanese data that links plant 
data with firm data we find that the 'footloose' effect of multinational 
ownership is attributable to multinationals choosing to close plants based 
upon production chain decisions. Specifically, the material intensity of 
exiting plants is capable of explaining the footloose characteristic of 
single-plant MNE ownership while when we control for the material 
intensity of the plant relative to the firm multi-plant multinationals are 
significantly more likely to keep their plants open. The results also 
illustrate that the positive link between plant death and multi-plant 
ownership that is found so often in the literature is also due to the relative 
characteristics of exiting plants. Domestic multi-plant firms are 
significantly more likely to close plants that are small and capital un-
intensive relative to the other parts of the firm. When we control for this 
the domestic multi-plant dummy becomes insignificant suggesting that the 
traditional positive link is due to these firms closing their weakest units. 
The results have a potentially interesting implication for aggregate 
productivity growth in Japan. Within the Melitz (2003) model of 
heterogenous firms and international trade, trade liberalisation is welfare 
improving because it leads to the death of the least productive firms. 
Subsequently, their output is then reallocated towards more productive 
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finns within the industry which raises aggregate productivity. An 
assumption of the model is that the least productive finns will always be 
the ones that exit. However, our results suggest that when a plant is 
weaker compared to other units within the same finn, but both larger and 
more productive relative to other finns in the same industry, its death 
could disrupt the positive effect that increased globalisation is predicted to 
have on aggregate industry productivity. Based on a Griliches and Regev 
decomposition of aggregate productivity growth we find for Japan that this 
effect is small. Entry and exit account for 2 per cent of total aggregate 
productivity growth.26 This is perhaps explained by the Japanese context 
however, which has been characterised by both low productivity growth 
and low rates of entry and exit (Caballero et aI., 2003; Peek and 
Rosengren, 2003; Aheame and Shinada, 2005). It would therefore be 
interesting to investigate this possible negative effect of globalisation in 
other contexts. 
26 This finding is robust to the use of a Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan decomposition. 
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3.7 Appendix 3 
Total Factor Productivity 
There are 48 manufacturing industries in our dataset. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is calculated for each plant relative to the industry 
average. Following Aw et al. (1997), we define the TFP level of 
establishment p in year t in a certain industry in comparison with the TFP 
level of a hypothetical representative establishment in year 0 in that 
industry as follows 
lnTFPpI = (InQji -lnQ,)-t .!.(Sij/ +SitXlnXij/-InX;,) 
;=1 2 
+ t(inQ. -lnQ._I)- tt(Sis +Sis_Jinxis -lnXis_J (1) 
.=1 .=1 ;=1 
where Qft, Sift and Xift denote the gross output of plant f in year t, the cost 
share of factor i for establishmentp's input of factor i in year t. Variables 
with an upper bar denote the industry average of that variable. We use 
1994 as the base year. Capital, labour and real intermediate inputs are 
used as factor inputs. 
The representative establishment for each industry is defined as a 
hypothetical establishment whose gross output as well as input and cost 
share of all production factors are identical to the industry average. The 
first two terms on the right hand side of equation (1) denote the gap 
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between plant Is TFP level in year t and the representative 
establishment's TFP level in year t and the representative establishment's 
TFP level in the base year. InTFPft in equation (1) constitutes the gap 
between establishment Is TFP level in year t and the representative 
establishment's TFP level in the base year. 
Industry Variables 
Globalisation has been shown to cause exit. The source of import 
competition in the US affects plant survival and causes finns to adjust 
their product mix (Bernard and Jensen, 2002; Bernard et aI., 2006). We 
disaggregate import penetration into low-wage import penetration 
(LWPEN) and import penetration from all other countries (OTHPEN)27. 
These measures are calculated as: 
M LW LWPEN. = il 
II Mit +Y;,-Xi' 
where L WPENit represents low-wage country import competition in 
industry i at time t, M;/W is the value of imports from low-wage countries 
in industry i at time t, Mit and Xii represents the value of total imports and 
exports in industry i at time t and Yit denotes output in industry i during 
year t. OTHPENit denotes imports from all countries except low-wage 
economies. 
27 Countries are deemed to be low-wage where they have a GOP less than 5% that of 
Japan. 
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Bernard et al. (2006) find that both fonns of import competition raise the 
probability of closure. A one standard deviation increase in L WPEN 
increases the probability of plant exit by 2.2 percentage points which is 
considerably greater than the effect ofOTHPEN. Similar results are found 
by Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden. In their results, the estimated 
coefficient on imports from outside the OECD is twice as large as that for 
OECD imports. 
Intra-industry trade is often found to have a positive effect upon finn exit. 
As international trade grows finns diversify their product range which 
may lead them to enter new industries and exit sectors they operate in 
currently. It has been established by Greenaway et al. (2008) that finns do 
not just closedown their operations, they switch to new industries too. 
Using Swedish manufacturing data they find that intra-industry trade leads 
to exit through plant closure, and, mergers and acquisition. This is also 
found by Bernard et al. (2006) for the United States: finns which are 
confronted by low-wage import competition sometimes switch to more 
capital intensive sectors. 
Our measure of intra-industry trade is constructed using the Grubel-Lloyd 
index: 
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where GLijt is the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry i 
in year t, Xi are exports in industry i during year t and Mit are imports in 
industry i during year t. 
The industry variables mentioned so far capture the influence of 
globalisation upon plant exit. We also include a measure of sunk costs. 
The empirical literature has identified sunk costs as being an important 
factor in shaping exit. Sunk costs also playa key role in determining 
exporting behaviour (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) and can affect the 
distribution of productivity in the industry (Aw et aI., 2002). 
Appendix Table 3.1: Industry-level Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Grubel-Lloyd index 144739 .50 .27 .01 1.00 
Trade that is intra-industry 
Sunk costs 155714 .01 .01 .00 .05 
Minimum of entry and exit rates 
Import competition 121760 .09 .09 .00 .67 
Imports divided by apparent consumption 
lWPEN 121760 .03 .04 .00 .28 
low-wage imports 
OTHPEN 121760 .06 .06 .00 .55 
Imports from all other countries 
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Appendix Table 3.2: Multinational Interactions 
Variable/Regression 2 3 4 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio 
Multiplant MNE dummy 1.838 3.813 3.93 0.091 
(4.86)** (17.70)** (18.25)** (6.75)** 
Singleplant MNE dummy 1.631 1.619 1.623 1.691 
(4.66)** (4.58)** (4.60)** (4.98)** 
Domestic multiplant dummy 2.426 2.34 2.337 2.315 
(15.43)** (14.88)** (14.85)** (14.62)** 
P ant relative to firm variables In racted with 
Relative size 0.741 
(7.25)** 
Relative capital intensity 0.94 
(1.37) 
Relative wages 1.033 
(0.28) 
Relative material intensity 0.839 
(10.94)** 
Plant Variables 
Size 0.326 0.3 0.301 0.276 
(24.08)** (28.11 )** (28.11 )** (34.70)** 
Capital intensity 0.794 0.824 0.812 0.781 
(10.10)** (7.50)** (9.11)** (10.77)** 
TFP 0.574 0.566 0.568 0.56 
(8.04)** (8.00)** (8.02)** (8.33)** 
Wages 1.995 2.233 2.198 1.879 
(8.40)** (9.61 )** (8.45)** (7.58)** 
Material intensity 0.753 0.744 0.745 0.795 
(6.60)** (6.73)** (6.76)** (5.32)** 
Firm Variables 
Export dummy 0.987 0.995 0.993 0.979 
(0.20) (0.08) (0.10) (0.31) 
Import dummy 1.215 1.223 1.224 1.194 
(3.03)** (3.08)** (3.11)** (2.71)** 
R&D intensity 0.998 1.002 1.002 0.997 
(0.57) (0.57) (0.68) (0.85) 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index 0.896 0.888 0.885 0.897 
(0.79) (0.86) (0.88) (0.78) 
LWPEN 1.046 1.053 1.049 1.043 
(0.42) (0.49) (0.46) (0.40) 
OTHPEN 0.911 0.9 0.898 0.915 
(0.53) (0.60) (0.61) (0.50) 
Sunk costs 0.956 0.958 0.958 0.956 
(3.02)** (2.90)** (2.89)** (3.07)** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo likelihood 
Number of observations 
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Notes: Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The 
multinational dummy includes domestic and foreign multinationals. The industry 
dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. **, * and + indicate 
significance at the I, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence. 
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Chapter Four 
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Trade Costs: A Source of 
Comparative Advantage 
4.1 Introduction 
The goods a country exports are decided by numerous considerations that 
may be grouped under the broad banner of trade costs. The magnitude of 
trade costs is large: Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report that the 
finished factory price of a good rises five-fold depending on the 
destination market. We estimate that even within Europe, the most 
integrated region of the world, trade costs have a tariff equivalent of 229% 
in 2006. Although traditional measures of protection such as tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers have been gradually eliminated through time, more 
difficult to observe factors such as language, information flows and 
bureaucracy continue to exert a highly distortionary impact upon trade. 
In recent years many, often novel, attempts have been made to discern 
how certain facets of trade costs impact on trade flows. Barriers to trade 
have been shown to consist not only of traditional protectionist measures 
such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but to extend to more subtle aspects 
as well. While macroeconomic factors such as currency unions have been 
found to affect aggregate trade flows between countries (Rose and van 
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Wincoop, 2001) microeconomic considerations have attracted more 
attention. For example, shipping cartel monopoly power (Hummels, 
Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2009), firm level fixed exporting costs (Bernard 
and Jensen, 1995; Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Roberts and Tybout, 1997) 
and information flows between entrepreneurs (Rauch and Trindade, 2002; 
Felbermayr, Jung and Toubal, 2009) have been found to affect trade flows, 
and by extension, trade costs. Nor is it true that economic factors are the 
sole determinants of trade costs; geographic characteristics have been 
shown to be important as well. Gravity models invariably return a 
negative sign on the distance variable while the median landlocked 
country trades 55% less than the median coastal country (Limao and 
Venables, 1999). 
Debate has thus far concentrated on quantifying the effect specific forms 
of trade costs have on the volume of trade and on the related issue of 
traded and non-traded goods. Until recently there has been relatively little 
consideration of how trade costs affect trade patterns and the sources of 
comparative advantage, either theoretically or empirically. However, 
Levchenko (2007) advances a theoretical model of how a country's 
institutions affect its export specialisation and then provides empirical 
evidence to support the theory by demonstrating that countries with good 
institutions export institutionally intensive goods. In another study Nunn 
(2007) constructs a measure of an industry's legal intensity and then 
establishes that countries with good legal institutions export relatively 
more goods which require relationship-specific investments. 
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The major premise presented in this chapter is consistent with the 
emphasis on trade costs shaping the pattern of trade in Levchenko (2007) 
and Nunn (2007). However, rather than focus on how a specific trade cost 
shapes trade patterns we expand the analysis to consider aggregate trade 
costs. We consider explicitly whether a country's trade costs may be 
treated as an endowment which shapes trade flows in similar fashion 
compared to traditional endowments such as human and physical capital. 
We then test to see whether trade costs are a source of comparative 
advantage that leads to specialisation in the export of goods that are 
sensitive to trade costs in the same manner as countries with large stocks 
of traditional endowments specialise in producing skill and capital 
intensive goods. 
The analysis begins by demonstrating a means of measuring bilateral, and 
consequently aggregate, trade costs by adapting the gravity model to 
eliminate the multilateral resistances that have proven so difficult in 
quantifying trade costs. We then proceed to provide an overview of the 
behaviour of trade costs across 108 countries during the period 1980 to 
2006. The analysis then proceeds to investigate whether trade cost 
endowments act as a source of comparative advantage using industry-level 
data from 26 OECD countries during the period 1988-2000. To do this we 
rely on data on the share of imported intermediate inputs used in the 
production of exports at the 2-digit ISle level. This provides a window 
into the extent to which a good is affected by trade costs. In environments 
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where trade costs are high the cost of producing a good which utilises a 
high share of imported intermediates in producing exports will be 
relatively more expensive than in a low trade cost setting and affect 
comparative advantage. 
We find compelling evidence to support this hypothesis. Specifically, 
countries with 'good' trade cost endowments specialise in exporting goods 
that are trade cost intensive?8 We also investigate whether comparative 
advantage begins within a country's region and conduct various 
robustness and endogeneity checks. Until now theoretical models have 
used melting iceberg trade costs as the mechanism through which 
countries move between autarky and free trade. The work in this chapter 
contributes to a new literature which demonstrates how trade costs by 
themselves may be a source of comparative advantage worthy of 
theoretical modelling. It also shows that firm entry into export markets is 
also influenced by institutional factors that have been largely neglected. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 we provide 
an overview of the recent literature on trade costs and the pattern of trade. 
Section 4.3 provides a theoretical outline of a means of deriving a measure 
of trade costs from a gravity model. A summary of the dataset and the 
evolution of trade costs through time is provided in Section 4.4. The core 
hypotheses are formally investigated in section 4.5 while robustness tests 
28 Trade cost intensity is measured as the share of imported intennediate inputs used in 
the good's production. 
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are conducted in sections 4.6 and endogeneity tests in 4.7. Conclusions 
are drawn in section 4.8. 
4.2 Literature Review 
This section of the chapter reviews the existing evidence on how elements 
of trade costs influence trade patterns. For a comprehensive review of the 
literature on trade costs and their impact upon the volume of trade see 
Anderson and Wincoop (2004). The foundations of this chapter's 
approach may be traced back to the papers of Keesing (1966) and Baldwin 
(1971). In Keesing's paper a positive correlation is found between US 
export perfonnance and industry skill intensities while in industry-level 
regressions of US net exports at aggregate and bilateral levels Baldwin 
demonstrated a range of significant relationships with cross-industry factor 
intensities. However, Leamer's (1980, 1984) critique that cross-
commodity or industry comparisons had weak theoretical underpinning 
led to this strand of the literature becoming unpopular. Specifically, he 
showed that industry export perfonnance did not depend in a strict 
Heckscher-Ohlin model on the input characteristics or factor intensities. 
Despite these criticisms the cross-industry methodology has been revived. 
Among other things this has been driven by recognition of, and allowance 
for, non-factor price equalisation and cross country differences in 
production techniques and technology. With the factor price equalisation 
requirement removed the commodity (industry) of production and trade 
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can be detennined. Romalis (2004), for example, shows that conditional 
on factor prices, industry export perfonnance in a quasi Heckscher-Ohlin 
model is detennined by industry input characteristics. Or more 
specifically, in tenns of the interaction of industry factor intensity and 
relative national factor endowments. 
This provides a theoretical underpinning to empirical studies. In the 
empirical application of his model Romalis (2004) uses US import shares 
of 123 countries in 370 industries. He shows a strong influence between 
the relative skill intensity and abundance on each country's share of US 
imports: skill abundant countries capture greater market share of skill-
intensive goods while the exports of countries with low human capital 
stocks tend to be concentrated on low skill-intensive industries. 
Although Romalis's model does not include trade costs it provides a 
framework upon which they may be incorporated. One of the first studies 
to do so is Levchenko (2007) which addresses how institutional quality 
affects the relative share of goods a country exports. His model builds on 
Romalis (2004) by introducing institutions into the framework. Cross-
sectional import data from the United States covering trade with 177 
partners in 389 four-digit industries is then used to test the model's 
predictions. As in the Romalis set-up his regressions include interactions 
between capital abundance and capital intensity as well as skill 
endowments and the skill intensity of the industry. However, a further 
interaction between institutional endowments and the institutional 
dependence of the industry is further incorporated. Institutional 
dependence (or intensity) is captured by a Herfindahl index. Where 
production of a good relies upon a greater number of inputs it is deemed to 
be more costly to produce in institutionally inferior countries since a 
greater number of transactions must be made. Levchenko finds that where 
a country that moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile in institutional 
quality, the predicted relative import share in the good occupying the 25th 
percentile in institutional intensity decreases by 0.09 standard deviations. 
The predicted relative import share of the good corresponding to the 75th 
percentile in institutional intensity increases 0.18 standard deviations. 
Institutionally superior countries therefore specialise in exporting goods 
which are institutionally complex. 
A similar study by Nunn (2007) studies a subset of institutional 
characteristics: the ability to enforce contracts. Where contracts are 
imperfectly enforced ex post there will be under-investment ex ante. 
Since countries with better contract enforcement will have less under 
investment, they will have a cost advantage in the production of goods 
requiring relationship-specific investments. To test whether this is the 
case he interacts the quality of a country's legal institutions with a 
measure of the extent to which each 6-digit industry relies on relationship-
specific investments. To construct the latter Nunn uses data on the inputs 
used by each industry. Where these inputs are traded on open markets 
they are assumed to require fewer relationship-specific investments. A 
one standard deviation increase in the judicial quality interaction is found 
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to increase exports by 0.33 standard deviations, providing support for his 
hypothesis. As in Romalis (2004) and Levchenko (2007), countries with 
large labour and capital endowments are found to export relatively more in 
sectors that utilise those inputs intensively. 
We build upon these papers to consider whether it is the case that 
countries with good trade cost endowments export relatively more 'trade 
cost intensive' goods. Although trade cost intensity appears difficult to 
conceptualise we believe that the share of imported intermediate inputs 
used in the production of exports represents a valid proxy. First because it 
tells us about the proportion of a good's inputs which must be imported 
for it to be produced and therefore the extent to which the finished good's 
price is subject to trade costs. Another feature of the measure is that it is 
reported on a cross-country and cross-industry basis meaning that we 
capture technological differences which so plagued early empirical 
investigations of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (see Leontief, 1953; Bowen 
et aI., 1987 and Trefler, 1993, 1995). 
4.3 Theoretical Foundations - The Gravity Model 
The gravity model has proven to be one of the most resolutely robust 
empirical relationships in economics. In spite of this, using the model to 
calculate trade costs has proven notoriously difficult, principally due to 
ambiguity surrounding how to quantify multilateral resistance. This has 
led authors to use proxies such as common borders and bilateral distance 
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to circumvent reliance upon actual price data (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003). 
However, Novy (2008) presents a means of getting around these problems 
by demonstrating that multilateral resistance can be captured by 
intranational trade. The model begins with the familiar gravity 
formulation in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) though Novy shows that 
the final result is invariant to whether the model is derived from a 
Ricardian (Eaton and Kortum, 2002) or heterogenous firms (Chaney, 2008; 
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) model of international trade. 
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(4.1) 
where xij are bilateral exports between country i and j, Yj, Yj and yW are 
GDP in country i,j and the world respectively, tjj represents bilateral trade 
costs between the two country pairs, D J ~ . . denotes multilateral resistance 
and a is the elasticity of substitution. 
The gravity model posits that all else being equal, bigger countries trade 
more with each other. Bilateral trade costs decrease bilateral trade but they 
are measured relative to multilateral resistances to trade: where the barriers 
between country i and the rest of the world (multilateral barriers) are lower 
relative to bilateral barriers between i andj, country i will trade less withj 
relative to all other destinations. 
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The innovation in Novy (2008) is that he shows a change in bilateral trade 
barriers does not only affect international trade but also intranational trade. 
For example, when the barriers to trade between country i and all other 
countries fall some of the goods that were previously consumed 
domestically are now shipped to foreign countries. Hence, it is not just 
international trade that is shaped by trade costs but intranational trade as 
well. 
Formally this can be seen through the representation of intranational trade 
as 
( J
1-'" 
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ii - W n D ' 
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(4.2) 
where Xii is intranational trade and Iii represents intranational trade costs: 
domestic transportation costs. Through rearrangement equation (4.2) can 
be solved for inward multilateral resistance 
(4.3) 
To eliminate the multilateral resistance terms from equation (4.1) Novy 
shows that the product of bilateral trade (xij*xji) is given as 
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(4.4) 
Incorporating equation (4.3) into (4.4) leads to the eventual solution for 
bilateral trade costs by using a geometric average and subtracting 1 to give 
a tariff equivalent 
1 1 
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where T ij measures bilateral trade costs, tijlji, relative to domestic trade 
costs, tiitjj.29 The intuition underpinning the bilateral trade costs is 
straightforward. The gravity equation tells us how consumers decide to 
allocate spending across different countries. If bilateral exports increase 
relative to domestic trade flows, it must have become easier for the two 
countries to trade with each other. The key advantage to this approach is 
that trade costs can then be captured using observable trade flows. 
4.4 Trade Costs through Time 
Using the framework outlined above we first analyse the behaviour of 
trade costs through time and across countries. We are able to compute T ij 
for a 181 countries using data on bilateral trade flows taken from the IMF 
29 Novy (2008) also derives trade costs using a Ricardian and two heterogenous finn models 
as the starting point. The relationship between bilateml trade costs and international and 
intranational trade is virtually identical. These are reported in the Appendix. 
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Direction of Trade Statistics database. Calculating intranational trade 
relies upon the UN's dataset and is calculated as 
n 
Xii =Yi - LXi} 
j=1 
(4.6) 
where Yi is output at basic prices in country i and xij denotes exports 
between country i and its partner,j.30 
There are 7 countries for which exports are recorded as being greater than 
OUtpUt.31 To avoid omitting these observations we use the methodology of 
Wei (1996) to calculate intranational trade. This relies on calculating the 
share of goods in GDP and multiplying this by the ratio of shipments-to-
value added. Tests reveal a high degree of correlation (0.96) between this 
measure of intranational trade and that proposed above. 
In total this provides 100,254 observations of bilateral trade costs over 108 
countries and partners across the years 1980-2008. The panels are far from 
balanced, in part due to the creation of many countries in the aftermath of 
the fall of the Berlin wall and myriad declarations of independence. 
30 Where zero exports are reported between two countries a value close to zero is entered to 
pennit calculation of trade costs between the pair. 
31 Austria, Ecuador, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
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Fig.Jre 4.1: Regional Average Trade Costs 1980-2008 
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Figure 4.1 depicts the evolution of trade costs across broad continental 
groupings during the period 1980 to 2008. In the years following the fall 
of the Berlin Wall there is a general upward trend in average bilateral trade 
costs. However, there is significant heterogeneity according to location. 
For example, Europe has the lowest average trade costs during the period 
ranging between approximately 240% and 325%. This is despite the 
region being one of the most integrated and lying at the centre of 
international trade networks. A possible explanation for the rise In 
European trade costs during the 1990s is the entry of several countries 
which were previously Soviet satellites. 
Asian and North American countries tend to have similar trade costs 
compared with Europe though they are marginally higher. In South 
America the ad valorem equivalent of the region's trade costs range 
between 300% and 410% implying that a good produced for $10 and 
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exported would incur $41 of additional costs due to crossing the border. 
Owing to their relative geographical isolation the Pacific countries also 
tend to have high trade costs compared with other regions. However, 
Africa has by far the most inferior trade cost endowments, in part due to its 
distance from world markets, geographical isolation and poorly developed 
markets. Despite a substantial fall in trade costs around 1990 from 
approximately 420% to roughly 325% there has been a general tendency 
towards rising trade costs throughout the remainder of the decade and the 
2000s which has returned trade costs to their 1990 levels. 
Fig..Jre 4.2: Intra-Regional Average Trade Costs 1980-2008 
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Part of the explanation for Africa's relatively high trade costs are barriers 
between countries within the continent. The data in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
indicate that the average African country faces substantially lower trade 
costs when dealing with external countries than with other African states. 
In contrast intra-regional bilateral trade costs in other countries tend to be 
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fairly homogenous as depicted in Figure 4.2 with South America 
converging towards this standard during the 1990s. This may indicate one 
reason why regional and bilateral trade agreements have become popular. 
Fig.Jre 4 .3: Extra-Regional Average Trade Costs 1980-2008 
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The information in Figure 4.3 provides insight into the upwards trend in 
trade costs depicted in Figure 4.1. This appears to stem from rising costs 
with countries located outside the region. Although there appears to be a 
drop in trade costs towards the end of the period this has been preceded by 
a significant increase in extra-regional trade costs during the preceding 
decade. This is particUlarly surprising given the advent of multilateral 
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that attempt to 
stem country' s protectionist tendencies. 
The geographical location of countries affects the cost of trade between 
them. Figure 4.4 suggests that transportation and infonnational costs are 
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higher the greater the distance between two countries. However, the 
relationship is not as robust as one would imagine. This may reflect two 
possibilities. First, gravity model estimates have failed to show decreases 
in the distance coefficient in gravity models over time (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2004). Second, our trade cost measure is already absorbing the 
effect of distance. 32 
There are also a number of outliers where the bilateral trade costs between 
the countries are high irrespective of their location. Typically, these are 
low-income countries. Among other things, their lack of development 
hampers them from taking advantage of scale economies when using 
ocean transport since their relatively small export values do not efficiently 
cover the high fixed costs of transportation (Hummels et aI., 2009). A lack 
of competition on shipping routes also raises the price of transporting 
goods due to monopolistic practices among shipping cartels. Hummels et 
al. (2009) find that exporters served by 2 ocean carriers face 21 % higher 
shipping prices than when 8 carriers operate on the route. 
32 The correlation between bilateral trade costs and distance between trading partners is 
0.06. 
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Proximity to major markets has been cited as a reason why some countries 
trade relatively more. This idea of economic remoteness is captured as 
[ J
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y .+ y . 
remoteness ij = '. J , 
dzst ij 
(4.7) 
where disti) is the great circle distance measured in kilometres between two 
countries and Yi and Yj are GDP in each country. Large countries are 
therefore less remote relative to small countries when distance is held 
constant. Equally small countries, such as the Netherlands, which are 
geographically close to large markets are less remote than those that are 
distant. 
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Owing to this one would expect that in addition to the effect of distance, 
bilateral pairs that are economically remote would also have higher 
bilateral trade costs. However, Figure 4.5 shows little relationship 
between the variables. This may be due to our trade cost variable 
capturing sources of trade costs well. For example, if trade flows between 
countries are highly determined by income in each then this will be 
absorbed as reducing trade costs. There are several countries which 
despite having low remoteness have high trade costs. This group is 
composed mainly of small island nations located in either the Indian or 
Pacific Ocean and sub-Saharan African or landlocked ex-soviet countries. 
The gravity literature has sought to investigate how various aspects of 
trade costs affect the volume of trade. For example, borders (McCallum, 
1994), information flows (Rauch and Trindade, 2001; Felbermayr, Jung 
and Toubal, 2009), transport costs (Limao and Venables, 1999), the World 
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Trade Organisation (Rose, 2004), shipping cartels (Hummels, Lugovskyy 
and Skiba, 2007) and currency unions (Rose and van Wincoop, 2001) 
have all been found to influence trade between countries. At heart these 
studies address how a particular facet of trade costs influence trade and 
study how either cross country or year variation affects trade flows. 
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The data in Figure 4.5 cast some light upon how some of the variables 
from the gravity literature affect bilateral trade costs. Countries bordering 
each other tend to have lower trade costs than non-contiguous countries 
but the border effect remains large: trade costs between average bordering 
pair raise export prices by approximately 150%. A shared colonial history, 
regional trade agreement, currency union membership and common 
languages also reduce trade costs. However, information flows appear to 
exert a large bearing on the cost of exporting. Even where countries share 
a common language the ad valorem equivalent of trade costs are 
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approximately 300% compared with 340% when the pair predominantly 
speak different languages. 
Figure 4.6: WTO Membership 
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Recently debate has focused on whether the WTO fosters trade linkages. 
Rose (2004) argues that the effects are not obvious while Subramanian and 
Wei (2007) show that there is a strong trade creation effect but that this is 
uneven across countries. In Figure 4.6 we observe that, on average, WTO 
membership reduces trade costs but the effect is marginal. Where both 
trading partners are members the average bilateral trade cost between them 
is roughly 320% while where neither are members the value is 340%. 
4.4.1 Sensitivity of Trade Costs to the Elasticity of Substitution 
The calculation of trade costs is reliant upon the elasticity of substitution. 
Assigning sensible values is far from easy given the lack of data for 
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several countries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report in their survey 
on trade costs that the elasticity of substitution typically falls in the range 5 
to 10. However, it does not help that there is little consensus in the 
literature about what the precise value should be. For example, Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) use a value of 8.3 while Chaney (2008) estimates a value 
of 2. Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2007) estimate magnitudes that are 
lower as do Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) who estimate the 
elasticity of substitution to be around unity. When studying bilateral trade 
costs between the United States and six major trading partners Novy 
(2008) uses a value of 8. 
Table 4.1: Elasticity of Substitution 
Elasticity of Substitution 
Country Partner 5 6 7 8 9 10 
United States Canada 0.603 0.482 0.401 0.343 0.300 0.266 
United States Zimbabwe 4.200 2.951 2.247 1.802 1.499 1.280 
The choice of the parameter value has important implications in 
calculating bilateral trade costs. As shown in Table 4.1 as the elasticity of 
substitution tends towards zero trade costs rise as consumers become more 
reluctant to consume foreign goods. The Table also shows that the 
estimates become increasingly erratic when the flow of exports between 
countries is low relative to intranational trade as demonstrated by the case 
of US trade with Canada and Zimbabwe.33 Circumventing this problem is 
not easy. A common elasticity of substitution across all countries is also 
33 Exports from the United States to Zimbabwe are 4 orders of magnitude less than with 
Canada. 
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unrealistic since consumers in poor countries are less likely to purchase 
goods from outside the country. Changes in the variable through time are 
also possible as countries grow their demand for imports may also change. 
For the purposes of the work in this chapter we use a value of 8 as in Novy 
(2008). 
4.4.2 Correlation between Aggregate Trade Costs and Existing 
Measures 
Table 4.2: Correlation Between Trade Cost Measures 
Trade Cost 
Market Potential 
Market Potential 
ICY Index 
Correlation 
0.317 
0.343 
0.429 
Source 
Redding and Venables (2004) 
Head and Mayer (2004) 
Hiscox and Kastner (2008) 
In the subsequent section we address the question of whether trade costs 
shape the pattern of trade. This relies upon using aggregate trade costs for 
each country which are calculated as the simple average of that country's 
bilateral trade costs with all partners. While it would be possible to 
calculate other permutations, such as export weighted trade costs, we 
refrain from doing so since trade costs between countries are high because 
they do not export. It is conceivable that in an environment of lower 
bilateral trade costs such countries may engage in trade. However, to 
weight aggregate trade costs according to the proportion of exports would 
produce a biased result since this would pay less attention to instances in 
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which the bilateral barrier is high. Table 4.2 shows the correlation 
between our preferred trade cost measure and those of Redding and 
Venables (2004), Head and Mayer (2004) and Hiscox and Kastner (2008). 
Some authors have provided novel ways of estimating trade costs. Some 
of these have focussed more on policy issues (Hiscox and Kastner, 2008; 
Kee, Nicita and Ollareaga, 2005, Sachs and Warner, 1995) while others 
have sought to quantify trade costs using indexes and direct measurements 
such as average tariffs (Economic Freedom Institute, 2006). Generally we 
find that there is a fairly low correlation between the existing measures 
(between 0.32 and 0.43). The low correlation is explained by the focus of 
Redding and Venables (2004) on geographical sources of market access 
and Hiscox and Kastner's policy orientated measure. Our measure 
captures both of these aspects as well as endowments and resources which 
may playa role. 
4.5 Trade Costs: A Source of Comparative Advantage 
To address whether trade costs affect the goods countries specialise in 
exporting, we construct a unique dataset using information drawn from 
several sources. We use 4-digit SITC (rev. 2) export data from the NBER 
described in Feenstra et a1. (2005). This contains information for 192 
industries for the year 2000. We weld this to a measure of aggregate trade 
costs derived using the data described in the previous section. The OECD 
STAN database provides information on human capital intensity 
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(measured as the percentage of total hours worked by high skilled 
workers) and physical capital intensity (fixed capital per worker) for 26 
countries during the time period. 
Finding time-varying measures of human and physical capital endowment 
data proved elusive. Hence we are forced to use that reported in Hall and 
Jones (1999) which is for 1988. However, the results do not change if we 
use similar data provided by Antweiler and Trefler (2002). Finally, trade 
cost intensity is measured as the share of imported intermediates used in 
the production of exported goods produced at the 2-digit ISle level. This 
is provided in the OEeD's STAN Input-Output database. High values 
therefore indicate that the good will be more expensive to produce in 
countries where trade costs are high as opposed to where they are low. An 
attractive property of our measure of trade cost sensitivity is that it varies 
in both the country and industry dimensions. A concordance is used to 
map the 4-digit SITe industries to the ISle industry classification listed 
on Marc Muendler's website. In order that we avoid possible endogeneity 
and simultaneity bias, we choose to apply the data on trade cost intensity 
for the United States from the year 2000 to all country-industry pairs and 
omit the US from the model. Identification is therefore attributable to 
changes in country-specific trade costs over time. 
Further measures of trade costs are included to ensure that a particular 
definition of trade costs does not influence the results. The methodology 
outlined in Redding and Venables (2004) provides a means of estimating 
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country-level market access and supplier access. These are derived by 
first estimating a gravity model of trade. Market access is defined as the 
distance-weighted sum of the market capacities of all partner countries. 
This captures all non-policy, or geographic, sources of trade costs. A 
gravity model of bilateral trade is estimated with controls for distance, 
common borders and country and partner fixed effects. The country and 
partner dummies then provide estimates for the market capacities while 
the distance and border coefficients are used to calculate bilateral transport 
costs. Similar measures are estimated by Head and Mayer (2004). Both 
the Redding and Venables (2004) and Head and Mayer (2004) estimates 
of market access are taken from CEPII's Real Market Potential dataset. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of the Trade Cost Variables 
Count !Trade Cost No R&V H&M ICY 
Austria 2.33 .05 .06 3.29 
Belgium 1.58 .05 .05 2.12 
Canada 2.41 .05 .06 3.22 
Czech Republic 2.19 .05 .06 
Denmark 2.03 .05 .06 3.26 
Finland 2.41 .05 .06 3.28 
France 1.63 .05 .06 2.90 
Germany 1.63 .04 .05 2.96 
Greece 3.01 .05 .06 3.47 
Hungary 2.17 .05 .06 
Iceland 3.84 .06 .07 3.39 
Ireland 2.02 .05 .06 3.25 
Italy 1.73 .05 .06 3.07 
Japan 1.91 .04 .05 2.96 
Korea 1.81 .05 .06 
Netherlands 1.58 .05 .05 2.63 
New Zealand 2.74 .05 .07 2.93 
Norway 2.43 .05 .06 3.46 
Poland 2.57 .05 .06 
Portugal 2.76 .05 .06 2.92 
Slovakia 2.88 .06 .06 
Spain 2.16 .05 .06 2.96 
Sweden 2.13 .05 .06 3.28 
Switzerland 2.01 .05 .06 3.12 
United Kingdom 1.67 .05 .06 3.18 
United States 1.82 .05 .06 3.03 
The evidence in Table 4.3 shows clear differences between country's 
aggregate trade costs. For example, Belgium's trade costs are 
approximately half those in Greece according to our preferred measure 
(Novy). A one standard deviation reduction in the ICY index is equivalent 
to reducing trade costs from the level in the United Kingdom (3.18) to 
France (2.90). The different trade cost measures exhibit key differences. 
For example, Hiscox and Kastner's methodology attaches more weight to 
policy influences. This explains why the open and integrated markets of 
Belgium and the Netherlands rank among the lowest trade cost countries 
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by this metric while on the other hand market access pays more attention 
to geographical considerations. Given its remoteness New Zealand 
appears as one of the highest trade costs when market access is used as 
does another remote island country, Iceland. 
The stark differences between countries' trade cost endowments lead us to 
investigate whether this acts as a source of comparative advantage in a 
manner similar to traditional endowments. For example, countries with 
low trade costs have an incentive to capture market share in the production 
of goods which are highly sensitive to trade costs (Deardorff, 2004). 
Where a country's trade costs are sufficiently high then despite having a 
comparative advantage in producing good x it may be a net importer of the 
good. In the previous section we observed that countries with lower 
endowments of trade costs tended to export relatively more in industries 
which imported intermediates are intensively used. The framework used 
is similar to that of Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) whereby the basic 
framework of Romalis (2004) is augmented it include an additional 
interaction. An Ordinary Least Squares estimator is used to estimate the 
equation: 
(4.8) 
where xij is the log of the share of industry i's exports in world trade, a j 
and a j are industry and exporter fixed effects, Ij' hj and k j are trade cost 
intensity, skill intensity and capital intensity in industry i and Te, He and 
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Kc are the exporting country's trade cost, skill and capital endowment. 
£ ij is a well behaved error term. 
The model specified in equation (4.8) conforms to that used by Romalis 
(2004), Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007). Although the endowment 
and intensity variables are not included additionally these are captured by 
the country and industry fixed effects due to the cross-sectional nature of 
the data. The estimates of equation (4.8), reported in Table 4.4, confirm 
the view that trade costs act as an endowment in the same way as human 
and physical capital endowments. In regression 1 we find that countries 
with higher trade costs specialise in exporting goods with lower trade cost 
intensities. However, the hypothesis appears to be robust to the choice of 
how trade costs are measured. Compared to the estimates using the Novy 
trade cost variable the standardised coefficients are approximately half as 
small at -0.04, -0.03 and -0.04 when the Redding and Venables, Head and 
Mayer and Hiscox and Kastner variables are used respectively. A possible 
explanation as to why the coefficient estimates are relatively smaller is 
that the Novy (2008) methodology captures all sources of trade barriers 
while these are more concerned with either policy or geographical 
barriers. 
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Table 4.4: Global Comparative Advantage 
Variable 
tjTe -.08*** -.04*** -.03*** -.04*** 
(-9.73) (-4.50) (-4.22) (-4.34) 
kjKc .00 .01 .01 .01 
(.95) (1.37) (1.39) (1.37) 
hjHe .03*** .04*** .04*** .04*** 
(4.48) (5.06) (5.08) (5.16) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tet ICY R&V H&M ICY 
Number of Observations 72869 72869 72869 66402 
R2 
.34 .34 .34 .27 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the share of industry i of country c at 
time t in world exports. Beta coefficients are reported with robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent,S percent and 10 
percent, respectively. 
We find some support for traditional endowment variables affecting the 
pattern of trade. Larger endowments of human capital lead countries to 
specialise in exporting goods that use such inputs intensively in 
production. In comparable regressions Nunn (2007) and Levchenko 
(2007) estimate the human capital interaction beta coefficient to be 0.085 
and 0.11. Unlike Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) we find that 
countries with larger physical capital endowments are no more likely to 
specialise in exporting capital intensive goods. A possible explanation is 
that resources are frequently misc1assified as being physical capital 
endowments. 
Since there is a time dimension in trade cost and exporting behaviour there 
are concerns about the non-independence of observations across time 
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periods. Trade shares in 1995 may not be independent of what they 
looked like in 1990. To control for this we cluster the standard errors at 
the country-industry level. Although un-reported the results remain 
unchanged. 34 Clustering at this level also controls for the potential non-
independence across SITC industries that is introduced by having a unit of 
observation (SITC) which is finer than the ISIC level. Since the 
independent variables are measured at the ISIC level or coarser there are 
repeated values for these variables across observations which again may 
introduce correlation between the residuals across observations. 
4.5.1 Do Information and Infrastructure Underlie the Results? 
It has been shown by Rauch and Trindade (2002) that the presence of 
Chinese migrants fosters trade. They attribute this effect to social 
networks improving cross-border information flows and thereby reducing 
barriers to trade. To investigate whether information flows between 
countries are driving the results in Table 4.4 we augment equation (4.8) to 
include an interaction between trade cost intensity and the stock of 
migrants taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Another potential source of trade costs which has shown to be 
important by Limao and Venables (1999) is infrastructure. They 
demonstrate that the cost of shipping a standardised container from 
Baltimore incurs significantly different transport costs depending on the 
destination. To investigate whether this is driving the results we include 
34 The trade cost interaction coefficient estimate is -2.03 and the t-statistic is ·1.88. 
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two further interactions. WDI data is used to construct interactions with 
the total length ofthe road and rail networks in each country. 
Table 4.5: Infrastructure and Information Aspects of Trade Costs 
Regression 
Variable 2 
~ T c c -.08*** -.14*** -.16*** -.18*** 
(-7.83) (-9.36) (-8.60) (-9.05) 
kiKc .00 .01 .00 .00 
(.95) (1.22) (.61) (.31) 
hiHc .03*** .04*** .03*** .03*** 
(4.46) (4.83) (4.00) (3.85) 
~ * M i g r a t i o n n Stock -.00 -.07*** 
(-.01 ) (-3.31) 
ttRailroad kms .07*** -.06 
(5.39) (-.70) 
~ * R o a d d kms .10*** .23** 
(6.06) (2.29) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tel Novy Novy Novy Novy 
Number of Observations 72869 70472 56478 66402 
R2 
.34 .34 .35 .27 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the share of industry i of country j at time 
t in world exports. Beta coefficients are reported with robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *"," and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent, respectively. 
The results in Table 4.5 do not lend support to the view that information 
flows under pin the results. However, we do find that infrastructure plays 
a role. Countries with larger road and rail networks tend to specialise in 
exporting more trade cost intensive goods.3s It may be that transportation 
costs are a significant factor in the cost of producing these goods and a 
35 The results are robust to controlling for country size. That is railroad kilometres per 
hectare. 
159 
widespread transportation network reduces the costs of transporting 
imported intermediate inputs to factories within the country. While these 
interactions enter as significant determinants they do little to affect the 
main result: trade costs remain a source of comparative advantage. 
4.6 Robustness Testing - Alternative Model Specification 
To check that we are picking up genuine national trade cost effects on the 
composition of global trade we explore a specification which interacts 
national trade costs with the traditional endowment factors. This allows us 
to investigate a weaker hypothesis: that trade costs modify, rather than 
determine, comparative advantage. To study this we include interactions 
between the trade cost variables and the traditional endowment 
interactions. One would expect that countries with large endowments 
would specialise in exporting goods that use those factors intensively but 
that trade costs would reduce the effect. 
The results in Table 4.6 lend at best limited support to this hypothesis. 
Regression I is the only instance in which the results are in line with 
expectations: human capital endowments lead to specialisation in skill 
intensive sectors but trade costs reduce the effect. The remaining 
regressions show no consistency or pattern. For example the signs are 
wrong in regression 2, there are no patterns in regression 3 and the final 
column shows the opposite of what would be expected. 
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Table 4.6: Alternative Model Specifications 
Variable 
hjHc .14*** -.82*** -.14 .08 
(4.71) (-9.24) (-1.23) (1.34) 
klKc .02 .08 .03 -.27*** 
(.73) (1.18) (.32) (-5.87) 
hjHc*Tc -.11*** .87*** .18 -.03 
(-3.42) (9.85) (1.61 ) ( -.58) 
kjKc*Tc -.01 -.08 -.02 .28*** 
(-.44 ) (-1.07) (-.22) (6.08) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tc Novy R&V H&M ICY 
Number of Observations 72869 72869 72869 66402 
R2 
.34 .34 .34 .35 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the share of industry i of country j at time t in 
world exports. Beta coefficients are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at I percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Although it could be possible that the market access and ICY measures 
provide the most perverse results because of their geographical and policy 
focus we conclude that trade costs do not modify traditional sources of 
comparative advantage. Instead they independently shape export patterns. 
4.6.1 Robustness Testing - Comparative Advantage at a Local level 
Trade theory customarily explains trade by comparisons that are done 
globally. A country exports a good for which its own relative cost of 
production is low compared to the rest of the world, or it has a 
comparative advantage in goods that make intensive use of a factor it has 
relatively more of than the world. This may be appropriate if we believe 
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both proponents and opponents of globalisation who seem to see us 
moving ever closer to an integrated world economy where trade costs are 
low. The numerous studies surveyed in Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2004) demonstrate that some aspects of trade costs have been falling 
through time but that they are far from negligible. The advent of regional 
supra-national bodies like the European Union and free trade agreements 
such as NAFT A and Mercosur suggest that trade costs may be falling 
more rapidly at the regional than the global level. 
Deardorff (2004) has termed this form of export specialisation 'local 
comparative advantage'. Where trade costs are sufficiently high outside 
relative to within the region, a country's export bundle will be determined 
according to local comparative advantage. To explore whether 
comparative advantage is better defined locally we re-estimate equation 
(4.8) for Europe. The dependent variable becomes the share of exports to 
the other OECD countries in the dataset rather than the share of global 
exports. Given that our dataset is highly Eurocentric with all but five 
countries (Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the United States) 
coming from the region we use the OECD as the region to test for local 
comparative advantage. 
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Table 4.7: Share of Regional Exports 
Regression 
Variable 3 
tiTe -.02** -.00 -.01 -.01 
(-2.11 ) (-.46) (-1.20) (-1.40) 
hiHe -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 
(-.55) (-.39) (-.44) (-.19) 
kiKc -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 
(-.51) (-.24) (-.24) (-.65) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Te Novy RV HM ICY 
Number of Observations 70264 67652 67652 63797 
R2 
.11 .11 .11 .11 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the share of industry i of country j at time t in 
OECD exports. Beta coefficients are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses . 
• **, •• and • indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Overall the local comparative advantage model does not perform well. It 
is only in regression 1 of Table 4.7 that the trade cost interaction enters 
significantly with the correct sign. Regardless of which model we use the 
human and physical capital endowment interactions are insignificant. The 
explanatory power of the model is also much reduced. The results may 
reflect the fact that OEeD countries are heavily engaged in trade 
worldwide. When we condense the sample to include just the European 
countries in the sample the results do not change. 
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4.7 Endogeneity 
An important concern with the results reported so far is endogeneitY6. 
Countries that specialise in trade cost intensive industries may have 
incentives to reduce the trade costs their exporters face. To account for 
this we instrument trade costs using variables that reflect particular facets 
of trade costs. Indexes for freedom to trade and legal quality are extracted 
from the EFI (2002) data set. While it is easier to conceptualise how 
freedom to trade abroad may affect exports by altering trade costs, legal 
institutions are more complex. However, as shown by Nunn (2007) legal 
institutions affect a country's institutional environment and may therefore 
shape the type of goods it exports. The instruments may therefore be 
viewed as a subset of trade costs. 
36 When the residuals from regression 1 in Table 5.3 are regressed on the trade cost 
interaction the resulting t-statistic on the trade cost interaction is -25.98 indicating a 
statistically significant relationship between the residuals and regressor. 
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Table 4.8: Estimates using Instrumental Variables 
Variable/Regression 2 3 
Second stage IV regression - dependent variable is share of world e x p o r t ~ ~
~ T c c -.780*** -.732*** -.775*** 
(-4.29) (-3.68) (-4.24) 
kiKc 1.593 1.601 1.594 
(1.49) (1.50) (1.49) 
hiHc 1.927*** 1.94- 1.928*** 
(7.35) (7.37) (7.35) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 70264 70264 70264 
R2 
.55 .55 .55 
First stage regression - dependent variable is tTc 
~ ~*F reedom to trade 23.11*** 20.867*** 
(137.48) (36.71 ) 
~ * L e g a l l quality 18.85*** 1.986*** 
(68.65) (4.07) 
F-test 59684 8476 36384 
Overidentification test (p-value) .46 
Notes: The dependent variable in the second stage regressions is the log of the share of 
industry i of country j at time t in world exports. In the first stage regressions the 
dependent variable is the interaction between trade cost intensity and the freedom to trade 
or legal quality variables. Beta coefficients are reported with robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. .",.. and • indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively. 
In Table 4.8 we report the results of the first stage regression of the 
instruments on trade costs and the second stage results for the 
instrumented regression. We measure the index variables as their inverse 
so that countries with superior institutions have lower trade costs. The fist 
stage regressions show that the freedom to trade and legal quality 
interactions are positively correlated with the trade cost interaction an 
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indication that they pick up similar characteristics. In the second stage 
regressions the estimated coefficient on the instrumented trade cost 
interaction is -0.78 and -0.73 when freedom to trade and legal quality are 
used respectively. 
Having seen some evidence that our instruments work In an exactly 
identified model, we incorporate both instruments into the model in 
regression 3. Each enters the first stage significantly and with the 
expected sign. The second stage results continue to show a negative sign 
on the instrumented trade cost interaction and the over identification test 
confirms the validity of the instruments. A problem with the instrumental 
variables estimates is that the trade cost interaction is larger than when 
OLS is used; in regression I of Table 4.4 the coefficient estimate was -
0.68. Since we envisage there to be potential reverse causality between 
exports and trade costs, the estimates using instrumental variables should 
be smaller than those computed using OLS. This would imply that our 
instruments are not entirely exogenous to the second stage error term and 
this biases the result. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this chapter builds upon recent enquiries that 
have shown particular aspects of trade costs to affect a country's 
comparative advantage. We confirm that aggregate trade costs act in a 
similar manner and that countries with low trade cost endowments 
specialise in exporting goods which are more sensitive to trade costs. We 
show that this result is not driven differences in the type of goods rich and 
poor countries export nor does it arise at a local level. Instrumental 
variables confirm that endogeneity is not responsible for the patterns we 
observe though given that our instruments are a sub-set of aggregate trade 
costs concerns remain about what they capture. Owing to data limitations 
the analysis is restricted to observed trade and 32 countries. Although the 
results may not generalise across a wider spectrum of countries, what we 
lack in country coverage is offset by what we gain from using a cross-
country, cross-industry measure of trade cost sensitivity: something which 
so plagued early empirical investigations of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
The analysis also suggests that entry into export markets, particularly in 
terms of the extensive margin, are affected by institutional characteristics. 
Falling trade costs have implications upon the rate of chum in the domestic 
market as well as in foreign markets. As export opportunities emerge the 
expected profit from entry rises as in Melitz (2003) causing entry and more 
intense competition for market share. 
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4.9 Appendix 4 
Expressions for bilateral trade costs derived from Ricardian model of 
international trade (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), Chaney (2008) and Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008) 
1 1 
E'v (t .. t .. J2 (X..X .. J2/) T .. "=.JL.!!... -I=--.!!........!L -I 
IJ tjjt jj XijXjj 
1 1 
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(
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T.. =.JL.!!... -I = --.!!........!L -1 
IJ tjjt jj xijXjj 
Hiscox and Kastner (2008) Trade Cost Measure 
(A4.I) 
(A4.2) 
(A4.3) 
The ICY index provided by Hiscox and Kastner (2008) for 76 countries is 
estimated using a parsimonious gravity model is used to calculate an 
'ICY' index of trade costs. As shown in equation (A4.4) the gravity 
model only encompasses trade between two countries, the GOP of each 
country and, crucially, country fixed effects. 
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(
Miill) In /Y
il 
= ail + pin Yjl - 6ln D ij + G ijl (A4.4) 
where Mijt is the volume of imports between i and j in I, Yit is country i's 
GDP at I, ail is the importing country-year intercept for country i in year 
I, }}t is exportingj's GDP in year I, Dij is the distance between countries i 
andj and Gijl is a well behaved error term. 
The Hiscox and Kastner methodology relies on the country-specific fixed 
effects capturing all omitted variables that influence trade flows. 
Endowments, institutions, geographic location and policy factors as well 
as tariffs, non-tariff barriers and traditional trade cost measures are 
captured by the fixed effects. The simplicity of the model entails relying 
on a number of restrictive assumptions. For example, it is assumed that 
governments impose trade barriers in a bilateral fashion. This may be 
particularly severe since the partial equilibrium nature of the gravity 
model fails to account for how bilateral trade flows are influenced, not 
only by trade costs between the country pair, but also by other countries 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Another issue is the omission of 
relevant variables, such as resource endowments, which could bias the 
estimates. Export restrictions in partner countries are also assumed to 
have a negligible impact. Hiscox and Kastner address many of these 
concerns in their paper by including robustness checks that include 
remoteness variables, resource endowments and country year fixed effects. 
169 
The results show the underlying coefficient estimates to remain highly 
correlated with their initial estimates. 
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Chapter Five 
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Globalisation, Hollowing out, 
Multinationals and Productivity in 
Japan's Lost Decade 
5.1 Introduction 
During Japan's 'Golden Age' (1956-1973) growth in output per worker 
averaged 8% per annum, four times the rate recorded in the United States 
over the same period. While capital flows doubtless played a part in 
resurrecting a country destroyed by war, the productivity miracle was 
ultimately responsible for the sustained economic successes which 
culminated in Japan becoming the world's second largest economy. 
During this period per capita income levels rose from 27% of US levels in 
1956 to 69% by 1973 and 84% by the start of the 1 990s. 37 The subsequent 
'lost decade' has seen GDP growth stagnate and has been mirrored by 
equally sluggish productivity growth. In our sample we estimate that 
across the manufacturing sector productivity growth averaged just 0.5% 
per annum from 1994-2005, while per capita income is estimated to have 
fallen to around 72% of US levels. 
37 Data from Maddison (2009). 
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Numerous hypotheses have been advanced to explain Japan's soporific 
economic perfonnance since the early 1990s. Often these emphasise 
macroeconomic factors, such as fiscal policy (both too little and of the 
wrong sort) or the liquidity trap (Krugman 1998a, 1998b).38 Others have 
instead used micro level data and sought to explain the low rate of 
productivity growth that accompanied the lost decade, with the industrial 
structure of Japan, the banking sector and multinational finns often 
identified as key factors. 39 
A number of competing arguments are included here. Cowling and 
Tomlinson (2000) for example, argue that it was caused by the 'elite 
globalisation' strategies of Japanese MNEs.4o They posit that the 
domestic manufacturing sector has been 'hollowed out' as multinationals 
have offshored production to lower wage economies in the rest of Asia. 
This has resulted in the closure of what were relatively productive 
domestic plants adding further drag to productivity.41 A different 
explanation for the closure of more productive finns is offered by 
Nishimura et al. (2005), who focus on the role of banks in allocating 
financial resources to productive finns. They argue that during the 199617 
38 Makin (1996) for example cites the slow response of the Bank of Japan to reduce 
interest rates due to outdated inflation measures, and the impact this may have had on 
peoples' beliefs. Or alternatively, Krugman (1999) argues that the aging population's 
desire to save for their retirement, along with the country's risk adverse nature, 
demonstrated by its high savings rate and accentuated by the collapse of the bubble 
economy, reduced consumer spending. 
39 These are of course the same factors often used to explain its relative economic success 
~ ~ until that point. 
Over the period of study some 800,000 jobs have been shed by Japanese manufacturing 
firms. 
41 Nishimura et a1. (2005) report that relatively productive firms were closed in Japan in 
1996 and 1997, although they do not investigate whether these were multinational firms. 
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financial crisis this link broke down such that firms with relatively low 
productivity survived at the expense of those with higher productivity. 
Kimura and Fujii (2003) argue instead that excess plant closure during the 
1990s reflected the reversal of the rapid expansion into new products and 
markets by Japanese firms during the 1980s. 
Some in the literature have taken the opposite view that the rate of firm 
and plant closure has been too low, rather than too high. Caballero et al. 
(2003), Peek and Rosengren (2003), Aheame and Shinada (2005) and 
more recently the Economist (2009) have argued that stringent bankruptcy 
laws, a unique industrial structure and government intervention have 
resulted in a plethora of what they label 'zombie' companies. Equipment, 
buildings and labour have been fossilised in firms that achieve relatively 
low sales and profit margins. 
Finally, others emphasise the weak contributions to aggregate productivity 
growth from the within firm and between firm components of aggregate 
productivity change. Makin (2008) for example, discusses the effect from 
the weak balance sheets of Japan's banks, that resulted from the collapse 
of property and asset markets at the beginning of the 1990s, coupled with 
their close alliances with Japanese MNEs. According to this view, loans to 
firms outside of the keiretsu networks were limited, preventing investment 
in profitable projects such that the rate of productivity improvement within 
firms was too low. Finally, Kwon et al. (2009) return to the theme of 
zombie lending, but to show how this led to resource reallocation towards 
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finns with low productivity adding negatively to aggregate productivity 
growth. 
In this chapter we investigate whether low productivity growth in Japan is 
due to the role played by increased globalisation and multinational finns 
using micro-level data drawn from the Japanese census of manufacturing. 
We begin by decomposing aggregate productivity growth to assess the 
relative contributions from productivity improvements within plants, those 
which arise through plant entry and exit and the reallocation of market 
shares across plants. We find that the weak contributions made from the 
entry/exit and within plant growth components appear to be the main 
contributors to the low aggregate growth. 
Using the results from this exerCIse we then focus in detail on the 
determinants of these sources of productivity change. Within this we 
include questions prominent within the previous literature, but which have 
so far lacked fonnal quantitative evidence. This includes issues about the 
characteristics of plants that have been shut by Japanese MNEs. 
Throughout the exercise we compare our results with those found for 
similar questions for other countries and the previous evidence for Japan. 
From this we identify a number of aspects of the Japanese economy where 
behaviour is very similar to that for other developed countries, as well as 
areas where the behaviour is different. With respect to the finns and plants 
that are closed down we find that, as in other country contexts, these finns 
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are likely to be small and have low productivity. However, the estimated 
marginal effects are much smaller, a consequence of the very low rates of 
entry and exit from Japanese manufacturing. These low exit rates are at 
least in part explained by a striking difference between Japanese firms and 
those in other developed countries. Our results suggest that increased 
globalisation, including a measure of increased import competition from 
low wage economies, has had no effect on the entry and exit of firms and 
plants in Japan. An explanation for this result we find little support for is 
the strict rules on bankruptcy laws and 'zombie' loans, preferring instead 
an explanation that focuses on the regulations in place that prevents the 
entry of new plants. 
The low rate of productivity growth in Japan is also often seen as a 
product of Japanese MNEs off shoring production and shutting plants that 
are, relative to others in their industry, high productivity. We find that this 
is true, plants shut by MNEs are relatively more productive than the 
industry average, but they are generally weaker elements of the MNE 
more generally. This behaviour is also not distinct to MNEs. Both MNEs 
and other multi-plant firms shut weaker plants. Indeed the behaviour of 
these two types of firm is very similar, including again their lack of 
response to increased globalisation. Finally, our analysis suggests that the 
rate of productivity growth within plants is also partly a consequence of 
low entry and exit rates. Generally we find that the determinants of 
productivity change are similar to those found for other countries, but that 
productivity improvement is lower in industries in which globalisation is 
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higher. The low rate of entry and exit in Japan therefore means that this 
affects more firms than would otherwise have been the case. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides an 
overview of the literature on Japan and a history of the rise of 
manufacturing. Section 5.3 describes the data set we use and the 
decomposition of aggregate productivity. In Section 5.4 we investigate a 
host of hypotheses and report regression results. We address employment 
growth in Section 5.5 and the reasons for low within plant productivity 
growth in Section 5.6. The questions investigated in this section include 
the closure of plants and within firm productivity change. Finally, Section 
5.7 draws conclusions. 
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5.2 A Brief History of Japanese Manufacturing 
Between 1603 and 1868 the feudal Tokugawa shogunate that ruled Japan 
embraced a fonn of isolationism rarely seen. Owing to the perceived 
threat posed by Christian converts in Japan contact with the outside world 
was forbidden. Trade with foreigners was confined to a handful of the 
shogun's treasury agents who were allowed to purchase the goods brought 
by one Dutch boat and handful of Chinese merchants each year. By 1825, 
exports accounted for 1.4 cents per capita which was almost entirely made 
up of copper, camphor and seaweed (Bernhofen and Brown, 2005). 
Imports totalled a similarly paltry sum. 
Today Japan could not be more different. The economy is one of the most 
globalised, and, following its phoenix-like rise following World War 2, it 
is the second largest in the world. Japanese finns have succeeded in 
conquering foreign markets through intensive exporting and operations 
abroad. Its brand names are instantly recognisable and by 1996 
approximately 86,000 people were employed in Japanese manufacturing 
finns' foreign plants. However, since the late 1980s the Japanese 
economy has resided in the doldrums. Despite the windfalls global 
integration has bestowed on it there are now fears that multinationals have 
'hollowed out' the economy. In this section we review the rise of Japan 
on the international stage and how this has affected productivity and finn 
survival. 
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5.2.1 The Ascent of Manufacturing 
Throughout its modem era the bedrock of the Japanese economy has been 
the manufacturing sector accounting for as much as 44% of GDP 
(Statistical Handbook of Japan). As exemplified in Figure 5.1, the sector 
has been responsible for many of Japan's successes in international trade, 
running large, persistent current account surpluses. However, the 
underpinnings of such international competitiveness are not due to 
rapacious entrepreneurship or innovation alone. Indeed the Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has pursued an active 
industrial policy and played an interventionist role by designating specific 
industries as being 'strategic' (Johnson, 1982). 
Figure 5.1: Manufacturing Current Account 
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Since the Second World War Japanese manufacturers have benefited from 
a raft of measures. Cowling and Tomlinson (2001) note that policy 
makers have granted direct subsidies, discriminatory tariffs, import 
restrictions and favourable industry regulation to manufacturing industries. 
MITI also helped stifle foreign competition through tariffs and quotas until 
1971. Restrictions were imposed on inflows of foreign direct investment 
to protect infant industries yet Japanese firms were encouraged to 
collaborate, with foreign firms abroad. 
A feature of manufacturing industries in Japan is their geographical 
concentration. For example, of Japan's 47 prefectures, 73% of machinery 
output occurs in 15 prefectures (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001). The 
reason for this concentration is partly due to the large labour force and 
transportation links present. However, another explanation is the keiretsu 
industrial structure. Alongside favourable government policies, Japanese 
firms have relied heavily on close relationships and co-operation between 
suppliers (buyers) of their inputs (outputs) to reduce costs and satisfy 
demand. Consequently there are extensive linkages between upstream and 
downstream firms within the same industry. This results in specialisation 
by the majority of small keiretsu firms which supply intermediate inputs. 
For example, 56% of small Japanese firms are involved in some form of 
subcontracting (Whittaker, 1997). A product of keiretsu networks is the 
Just-in-Time (JIT) model of production. JIT was designed to minimise 
inventories yet respond to daily orders as quickly as possible. Production, 
the supply of parts and delivery are coordinated in a horizontal manner 
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(Aoki, 1990). This reduces production costs and maintains product 
quality. 
The construction of keiretsu networks did not just extend to production. 
Banking keiretsu were also set up to provide finance to corporations. 
Aoki (1990) mentions that often a 'main bank' acts as the principle lender 
to the company and that it is responsible for closely monitoring the 
company's business affairs42. However, despite their financial ties main 
banks tend not to intervene while the corporation continues to make 
profits43 • Ordinarily the role of the banking keiretsu was to provide low-
cost, long-term finance. 
Keiretsu networks were not mere coincidence. Rather they were 
propagated by MITI which sought to encourage a system of mass 
production with large corporations at the centre supported by keiretsu sub-
contractors (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001). As mass production 
flourished, domestic markets became saturated with consumer durables. 
Initially corporations overcame this by exporting. However, the resulting 
large trade surpluses led to retaliatory trade barriers. To overcome these 
barriers Japanese firms began to locate abroad. 
Since MITI relaxed restrictions on outward FDI in 1971 Japanese firms 
have steadily relocated production abroad. Between 1981 and 1995 $470 
42 Financial institutions as a whole (including insurance companies) own about 40% of 
the total outstanding stock of listed companies. However, the main bank has the closest 
ties with the finn, both in tenns of cash-management, as well as short tenn credits. 
43 During crises the main bank would assume responsibility for conducting rescue 
operations (Aoki, 1990). 
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billion was invested by Japanese finns in foreign affiliates (Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2001). Figure 5.2 also shows that this trend has continued in 
the subsequent decade. In 2004 the number of Japanese establishments 
located abroad had approximately doubled since 1995. Unsurprisingly the 
firms which have most vigorously embraced the benefits of globalisation 
were the ' national champions ' around which keiretsu sub-contractors 
orbit. 
Figure 5.2: Japanese Firms Abroad and Foreign Firms at 
Home 
7000 ,.---------------------------, 
.!!l 6000 
'0 ; 5000 
Q; ~ ~ 4000 
.0111 
E = 3000 
:1.0 
Z ~ ~ 2000 
w 1000 
obL,- ....... --.--.IIL-. ... IL,- ...... --
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Year 
l-Japanese Establishments Abroad _ Foreign Establishments in Japan I 
L-____ ~ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ~ - - __ ~ ~ ~ __ 
Note: Data obtained from OECD's The Role of Multinationals in OECD conomie 
5.2.2 The Impact of Globalisation on Japanese Firms 
The Melitz (2003) model of heterogenous finns in international trade 
demonstrates that trade liberalisation affects aggregate productivity and 
causes finn death. Increased export opportunities raise the incentive to 
enter the domestic market leading to more competition amongst firms. 
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Firms with productivity below some threshold can no longer survive and 
exit the market. This prompts reallocations of market share away from 
less productive, and towards more productive, firms leading to an increase 
in aggregate productivity. A model by Helpman et al. (2004) shows 
similar results when foreign direct investment is incorporated into the 
model. 
Bernard and Jensen (1995) established that exporters in the United States 
are more productive than non-exporters. Similar findings have been 
observed in other countries: for example, Clerides, Lach and Tybout 
(1998) for Colombia, Mexico and Morocco, Bernard and Wagner (2001) 
for Germany and Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi and Sokoloff (2002) for five 
East Asian countries. There is also a raft of evidence showing that various 
forms of globalisation affect exit. For example, Pavcnik (2002) shows 
trade liberalisation in Chile during the late 1970s and early 1980s cause 
firm death. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) find low-wage import 
penetration to cause death in the United States while Simpson (2008) 
observes that off shoring increases plant death in the United Kingdom. 
With these ideas in mind, and the knowledge of how Japanese firms 
embraced globalisation we tum to the evidence on the type of firms which 
export and invest abroad and how this affects exit. 
Using longitudinal panel data over the period 1994 to 2000 Kimura and 
Kiyota (2006) find that exporters are 3.54 percent more productive than 
non-exporters and firms which engage in FDI are 3.79% more productive 
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than firms that do not have any foreign affiliates44 • There also appears to 
be an ordering of firm's international orientation according to 
productivity. Firms with the highest TFP engage in both exporting and 
FDI, the next most productive only engage in foreign direct investment 
and firms which only export have the lowest productivity of globally 
engaged. Kimura and Kiyota (2006) also find that productive firms are 
more likely to become exporters or multinationals. Survival in foreign 
markets also affects firm productivity. Entering the export market 
increases firm TFP by 2.19% but firms which remain exporters between 
periods have 3.58% higher productivity. 
The effects of globalisation upon firm survival in Japan have also been 
addressed to a certain extent. Using information on firm death, rather than 
plant death, Kimura and Kiyota (2006) find that exporting firms face 
hazard rates 7 -18 percent lower than non-exporters. However, 
multinational firms face hazard rates 9-23 percent higher than non-FDI 
firms. Kiyota and Kimura attribute the negative effect of foreign direct 
investment on firm survival to the high financial or managerial burdens 
placed on small firms which are engaged in FDL45 
In another study Kimura and Fujii (2003) investigate the determinants of 
firm survival in Japan using firm-level data over 1994 to 1999. For firms 
with more than 100 workers they find firm size and R&D reduce the 
probability of exit while high wage firms are more likely to exit. Global 
44 Finns are considered to conduct FDI where they have at least one foreign affiliate. 
4S In Chapter Four we show that this is not the case. Rather it is the multi-plant 
component instead. 
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engagement is again found to affect survival. Exporters are less likely to 
close but firms which outsource from abroad are more susceptible to 
closure but as the firm becomes larger the effect vanishes. There is also 
evidence that firms relocate production across borders when they own 
foreign affiliates and that their high-wage, and low value added, Japanese 
affiliates are more likely to die. 
The evidence presented by Kimura and Fujii (2003) and Kimura and 
Kiyota (2006) suggests that Japanese firms which engage in globalised 
activities have similar traits when compared with equivalent firms 
elsewhere. They also show that exporting and foreign direct investment 
affects the survival of Japanese firms. However, their regressions suffer 
from omitted variables: no controls are included for import penetration, 
multinational status or sunk costs. No mention is made of how firm exit 
or the entry into export markets affects aggregate productivity. 
5.2.3 A Hollow Giaot? 
The collapse of the Nikkei stock market in 1989 heralded the start of a 
new era for the Japanese economy. In 1991 property values plummeted, 
growth stagnated and the country was periodically mired in recession 
(1991-1993 and 1998-1999). Unlike in any other developed country, 
deflation became normal. Arguments on why Japan met this fate have 
been varied. Krugman (1994) suggests that state sponsored investment 
propelled the high post-war growth rate rather than productivity 
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improvements. The Bank of Japan's extremely hawkish monetary policy 
during the 1980s may also be a contributing factor. However, recently 
some commentators have propounded the view that the Japanese economy 
has been 'hollowed out' by multinationals which will lead to economic 
decline and stagnation. 
The decision by post-war Japanese policy makers to pursue an institutional 
form of capitalism resulted in the construction of keiretsu networks. This 
was in part due to MITI's explicit favouring of large corporate groups to 
create economies of scale and thereby catch-up with foreign competitors. 
However, following the relaxation of restrictions on outward FDI in 1971 
and the removal of currency controls in 1980, Japanese corporations began 
to establish foreign affiliates with gusto. The scale of this relocation of 
investment and production should not be underestimated. Between 1981 
and 1995 the average annual growth in the outward flow of Japanese FDI 
was 22% and during which time the manufacturing sector shed 1 million 
jobs (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000). 
Japanese multinationals have been perceived to have taken advantage of 
the liberalisation of restraints on FDI to relocate production abroad. 
Indeed between 1985 and 1997 there has been a four-fold increase in 
Japan's aggregate overseas production ratio (Cowling and Tomlinson, 
2000). Some multinationals have done so in order that they overcome 
export barriers, for example, the Japanese car manufacturers in the United 
States. Others have embraced offshoring as a means of cutting costs. 
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Much of this has been concentrated on the low-wage economies of East 
Asia. Cowling and Hollingsworth (1998) find that a 10% fall in real 
wages in East Asia reduces aggregate Japanese domestic manufacturing 
output by 3%. 
The relocation of production abroad has had profound consequences upon 
the keiretsu firms. Between 1991 and 1996 the volume of orders placed 
by Japanese corporations halved (Japanese Small Business Research 
Institute, 1996). The plight of small domestic firms has been compounded 
by their weaker bargaining power since multinationals may threaten to 
purchase their intermediate inputs from their global supply chains. The 
keiretsu linkages led small firms to become highly specialised in 
production. Coupled with extensive customisation this leaves little 
opportunity to attract new buyers or enter new markets. On average, small 
firms' gross profit margins fell from 3.5% in the period 1986-1991 to 
1.6% in 1992-1997 highlighting the competitive pressures they face 
(J apanese Statistical Yearbook, 1999). 
Total factor productivity growth in all of Japan's industrial sectors has 
been declining since the 1980s (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001). This 
could reflect Japan's proximity to the technological frontier following the 
productivity 'miracle'. However, during the 1990s TFP growth 
accelerated in the United States. Another explanation could be that the 
cross-shareholdings, the keiretsu networks and the long-term inter-firm 
relationships have made the cost of firms' exits extraordinarily high 
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(Kimura and Fujii, 2003). Low productivity firms have not exited the 
market and have held back aggregate productivity growth. However, 
Cowling and Tomlinson (2001) have advanced the view that hollowing 
out has been responsible through the relocation of productive 
multinational plants, and those of their keiretsu suppliers, abroad. 
5.3 Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity 
" the demise of the keiretsu relationships and the transfer of higher 
value added activities overseas will reduce both total factor productivity 
growth and international competitiveness." Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) 
The data we use in this paper combines information from the Japanese 
"Census of Manufacturers" and the "Basic survey on Japanese Business 
Structure and Activities" (BSJBSA) conducted annually by MET!. 
Further details on these datasets can be found in the Appendix to this 
chapter. The "Census of Manufacturers" (COM) comprises 169,590 plant-
level observations from 1994 to 2005 for all establishments with more 
than 5 employees.46 A lack of data on intangible assets, necessary in the 
construction of TFP, means we are also forced to exclude plants with less 
than 10 employees from the sample. We use this data to conduct a 
decomposition of aggregate productivity following the methodology 
outlined in Griliches and Regev (1995). This methodology provides the 
46 Entry and exit will therefore be defined by movement above and below this level. 
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contribution to aggregate productivity growth from that within plants, the 
between component (the reallocation of market share across plants in the 
industry) and that which follows from the entry and exit of plants in the 
industry. We link the COM plant-level data to the BSJBSA firm-level 
data. The use of the BSJBSA restricts our regression analysis later in the 
paper to include only firms with more than 50 employees, although it is 
worth noting that the lower limit on plants remains 10 employees. 
As already discussed we estimate that the aggregate rate of productivity 
growth across the manufacturing firms within our sample was just 0.5 per 
cent per annum. This figure lies between the estimates for the Japanese 
economy as a whole of 0.8 per cent per annum (1990-1995) by Jorgenson 
and Motohashi (2005), 0.2 per cent per annum (1991-2000) by Hayashi 
and Prescott (2002) and 0.1 per cent (1991-2002) by Aheame and Shinada 
(2005). Decomposing this growth using equation (3.1) suggests that all of 
the channels have contributed positively to the overall rate of productivity 
growth in Japan. Therefore none has been very fast as a consequence, such 
that all of the channels would appear to be relevant when discussing 
explanations behind the low rate of Japanese productivity growth. 
M: = LB;6pil + L ~ B ; , ( P i i -p}+ LOApit -p}- LB;t-k(Pit-k -p} (5.1) 
within between enrty Exit 
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Table 5.1: M u ~ i n a t i o n a l l and non-MNE Plant Productivity Decompositions 
Obs Rate % Contributed b MNEs 
Average Annual Productivity Growth Rate 143725 0.5% 
Of which 
Within Plant 143725 .14 28.6 
Between Plant 143725 .83 32.5 
Plant Entry 143725 .01 0.0 
Plant Exit 143725 .02 50.0 
Note: Multinational components include domestic and foreign multinationals 
According to Table 5.1 the majority of this growth, 68 per cent, is 
contributed by non-MNE firms. This is disproportionate to the 
employment and output shares of such firms: non-MNEs account for 49 
per cent of employment and 35 per cent of output. In this sense it would 
also seem that any explanation of the slow productivity growth in Japan is 
also likely to include both multinational and non-multinational firms. For 
both MNEs and non-MNEs aggregate growth primarily arose through the 
reallocations of market share from less productive to more productive 
firms. This form accounted for 82 per cent of productivity growth, or an 
average annual rate of 0.83 per cent per annum. Of interest this rate of 
growth is comparable to that reported for the US in Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Krizan (2001), which might be used to suggest that within firm and 
entry and exit are the main sources for slow growth in Japan relative to 
that found in other developed countries. 
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In support of this view, and in contrast to the fears of hollowing out 
through the closure of finns and plant, the effect of closure accounted for 
just 1 % of total productivity growth. This, is as Ahearne and Shinada 
(2005) and The Economist (2004, 2009) suggested, and as we show in 
more detail below would appear to be explained largely by the very low 
rate of entry and exit that occurred within Japanese manufacturing. 
Finally, the contribution from within plant productivity growth was just 14 
per cent, on average. To provide some context to this figure, Haltiwanger 
(1997) found within plant productivity changes in manufacturing 
industries generated 54% of aggregate U.S. productivity improvements 
between 1977 and 1987. For Israel, Griliches and Regev (1995) found the 
figure to be 83% for the years 1979-88. 
The decompositions we present also broadly support those in Ahearne and 
Shinada (2005) that use data on finns listed on the Japanese stock 
exchanges on an industry-by-industry basis. While there are differences 
across sectors, they calculate that for the construction, wholesale and 
retailing industries in Japan that the between component of aggregate 
productivity growth was negative, while it was close to zero in most 
manufacturing sectors. 
In the next section of the paper we explore the detenninants of the 
different elements of aggregate productivity, starting with the question of 
why the rate of exit is very low in Japan and whether this is explained by 
the actions of MNEs or of the forces of globalisation. We separate this 
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question into two parts. The first compares the closure of single and multi-
plant firms in a single framework. We then consider the question of which 
plants within a firm are singled out for closure. The final section considers 
the rate of productivity growth within firms. Given the comparability with 
the contributions to overall productivity growth found in the US we 
choose to exclude the between component from further analysis. 
5.4 Empirical Results 
Question 1: What causes the closure of Japanese plants? 
We identify exit from the sample using the unique identification number 
given to all firms and their plants. A plant is deemed to have entered 
when it is observed at time t but was not observed in the dataset in the 
previous period, t-1. Equivalently, a plant that exits is one that was 
observed at t-1, but not at time t. In Table 5.2 we report the rate of entry 
and exit within each year for the total sample and for MNEs, and for 
single and multi-plant non-MNEs. Throughout the sample there are 2,330 
instances of entry and 3,392 observations of exit, with a median rate of 
exit of 1 per cent per annum.47 The low rate of entry and exit is consistent 
with the high average age of firms in the sample, which is over 40 years. 
We use this to suggest that the low rate of exit is not a consequence of the 
size threshold imposed on the Japanese census data at 5 employees. It also 
47 These are line with the evidence for Japan reported in Caballero et al. (2003), Peek and 
Rosengren (2003) and Ahearne and Shinada (2005). 
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suggests that low entry and exit rates have been a feature of the Japanese 
economy for a very long period of time, and are therefore unlikely to be 
the reason that productivity growth declined in Japan after the 'golden 
age'. Finally, in contrast to any argument that they are a consequence of 
some form of active industrial policy in Japan, it is worth noting that they 
are a feature ofthe data that also holds across industries. 
This rate of exit is much lower than that found for other developed 
countries. For the U.S. Bernard and Jensen (2004) calculate 32 per cent of 
plants are shut over a 5 year period. Indeed the rate of churn (entry plus 
exit) in Japan is most similar to that found for small, open developed 
countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden rather than the typical 
large developed country. According to the Eurostat FEED48 dataset the 
lowest rate of chum amongst European countries is 5.7 per cent in 
Switzerland, 9.3 per cent in Sweden and 9.7 per cent in Austria. For 
France, Germany and the UK the comparable figures are 11, 17 and 18 per 
cent respectively. Low entry and exit rates in smaller countries are usually 
explained as a result of the open nature of their economies, resulting in 
severe left truncating of the productivity distribution in a Melitz (2003) 
type of framework. A consequence of this is the high share of exporters in 
the total population of firms. Greenaway et aI. (2008) report for Sweden 
that exporters account for over 80 per cent of the total number of firms. In 
our data the proportion of exporters is around 30 per cent, a figure it is 
worth noting is likely to be biased upwards because export information is 
48 Eurostat Firm Entry and Exit Data Dimensions. 
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available only for firms with more than 50 employees. Severe left 
truncating of the productivity distribution would not therefore appear to be 
a likely source of low entry and exit rates in Japan. 
Table 5.2: Annual Entry and Exit Rates 
Complete Sample MNE Multi (ex. MNE) Single Plant 
Year Ent Exit Ent Exit Ent E x ~ ~ Ent Exit 
1994 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1995 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1996 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1997 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
1998 .03 .03 .02 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 
1999 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 
2000 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 
2001 .01 .03 .01 .03 .02 .03 .01 .03 
2002 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 
2003 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
2004 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 
2005 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Entry and exit rates vary across firm types, with the highest rates 
identified in multi-plant firms and multinationals. While these rates of exit 
are low when compared to other countries, that they are higher relative to 
those found for single plant firms might explain why the rate of closure of 
plants is seen by commentators within Japan as high, although some 
cultural aversion to exit would be needed to claim that these are excessive. 
That the rate of exit is higher for multi-plant firms would appear consistent 
with the explanation of corporate restructuring by large Japanese firms as 
a result of their over-expansion in the 1980s by Kimura and Fuji (2003) or 
alternatively of offshoring of the production of intermediate inputs by 
Japanese multinationals. 
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As multi-plant and multinational finns are typically larger and more 
productive than single plant finns it would also appear consistent with the 
argument made in Nishimura et al. (2005) that this could have acted as a 
drag on aggregate productivity growth. We explore this point in Table 5.3 
below where we report the average productivity of plants according to 
their ownership and if they exit alongside the averages for finns of 
different types as a whole. As expected, the table shows that, on average, 
plants owned by MNEs are some 7 per cent more productive than the 
average plant within the same industry and some 10 per cent more 
productive than the average non-MNE plant. It would also seem that, 
conditional on their ownership, plants that exit have lower average 
productivity compared to those that remain. In the case of MNE plants this 
difference is small at 1 per cent, but it is larger for non-MNE plants at 4 
per cent. The table also confirms the view that the plants shut by MNEs 
are relatively productive compared to other plants in the manufacturing 
sector and could therefore contribute negatively to aggregate productivity 
growth. Plants shut by MNEs are on average 6 per cent more productive 
than the average plant in the manufacturing sector. 
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Table 5.3: Plant Productivity Across Firm Types 
Firm Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average Plant Productivity 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36 
Average Plant Productivity if Owned by: 
Muttiplant Multinational 41690 1.03 .40 -4.81 4.36 
Single Plant Muttinational 11638 .99 .35 -2.39 3.83 
Domestic Multiplant Firm 41998 .93 .36 -3.66 4.3 
Single Plant Domestic Firm 74264 .92 .30 -4.34 3.68 
Average E x ~ i n g g Plant Productivity if Owned by: 
Muttiplant Multinational 1142 1.02 .51 -2.26 4.36 
Single Plant Muttinational 174 1.02 .57 -1.03 3.83 
Domestic Multiplant Firm 1237 .88 .51 -2.85 4.3 
Single Plant Domestic Firm 839 .90 .47 -2.12 3.44 
What are the factors that explain which plants and finns are shut in Japan? 
In Table S.4 we investigate the detenninants of plant closure using a Cox 
Proportional Hazards model. In so doing we build on prior evidence for 
Japanese manufacturing found in Kimura and Fujii (2003) and Kimura and 
Kiyota (2006), which we extend to consider the role of finn and industry 
import penetration, the multinational status of the finn and industry sunk 
costs. We group the dependent variables into plant, finn and industry level 
detenninants of exit. The plant level variables include measures of size 
(employment), capital intensity, TFP and average wage. Summary 
statistics of these variables can be found in Table AS.1 in the Appendix. 
The finn level variables capture the R&D intensity of the finn, its 
ownership (whether it is a foreign owned finn), and the extent of its 
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engagement with global markets (whether it exports, imports or owns 
affiliates abroad). The industry level measures attempt to capture the 
effects of globalisation on the probability of survival more generally and 
are measured by import penetration and intra-industry trade. Summary 
statistics of these and the firm variables are reported in Appendix Table 
AS.2 and AS.3. 
The hazard function, h(t), is defined as the rate at which plants exit in the 
interval between t and t+ J conditional upon having survived until t. 
Failure is defined as when a plant exits and survival is the number of years 
the plant is present in the dataset. The hazard rate is specified as 
(5.2) 
where ho is the baseline hazard. X is a vector containing plant, firm and 
industry variables. Throughout the analysis a Cox proportional hazards 
model is used due to its flexibility though we also use duration models to 
ensure our results are not a product of unobserved heterogeneity. Using a 
Cox model also implicitly incorporates entry into the model. A hazard 
ratio less than 1 indicates that an explanatory variable reduces the 
probability of exit while values in excess of 1 imply a greater risk of 
failure. Non-parametric estimators have proved popular in the plant exit 
literature with Mata and Portugal (2002) and Bandick (2007) employing 
them to describe the survival rates of Swedish multinational owned, and 
Spanish, plants. 
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The results in Table 5.4 suggest that the type of plants that are closed in 
Japan are similar to those found to exit in other countries. We find in 
regression 1 that the probability of exit is decreasing in the size, capital 
intensity and TFP of the plant and increasing in the average wage. This 
matches evidence reported in Dunne et al. (1989), Gorg and Strobl (2003), 
Mata and Portugal (1994). Bernard and Sjoholm (2003), Bernard and 
Jensen (2007) for other OECD countries and Kimura and Fujii (2003) for 
Japan. The probit results in the table suggests however. that the effect of 
these variables on the probability of exit is very small. an artefact of the 
low rate of exit in the sample. A one unit increase in plant size, capital 
intensity or TFP reduces the hazard by 74%, 22% and 40% respectively. 
Upstream plants, which are more materially intensive, face 22% lower 
hazard rates relative to the baseline. 
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Table 5.4: Exit in Japan 
Variable/Regression 1 2 3 4 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio MFX MFX 
Estimator Cox PH Duration Clolog Probit 
Plant Variables 
Size .27*** .26*** -.012*** -.014*** 
(-34.70) (-34.23) (-37.02) (-36.41) 
Capital intensity .79*** .78*** -.002*** -.003*** 
(-10.51) (-10.49) (-9.76) (-10.29) 
TFP .62*** .60*** -.005*** -.008*** 
(-7.27) (-7.41) (-6.95) (-8.44) 
Wages 1.90*** 1.91*** .007*** .010*** 
(7.89) (7.57) (8.49) (8.94) 
Material Intensity .78*** .77*** -.002*** -.004*** 
(-5.80) (-5.84) (-5.48) (-6.99) 
Firm Variables 
Export dummy .01*** .01*** -.047*** -.053*** 
(-7.55) (-7.46) (-4.80) (-5.30) 
Import dummy .15*** .12*** -.015*** -.019*** 
(-3.43) (-3.53) (-3.69) (-3.97) 
Firm exports 1.17*** 1.18*** .002*** .002*** 
(7.62) (7.52) (7.51 ) (7.56) 
Firm imports 1.08*** 1.09*** .001*** .001*** 
(3.68) (3.78) (3.65) (3.82) 
R&D intensity 1.00 1.00 .000 .000 
(-.27) (-.49) (.19) (.33) 
Domestic MNE dummy 1.35*** 1.35*** .003*** .004*** 
(4.00) (3.86) (3.68) (4.10) 
Foreign MNE dummy 1.90** 1.99** .007 .006 
(2.00) (2.11 ) (1.27) (1.04) 
Multiplant dummy 2.17*** 2.13*** .009*** .011*** 
(14.87) (14.06) (13.44) (14.40) 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index .89 .89 -.001 -.001 
(-.81 ) (-.86) (-.60) (-.39) 
Low wage imports 1.02 1.02 .000 .001 
(.20) (.18) (.34) (.43) 
Other imports .90 .91 -.002 -.002 
(-.59) (-.50) (-.83) (-1.00) 
Sunk costs .96*** .96*** -.000*** -.001*** 
(-3.00) (-2.99) (-2.67) (-2.66) 
theta .00 
(.59) 
Log pseudolikelihood -30965 -13819 -11588 -11662 
Number of observations 131669 131669 131669 131669 
Notes: Hazard ratios reported in regressions 1 and 2. In regressions 3 and 4 the 
coefficients are marginal effects. Z-statistics, clustered at the firm level, are reported in 
parentheses with the exception of the theta variable for which the value in parentheses is 
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a t-statistic. Industry dummies are defined at the three-digit level. "*, .* and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
We find a more limited role for firm characteristics in determining exit. 
There are reasons to believe that that a firm's R&D expenditure may affect 
the markets in which a firm operates. Perez et al. (2004) for Spain find 
that R&D intensity lowers the hazard rate, while Kimura and Kiyota 
(2003) find similar evidence for Japanese firms. However, the direction of 
the relationship is not obvious. Since R&D is associated with uncertainty, 
firms with high R&D intensities or which operate in R&D intensive 
sectors may face a higher risk of failure. This has been found by 
Audretsch and Mahmod (1995), Audretsch et aI. (2000) and Segarra and 
Callejon (2002). Conditional on the plant variables we find no effect from 
the R&D intensity of the firm in determining the probability of exit. This 
result occurs as a result of the above average characteristics of plants that 
belong to firms that conduct R&D however. When we exclude the plant 
variables from the regression we find that firm R&D intensity reduces the 
probability of exit.49 
We also find in Table 5.4 initial evidence that firm-level globalisation 
plays a role in finn closure. For example, plants belonging to exporting 
and importing firms face substantially lower hazard rates. This 
corroborates with evidence for the United States (Bernard and Jensen, 
1995), the United Kingdom (Greenaway and Kneller, 2004), Belgium 
49 See regression 5 in Table 3.5 of Chapter Three. 
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(Muuls and Pisu, 2009) and Italy (Castellani, Serti and Tomasi, 2008). 
Such finns are believed to possess innate characteristics that guard against 
exit. For example, they are larger and more productive. However, the 
extent of the finn's engagement in international markets also matters. 
Offshoring, or international outsourcing, may be responsible for the 
significance of the finn import variable. The volume of finn exports also 
increase the probability of death. 
Off shoring as an explanation for plant closure might also explain the 
significance of the indicators of the MNE status of the finn in the 
regression. In regression 1 we find that plants belonging to domestic 
MNEs and foreign MNEs are more likely to exit, with a stronger effect 
found for foreign MNE status.50 This latter effect occurs despite the low 
levels of foreign presence of foreign finns within Japan. Of the 53,328 
observations of plants owned by a multinational, only 761 observations 
relate to plants owned by a foreign multinational. Also of interest, we find 
that the behaviour of multinational finns is distinct from that of multi-
plant finns more generally, which also have a higher probability of exit 
conditional on their finn and plant characteristics. If plant closure is due to 
the pace of entry into new products and markets during the 1980s, the 
pattern of its reversal is different between multinationals and non-
multinationals. 
so We measure foreign ownership as a binary variable equal to 1 ifmore than 50 percent 
of the finn's capital is foreign owned and zero otherwise The 50% threshold is also used 
by Gorg and Strobl (2002). The results are robust to either the International Monetary 
Fund's definition of foreign ownership at the 25% level, or, to including the absolute 
percentage of capital which is foreign held (which may take a value between 0 and 100). 
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The behaviour of MNEs is again not inconsistent with that found for 
multinationals in other countries, where the effect of foreign ownership on 
the probability of survival has been found to be somewhat mixed. Using 
panel data on Chilean manufacturing plants, Alvarez and Gorg (2005) find 
that foreign ownership has a positive effect on exit, but only during the 
significant recession of the late 1990s, while Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) 
find that conditional on their greater size and labour productivity, foreign 
plants are more likely to exit in Indonesia. Mata and Portugal (2002) in 
contrast find that conditional on firm characteristics, being foreign has no 
effect on the probability of exit in Portugal, while OzIer and Taymaz 
(2004) fail to find any difference in survival prospects between foreign 
and native firms for Turkey. 
The most striking difference in the behaviour of Japanese firms with that 
found for other countries comes with respect to the industry level 
measures of globalisation. In other contexts greater industry level 
exposure to global markets has been found to be a cause of firm and plant 
death, see for example Bernard et al. (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2008). 
Greater exposure to foreign competition in industries in which the country 
has a comparative disadvantage leads to the closure of production plants. 
For Japan we find no such effects, irrespective of the source ofthat import 
competition. This is somewhat unexpected given that the measures of firm 
level imports were found to significantly affect the likelihood of exit. 
Firms that offshore, either through importing or their ownership of 
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affiliates abroad, are significantly more likely to exit than other types of 
firms, but the greater levels of import penetration within the industry more 
generally has no effect on the likelihood of exit. 
One explanation might be that import penetration levels in Japan are low 
and some threshold level is required to be reached before it affects plant 
closure. Such a view does not have strong support. While import 
penetration rates are lower in Japan compared to other OECD countries 
they are not drastically lower. Over the sample, on average, imports from 
non-low wage countries account for about 9 percent of production. In 
comparison, Bernard et at. (2006) report for the US that aggregate import 
penetration rose from 15 percent to 28 percent between 1977 to 1997. 
Moreover, the level of import penetration from low wage economies is 
more similar between these two countries. In the US import penetration 
from low wage economies increased from 2 percent to 6 percent whereas 
in our sample it doubled to 4 percent between 1994 and 2002. 
Of the industry variables, only industry sunk costs are found to have a 
significant effect on exit. This supports evidence from Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson (1988, 1989), Bernard and Jensen (2007) for the US, Geroski 
(l991a,b) for the UK and Greenaway et aI. (2008) for Sweden.51 
According to our estimates a one unit increase in industry sunk costs 
reduces the baseline hazard rate by 4%. In industries with high sunk costs 
51 We do not consider the question of whether sunk-costs and exit are correlated with 
entry into the Japanese manufacturing sector (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988, 
1989), or indeed whether there is a net rate of entry or exit into the industry. 
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potential entrants must draw a high productivity so that they may 
profitably produce (Hopenhayn, 1992; Melitz, 2003). Consequently there 
are fewer successful entrants and incumbents face a lower probability of 
exit. 
This result points to the role of entry as an unexplored determinant of low 
exit rates in Japan. Strict bankruptcy laws, government regulation and 
'zombie' lending by banks to relatively unproductive firms have been used 
to explain low rates of exit, however without similar restrictions on the 
ability of new firms to enter the market it is not clear why the rate of new 
entry would also be low. In support of this view, and of surprise given the 
discussion in the previous literature on the difficulties in closing firms, 
according to the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Indicators Japan 
ranks as the country in which the costs of closing a business (measured as 
the recovery rate in bankruptcy) are lowest out of the 183 countries that 
make up the sample. For comparison the UK is ranked number 9, the US 
at 15, Germany at 35 and France at 42. In contrast Japan's ranking in the 
ease of opening a new business in that dataset is 91 (out of 183) in 
between Mexico and Uzbekistan. For this measure the US lies at number 
8, the UK at 16, France at 22 and Germany at 84. 
In the remaining regressions of the table we consider the robustness of 
those findings to different estimation techniques. Our preferred estimator 
is the Cox Proportional Hazards model due to its flexibility. We are 
confident that our results are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity. In 
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regression 2 we re-run the model but use a duration model in which we 
parameterise the hazard rate using a Wei bull distribution and unobserved 
heterogeneity is assumed to follow a gamma distribution. The results are 
almost identical to those obtained using the Cox model though the 
estimated coefficients are marginally higher. The t-statistic on the 
duration parameter, theta, is estimated to be 0.59 indicating that the model 
captures the relevant information and if there is unobserved heterogeneity, 
it is uncorrelated with the independent variables. Since the Cox model is a 
continuous time estimator we also experiment with its discrete time 
equivalent, the cloglog estimator in column 3. We report marginal effects 
which mirror the sign of those in regressions I and 2. A probit model is 
used in regression 4 which returns strongly similar results which is 
unsurprising given the asymptotic properties of survival analysis and 
binary estimators. The small marginal effects reflect the low rate of exit 
from the sample. 
Question 2: What are the Causes of Exit within Multiplant Firms? 
From Table 5.4 it is clear that plants that are small, have low productivity, 
low capital intensity etc. have a greater probability of closing down. 
However we also find that the marginal effect of these variables is small 
and that both multi-plant and multinational firms have a greater 
probability of exit. Motivated by the latter, in this section we focus on the 
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type of plants that are shut by multinational firms and those multi-plant 
firms that have no overseas affiliates. 
We now measure the plant variables relative to the firm average. For 
example, the size ratio is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number 
of plant employees divided by the number of people employed by the 
firm. Similar variables are constructed for capital intensity, material 
intensity and wages. Since multiplant firms may have operations in 
several industries, such that plant and firm TFP are not comparable, we 
choose to drop this variable from the regression. The remaining control 
variables are similar to those included in Table 5.4. Finally, we explore 
the Kimura and Fujii (2003) hypothesis that plant closure in the 1990s 
reflected the excessive growth of large Japanese firms in the 1980s. We 
capture this effect using a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one 
if the plant operates in the same 3-digit industry as the firm (and zero 
otherwise). 
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Table 5.5: Exit within Multiplant Firms 
2 3 4 5 6 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio 
Sample MNE Multi Both MNE Multi Both 
Plant Variables 
Relative size .45*** .50*** 1.00 .33*** .24*** 1.36*** 
(-19.09) (-16.92) (-.08) (-21.97) (-23.02) (4.22) 
Relative capital intensity .70*** .73*** .95 .76*** .81*** .95 
(-7.83) (-10.04) (-.98) (-6.13) (-6.90) (-1.00) 
Relative wage 1.55*** .99 1.65*** 2.58*** 1.73*** 1.42* 
(3.72) (-.12) (3.46) (7.33) (4.15) (1.94) 
Relative material intensity .77*** .86*** .96 .71*** .87** .84* 
(-3.57) (-2.99) (-.49) (-3.99) (-2.28) (-1.80) 
Relative TFP .64*** .61*** 1.04 
(-3.82) (-4.67) (.27) 
Same dummy .94 .86* 1.06 .89 .89 .96 
(-.67) (-1.76) (.48) (-1.29) (-1.54) (-.35) 
Firm Variables 
Export dummy 23.68*** .82 1.29 .01*** .01*** .51 
(15.25) (.24) (.28) (-5.10) (-4.36) (-.59) 
Import dummy .90*** 1.08 1.63 .25* .06** 5.28 
(-4.42) (.07) (.53) (-1.75) (-2.49) (1.52) 
Firm exports .90*** 1.00 1.01 1.16*** 1.19*** 1.02 
(-4.42) (-.01) (.18) (5.17) (4.36) (.43) 
Firm imports .91 *** 1.00 .98 1.05* 1.12** .93* 
(-3.84) (.05) (-.49) (1.78) (2.71 ) (-1.83) 
R&D i n t e n s ~ y y .98*** .97*** 1.02** 1.01 1.00 1.01 
(-3.10) (-7.21) (2.02) (1.07) (-.48) (1.49) 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index 1.01 .95 1.08 .98 .84 1.09 
(.03) (-.24) (.89) (-.08) (-.76) (1.04) 
LWPEN 1.17 1.14 1.13** 1.14 1.08 1.01 
(.84) (.69) (2.56) (.67) (.48) (.17) 
OTHPEN 1.06 .63 1.04 .98 .62 1.07 
(.20) (-1.42) (.49) (-.06) (-1.44) (.84) 
Sunk Costs .94*** .98 .97 .94*** .99 .98 
(-2.45) (-.98) (-.99) (-2.56) (-.63) (-.85) 
Log pseudolikelihood -9420 -10.529 -21425 -9266 -10268 20980 
Number of Observations 31606 33406 65012 31613 33412 65025 
Notes: In regression 1, 2 and 3 the plant variables are measured relative to the firm 
average. In regressions 4, 5 and 6 the plant variables are measured relative to the 
industry average. The coefficient estimates in regressions 3 and 6 show the interaction 
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coefficient between each variable and the multinational dummy. Coefficient estimates 
are hazard ratios. Z-scores clustered at the finn level are reported in parentheses. The 
relative TFP variable is constructed as the logarithm of the plant's productivity relative to 
the average in its 3-digit industry. Industry dummies are defined at the three-digit level. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent levels. 
Regression 1 reports the results for multinational firms and regression 2 
for multi-plant finns without overseas affiliates. 52 We label these for ease 
as multi-plant finns. In many aspects the type of plants shut by these two 
types of finn are very similar, indeed it is not obvious from these results as 
to why multinationals have been singled out as the main cause of 
hollowing out in Japan. Conditional on unobserved 3 digit industry fixed 
effects for the firm and for the plant, the results of regression 4 show that 
multinational plants that are large relative to the firm are less likely to exit, 
as are more capital intensive plants. These are the same types of plant that 
are less vulnerable to closure within multi-plant firms. The effects of size 
and capital intensity are also similar for multinational and multi-plant 
firms, indeed we cannot reject the hypothesis that multinationals and 
multi-plant finns react identically to the same change in size, capital 
intensity and material intensity when we pool the observations into a 
single regression. We also find for both types of firm little evidence that 
those plants that lie within a different 3-digit industry to the firm are more 
52 The MNE finns include a small number of foreign multinationals. In unreported 
regressions we test to see whether the effect differs according to whether the 
multinational is domestic or foreign owned. The results are not substantively different to 
the MNE results in Table 5.5. When we test for differences in the coefficients between 
domestic and foreign multinationals no statistically significant differences are found at 
conventional levels. 
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vulnerable to exit. Increased focus on the core activities of the finn does 
not appear to have been a significant driver of exit over this time period. 
The differences in the determinants of plant closure instead relate 
primarily to the variables that capture motives for offshoring. There is 
evidence from regression 1 that MNEs are more likely to shut high cost 
plants, for example, since the hazard ratio is 1.55. For multi-plant finns 
this factor was not important, perhaps reflecting the need under just-in-
time delivery to be close to final producers. We also find that MNEs shut 
plants based on the capital and material intensity of the plant. MNEs are 
significantly less likely to shut plants that are capital and material 
intensive, which we take to mean further along the production chain 
relative to the rest of the finn. The effect of these variables is of a similar 
size to those for the other plant characteristics. We find for multi-plant 
finns that whether or not it is engaged in international markets is not a 
good predictor of the plants that are shut. This might occur because this 
variable is measured at the level of the finn, although, given that we find 
that the export status of the finn does affect the likelihood the finn will 
shut plants, perhaps a better explanation is that off shoring and importing 
of inputs are not identical concepts. However, plants owned by 
multinationals face substantially higher hazard ratios if the finn is an 
exporter but all other measures of finn-level globalisation ameliorate the 
threat of closure. Finally, the R&D intensity of the finn increases survival 
for plants owned by both finn types but sunk costs only act as a barrier to 
exit when the plant is part of a multinational. 
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When we measure plant characteristics relative to the industry average in 
regressions 4 to 6 some of the results differ to those in columns 1 to 3. 
Among the plant variables we observe that mUltiplant firms are now more 
likely to close relatively high wage plants. The other plant variables 
remain essentially as before. The major differences occur at the firm 
level. Exporting and importing firms are now less likely to shut their 
plants while the volume of firm imports and exports raise the hazard rate 
by between 5% and 19% depending on the sample. 
Consistent with the results in Table 5.4 we continue to find no role for the 
globalisation variables within any of the regressions. The level and the 
structure of trade have no effect on the volume of plant exit within Japan. 
Given the contrast between these results and those found for other OECD 
countries this again suggests some common institutional factors that limits 
the amount of exit (or entry) that occurs. 
Question 3: How does Multinational Concentration within the 
Industry AtTect Exit? 
We extend the analysis to consider additional measures of globalisation, 
again at the industry level. We have observed that multinational plants 
are, on average, large, more capital intensive and more productive than 
domestic plants. They are backed by a firm structure which may open 
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new markets and opportunities. Anecdotal evidence suggests indigenous 
firms struggle to survive when confronted by competition from 
multinationals while Bandick (2007) presents formal econometric 
evidence on how multinational concentration shapes exit in Sweden. 
To address this we incorporate two measures of multinational 
concentration into our model to assess whether their presence in the 
industry imparts an externality upon other active plants. Multinational 
concentration is defined as the share of employees in multinational plants 
relative to total employment in the sector: 
If ATE C . (Total MNE Employeesit J 
lYJiV. oncentratlOnil = - -
- Total_ Employeesit 
where TotaCMNE_Employeesi/ denotes the total number of people 
employed in multinational plants in industry i at time t and 
TotaCEmployeeSit is the total number of workers in industry i at time t. 
As a robustness check we measure multinational concentration as the ratio 
of MNE plants to total plants in the industry at time t. 
In Table 5.6 both concentration measures are dis aggregated into domestic 
and foreign multinational parts. There is a large degree of heterogeneity 
in multinational concentration across industries regardless of which 
indicator we use. The average concentration of multinationals is 50 
percent and 31 percent using the employee and plant measure respectively. 
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In the tobacco industry virtually the entire sector is comprised of 
multinationals and although multinationals comprise the majority of 
workers in 31 industries, there are 7 industries in which more than 50 
percent of plants are MNE owned. 
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Table 5.6: Muttinational Concentration by Industry 
Employees Plants 
Indust Domestic Forei n Domestic Forei n 
Sample .49 .01 .31 .00 
Livestock products .29 .01 .25 .01 
Seafood products .18 .01 .16 0 
Flour and grain mill products .27 .01 .27 0 
Miscellaneous foods and related products .32 .01 .20 .00 
Prepared animal foods and organic fertilizers .21 .01 .19 0 
Beverages .42 .01 .31 .00 
Tobacco .99 .01 1 0 
Textile products .32 .01 .24 .00 
Lumber and wood products .20 .01 .15 0 
F umdure and flXlures .40 .01 .20 .00 
Pulp, paper and coated and glazed paper .57 .04 .33 .01 
Paper products .29 .01 .25 .00 
Printing, plate making for printing and bookbinding .28 .01 .14 .00 
Leather and leather products .14 .01 .12 0 
Rubber products .72 .01 .48 .00 
Chemical fertilizers .24 .01 .19 0 
Basic inorganic chemicals .45 .02 .35 .01 
Basic organic chemicals .86 .02 .71 .01 
Organic chemicals .75 .02 .54 .01 
Chemical fibres .82 .01 .63 0 
Miscellaneous chemical products .66 .01 .45 .01 
Pharmaceutical products .56 .01 .35 .00 
Petroleum products .44 .01 .41 .01 
Coal products .59 .01 .43 0 
Glass and tts products .57 .04 .35 .02 
Cement and its products .28 .01 .15 .00 
Pottery .66 .03 .30 .01 
Miscellaneous ceramic, stone and clay products .42 .01 .31 .00 
Pig iron and crude steel .82 .06 .52 .02 
Miscellaneous iron and steel .39 .02 .22 .01 
SmeHing and refining of non-ferrous metals .57 .04 .46 .02 
Non-ferrous metal products .60 .01 .36 .00 
Fabricated constructional and archtectural metal products .38 .01 .18 .00 
Miscellooeous fabricated metal products .42 .01 .28 .00 
General industry machinery .68 .01 .33 .01 
Special industry machinery .57 .01 .32 .00 
Miscellaneous machinery .53 .03 .31 .00 
Office and service industry machines .62 .01 .35 .00 
Electrical generating, transmission, distribu1ion and industrial apparatus .56 .02 .27 .00 
Household electric appliances .78 .03 .53 .01 
Electroninc data processing machines, d ~ i t a l l ood analog compu1er .59 .02 .38 .01 
equipment and accessories 
Communication equipment .68 .02 .41 .00 
Electronic equipment and electric measuring instruments .65 .02 .35 .01 
Semiconductor devices and integrated circuits .60 .02 .40 .01 
Electronic parts .55 .01 .40 .01 
Miscellanoeus electrical machinery equipment .68 .02 .45 .01 
Motor vehicles .84 .05 .52 .02 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories .71 .02 .44 .01 
Other transportation equipment .67 .01 .36 .01 
Precision machinery and equipment .59 .01 .39 .00 
Plastic products .47 .01 .35 .00 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries .56 .01 .34 .00 
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In regression 1 of Table 5.7 we study separately the effects of domestic 
and foreign multinational concentration. Neither variable has a significant 
impact upon plant exit. To examine whether we are obscuring the effect 
of multinational concentration by looking at the whole sample, we split the 
sample into MNE, multiplant and single domestic owned plants. We 
continue to find so significant relationship between plant death and either 
form of MNE concentration at conventional levels. A potential 
explanation for this could be that under keiretsu contracts domestic plants 
were reliant upon multinationals to purchase their output. If this is the 
case then multinationals would not be a primary source of competition. 
Instead plants serving the Japanese market would compete primarily with 
other domestic firms. 
We calculate domestic plant concentration using the same methodology as 
was used for multinational concentration. The results are not reported 
since no significant effect is detected across any specification leading us to 
conclude that the concentration of multinationals and domestic firms 
within a sector do not determine plant exit. Rather it is plant and firm 
characteristics instead of externalities which govern exit. 
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Table 5.7: Multinational Concentration 
Variable/Regression 2 3 4 
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio 
Sample All MNE Multi Single 
Plant Variables 
Size .27*** .32*** .24*** .20*** 
(-34.69) (-23.22) (-23.27) (-17.10) 
Capital intensity .79*** .77*** .81 *** .78*** 
(-10.51) (-6.28) (-6.79) (-5.68) 
TFP .62*** .67*** .63*" .44*** 
(-7.27) (-3.80) (-4.54) (-4.88) 
Wages 1.90*** 2.38*** 1.75*** 1.40* 
(7.89) (7.16) (4.23) (1.86) 
Material Intensity .78*** .69*** .87** .78*** 
(-5.79) (-4.49) (-2.16) (-2.63) 
Firm Variables 
Export dummy .01*** .01*** .01*** .09* 
(-7.55) (-5.83) (-4.38) (-1.64) 
Import dummy .15*** .22** .06*" .02*** 
(-3.43) (-2.10) (-2.47) (-2.86) 
Firm exports 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.19*** 1.11* 
(7.61) (5.85) (4.38) (1.77) 
Firm imports 1.08*** 1.06** 1.12*** 1.18*** 
(3.67) (2.17) (2.69) (3.04) 
R&D intensity 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 
(-.27) (1.02) (-.49) (.18) 
Domestic MNE dummy 1.35*** .87 
(4.00) (-.41) 
Foreign MNE dummy 1.91 ** 
(2.01) 
Multiplant dummy 2.17*** 1.85*** 
(14.87) (5.52) 
Industry Variables 
Grubel-Lloyd index .90 .93 .87 .88 
(-.78) (-.28) (-.63) (-.39) 
low wage imports 1.02 1.02 1.07 1.00 
(.22) (.09) (.39) (.01 ) 
Other imports .90 1.00 .62 1.16 
(-.59) (-.01 ) (-1.40) (.42) 
Sunk costs .96*** .94** .99 .96 
(-2.99) (-2.58) (-.63) (-1.51) 
Domestic MNE concentration .98 .94 .99 .61 
(-.09) (-.13) (-.04) (-1.05) 
Foreign MNE concentration 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00 
(-.30) (.11 ) (-1.12) (.20) 
log pseudolikelihood -30965 -10755 -10265 -6682 
Number of observations 131669 39893 33412 58364 
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Question 4: Do Plants Switch Industry rather than Exit? 
Given that exit has been not been found to be related to several measures 
of globalisation, we investigate whether plants switch industries instead. 
Heterogenous firm models such as Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Redding 
and Schott (2007) have emphasised finn exit through death. In such 
models firms which fall below a given productivity threshold can no 
longer cover the fixed costs of operating in the industry and exit. 
However, it has been observed empirically that exit through death is not 
the only means through which firms leave an industry. 
Greenaway et al. (2008) find that exit through plant closure is the least 
likely form of exit in Sweden. In their study 35% of exit occurs through 
firms switching to another industry. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) 
also find switching to be important in response to import competition from 
low-wage countries. Similarly, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009) find 
that one half of firms alter their mix of five-digit SIC products every five 
years and that firms add and drop products over time. 
We define industry switching as where plant i is observed in the 3 digit 
industry j at time t-1 but is present in a different 3 digit industry, k, at time 
t. As with exit, the number of plants that switch industry is low. 
Approximately 2.4% of plants in the sample switch industries over the 
period. There are also differences in the characteristics of plants which 
switch and those that exit. For example, switching plants tend to be larger, 
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have higher sales and use more intermediate inputs. Exiting plants tend to 
have higher capital stocks per worker and pay higher wages. 
Table 5.8 also highlights some differences in the firms which own 
switching and exiting plants. Switching plants are, on average, owned by 
relatively more productive firms but the firms tend to have lower sales and 
use fewer intermediate inputs than the owners of exiting plants. The 
incidence of multiplant ownership among the switching and exiting groups 
is 49% and 70%. There do not appear to be substantial differences 
between the firm types in terms of the incidence of multinational and 
foreign ownership. The same holds for importing and exporting 
behaviour. 
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Table 5.8: Switching Plant and Firm Characteristics 
Variable I Form of Extt Switch Extt Continue 
Observations 4066 3392 141145 
Plant Variables 
Plant Size 241 131 228 
Number of Employees 
Capttal per Worker 16.73 19.24 17.24 
Millions of Japanese yen 
PlantTFP .93 .94 .97 
Total Factor Productivity 
Plant Wages 4.99 5.17 4.87 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Plant Sales 10060 6333 11779 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Intermediate Inputs 6189 3683 6947 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Finn Variables 
Age 46 47.57 47.06 
In years 
Size 2167 2369 1627 
Number of Employees 
Capttal per Worker 16.95 20.50 18.67 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Firm TFP 1.02 .98 .98 
Total factor Productivity 
Firm Sales 128598 146861 100788 
Millions of Japanese yen 
R&D Complexity .02 .02 .01 
R&D Expenditure divided by firm sales 
Intermediate Inputs 104135 120903 81512 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Foreign Ownership Dummy .01 .01 .01 
1 if foreign firm holds more than 50% of capital 
FDI .36 .39 .32 
1 if outward loans and investment >0 
Multiplant Dummy .49 .70 .49 
1 if the firm has more than one plant 
Export Dummy .46 .43 .39 
1 if the firm exports 
Import Dummy .37 .38 .33 
1 if the firm imports 
T -tests do not show a statistically significant difference between the level 
of low-wage import penetration in the switching plant's initial and final 
industry. In Bernard et a1. (2006) this is cited as a fundamental reason 
why plants decide to switch industry. Similarly, switching plants do not 
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move to an industry with statistically different capital intensities, intra-
industry trade or import penetration from other countries. 
5.5 Employment Growth 
The Economist (20th June 2009) provided anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that a large number of Japanese firms are moribund shells which survive 
in name only. They highlight the role of government policy in prohibiting 
firms from declaring bankruptcy. We have also found that globalisation, 
either in its low-wage import penetration or other-country forms, has been 
consistently found not to affect plant death in Japan. This leads us to 
explore whether competition from abroad has manifested itself through 
job losses. Elsewhere it has been noted that "Hollowing Out" is not just 
mitigated through multinational plant closure, there are also employment 
effects (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001). The closure of plants leads to the 
loss of employment among the workers of that plant. However, there are 
also indirect effects on suppliers who lose a customer. If keiretsu linkages 
are strong, then there may be further job losses among suppliers who rely 
almost exclusively upon one multinational to buy their output. 
Indeed there has been a contraction in manufacturing employment 
between 1994 and 2005. In Figure 5.3 we see that over the period 
employment fell by 22% from approximately 3.5 million workers to 2.7 
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million. This is consistent with unemployment increases in manufacturing 
belts reported in Cowling and Tomlinson (2001). 
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Cowling and Tomlinson (2001) note that during the 1990s Japanese 
multinationals aggressi vel y relocated production overseas. 
Simultaneously the number of people employed in Japanese plants fell 
substantially. Our data reveals that over the period 1994 to 2005 
approximately 800,000 jobs were lost in the sector as a whole. Although 
the overwhelming pattern across industries was a reduction in the number 
of employees Table 5.10 shows that some sectors have suffered more 
serious job losses than others. 
The chemicals fibres industry leads the way in terms of the percentage 
change in the number of people employed with a fall of 68%. Of the 52 
sectors, 7 have shed half their workforce with the average contraction 
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being 26%. In terms of absolute job losses. the textile industry has been 
most seriously affected with roughly 71000 fewer people being employed 
in 2005 compared with eleven years earlier. Some sectors have prospered. 
Flour and grain mill products. motor vehicle parts and accessories, basic 
organic chemicals, tobacco and miscellaneous foods and related products 
have experienced an increase in the number of people employed over the 
period. In the case of the latter employment increased by 27% to 214,722 
workers. 
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Table 5.10 Irdustrial E m ~ o y m e n t t in 1994 and 2005 
E m ~ y e e s s Percentage Change Plant Closures 
Industrv 1994 2005 Change (%' Jobs Lost LWPEN OTHPEN MNE Other 
S a m ~ e e 3520785 2726144 ·26.0 794641 551 540 1316 2076 
Chemical fibres 16905 5396 -68.1 11509 1580 150 5 8 
M ~ I ~ n e o u s s manufacturing Irdustries 41022 15403 -62.5 25619 128 9 33 75 
Leather ard leather products 4534 1775 ~ . 9 9 2759 176 -6 1 7 
Textile products 123587 52627 ·57.4 70960 180 ·78 86 257 
Electroninc data processing machines, dgital ard analog computer 66249 28594 ·56.8 37655 1190 60 28 51 
equipment ard accessories 
H o u s e h o ~ ~ ~ e c t r ~ ~ a ~ ~ n c e s s 60565 26604 ·56.1 33961 465 ·33 28 44 
Fabricated constructional and archtectural metallJoducts 71507 35250 ·50.7 36257 2ll ·28 21 83 
Cement ard its products 28839 14584 -49.4 14255 238 309 19 89 
C h e m ~ 1 1 f e r t i l ~ e l S S 2577 1314 -49 1263 620 120 1 4 
P ~ ~ iron and crude s t ~ ~ 101499 55729 -45.1 45770 6 ·57 8 9 
Communication equipment 102684 58405 -43.1 44279 343 96 43 73 
Pulp. paper ard coated ard glazed paper 55219 31662 -427 23557 531 447 15 44 
Lumber ard IIOOd products 23107 14149 ·38.8 8958 89 44 10 55 
Electrical generating, t r a n s m i s s ~ n , , d ~ t r i b u t i o n n ard irdustrial a ~ r a t u s s 157088 100941 ·35.7 56147 405 ·31 47 134 
Electronic equipment and electric measuring instruments 62831 40756 ·35.1 22075 1387 1491 29 61 
Petroleum products 13379 8962 ·33 4417 6 460 5 12 
S e m ~ n d u c t o r r dE'lCes and integrated circuits 131990 89518 ·32.2 42472 974 359 16 41 
F umiture and fOOures 32701 22208 ·32.1 10493 283 ·18 11 50 
Prmn machinery and equipment 75767 53353 ·29.6 22414 259 283 32 86 
Organic chemicals 69430 49259 ·29.1 20171 200 799 16 28 
SmeRirIJ and refining of non-ferrolS m e t a ~ ~ 13770 9788 ·28.9 3982 40 36 7 12 
M ~ l l a n e o u s s c e r a m ~ , , stone and clay products 26075 16623 ·28.6 7452 220 ·51 11 26 
Non-ferrous metal products 68718 49248 ·28.3 19470 497 ·23 31 59 
Bever!r:les 30452 22141 ·27.3 8311 68 656 21 45 
Pottery 20394 14878 ·27 5516 570 34 6 18 
Miscellanoeus ~ e c t r i c a l l machinery equipment 63480 47593 ·25 15887 ~ ~ 113 31 55 
Miscellaneous iron and steel 74576 57642 ·227 16934 116 188 20 87 
M i s c e l ~ n e o u s s famed metal products 105795 82598 ·21.9 23197 370 46 45 131 
Paper products 39791 31275 ·21.4 8516 458 65 29 89 
Pharmaceutical products 58112 E088 ·207 12024 67 2543 32 60 
Rubber products 70535 56139 ·20.4 14396 189 ·59 22 43 
Motor vehdes 226920 180773 ·20.3 46147 8759 941 12 29 
wvestock products 55499 44736 ·19.4 10763 104 395 38 103 
Electronic perts 137717 112419 ·18.4 25298 757 -6 67 159 
OfOCe art! service irdustry machines 60490 49867 ·17.9 10823 266 -52 25 68 
Glass and its products 30492 25171 ·17.5 5321 384 157 5 14 
Other tral'6portaOOn equipment 77578 64146 ·17.3 13432 491 1203 14 39 
General roustry machilery 127751 107561 ·15.8 20190 533 176 40 83 
Coal products 2273 1917 ·15.7 356 239 . ~ ~ 2 5 
Special indlBtry machinery 137767 118221 ·14.2 19546 710 686 71 132 
Basic inorganic chemicals 18822 16145 ·14.2 2677 100 136 12 24 
Plastic products 126875 110532 ·12.9 16343 429 51 82 185 
Seafood products 25680 22786 ·11.3 2894 36 ·21 12 48 
Miscellaneous chemical products 71140 63465 ·10.8 7675 286 550 31 58 
Miscellaneous machinery 69732 63233 ·9.3 6499 223 209 26 67 
Prepared animal foods art! organic f e r t i l ~ e l S S 2869 2721 ·5.2 148 194 79 4 17 
Prilting, pate making for prirlirIJ and bookbinding 64726 64229 ·08 497 1()(B 581 30 140 
Flour and grain mill products 3785 3894 29 ·109 .eo 124 3 5 
Motor vehicle parts and accessaies 295889 314830 6.4 ·18941 775 267 79 160 
Basic organic c h e m i c a ~ ~ 2194 2412 9.9 ·218 -63 1288 0 2 
M i s c e l ~ n e o u s s foods and relied proOOcIs 169408 214722 26.7 -45314 61 58 54 238 
Tobacco 0 62 
-62 13464 0 0 
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Note: A negative sign in the Jobs Lost column indicates an increase in the number of 
workers employed in that sector. 
Although we have seen that the incidence of import penetration across the 
sample was generally low we observe large changes in the magnitude of 
both low-wage import penetration and competition from other countries. 
In most industries the percentage change in both import competition 
measures has been in triple digits. There is also some tacit evidence that 
the growth of import competition affects job losses. The correlation 
between low-wage imports and the number of job losses is 0.27. 
However, for imports from other countries the correlation is very weak. 
In addition to plant closure and productivity losses 'Hollowing Out' has 
been linked to job losses through the off shoring of jobs and reductions in 
employment at upstream firms. Table 5.10 also lists the number of 
multinational plant closures in each sector over the period and the number 
of plants closed by other firms. The correlation between the number of 
MNE plant closures and the number of jobs lost is 0.21 while for the 
change in employment it is 0.15. For non-multinational plant closures the 
values are 0.15 and 0.21 respectively. 
Table 5.11: Firm Type and Employment Changes 
Employees 
Firm T e 1994 2005 
Multinationals 1767897 1418035 -19.8 
Domestic Multiplant Firms 630844 382720 -39.3 
Single Domestic Firms 881300 637019 -27.7 
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We find evidence that the magnitude of changes in employment over the 
period vary according to firm type. Despite concerns about hollowing out, 
multinationals have experienced the lowest percentage change in workers. 
In Table 5.11 we see that multinationals reduced their workforce by 19.8% 
while domestic multiplant firms and single-plant domestic firms saw 
contractions of 39.3% and 27.7%, on average. The sharper falls in 
employment amongst domestic firms may be partly due to the loss of 
business from MNEs as multinationals outsource abroad rather than 
domestically. It could also be that outsourcing by multinationals has been 
ongoing before the period meaning that the parts of the value chain most 
suited to outsourcing have already been moved overseas biasing the 
figures downwards. 
During the last decade a literature has emerged which attempted to 
quantify the extent to which import competition as opposed to 
technological change has contributed to employment changes. Some of 
these studies have investigated whether technological upgrading has 
resulted in a greater share of non-production workers being involved in 
production (see Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994). Others such as 
Morrison Paul and Siegel (2001) have been more ambitious and have 
sought to distinguish between the effect of technology, trade and 
outsourcing on employment and earnings. 
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To investigate the effect of technological change and trade on employment 
we follow Berman et al. (1994) by specifying a restricted labour cost 
function 
(5.3) 
Where LC is labour cost, wijt is the wage paid in plant i in industry j at 
time t, K is the stock of capital, Y is output, t is time and f is assumed to 
have a translog form. Employment can then be derived as 
(5.4) 
by assuming cost minimisation, constant returns to scale and homogeneity 
of degree one on prices which guarantees that the sole solution will be the 
efficient outcome as well. Taking first differences yields 
(5.5) 
where Gijl is a well behaved error tenn. Bennan et al. (1994) then append 
equation with two proxies for technological change: R&D intensity and 
the ratio of expenditures on computers to total investment. 
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We follow the Bennan et al. approach by capturing technological 
upgrading through the change in plant productivity. The effect of trade is 
mitigated through changes in the import penetration ratio. In regression 1 
of Table 5.12 we find that technology rather than trade has been 
responsible for job losses. A one standard deviation increase in the 
growth rate of plant TFP reduces employment by 0.13 standard deviations. 
This concurs with Morrison Paul and Siegel's (2001) findings for four 
worker groups defined according to education. Unlike Morrison Paul and 
Siegel, we find import penetration to be insignificant. We also find that a 
one standard deviation in the growth rate of plant wages relative to the 
industry causes a 0.38 standard deviation fall in plant employment. It is 
also evident that plants with higher capital usage relative to their output 
require fewer workers. For a one standard deviation increase in the capital 
to output ratio employment falls 0.19 standard deviations. This may also 
capture the effect of technology to a certain degree. 
226 
Table 5.12: Employment Growth Regressions 
Regression 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Plant wages relative to industry avera -.38*** -.38*** -.38*** -.38*** 
(-38.81) (-42.57) (-42.53) (-42.53) 
Capital to Output ratio -.19*** -.00 -.00 -.00 
(-25.46) (-.82) (-.84) (-.84) 
Plant TFP -.13*** -.35*** -.35*** -.34*** 
(-17.92) (-40.52) (-40.54) (-39.95) 
Industry Import Penetration .01 .01* .01* .01* 
(1.15) (1.76) (1.71) (1.69) 
Domestic Sales Growth .51*** .51*** .51*** 
(52.61) (52.63) (52.61) 
Foreign Sales Growth .00* .01*** .01*** 
(1.91 ) (3.00) (2.98) 
Import Penetration*Plant TFP .01 
(1.37) 
Export Dummy .00 .00 
(.29) (.37) 
Import Dummy -.01 *** -.01*** 
(-2.94) (-2.90) 
Domestic MNE Dummy -.02*** -.02*** 
(-6.84) (-6.71) 
Foreign MNE Dummy -.01** -.01** 
(-2.13) (-2.11) 
Constant .01** .01*** .01*** .01*** 
(2.28) (3.87) (4.95) (5.13) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 106916 106916 106916 106916 
R2 
.19 .33 .33 .33 
In subsequent specifications we incorporate variables used elsewhere in 
the literature. For example, van Reenen (1996) finds market share affects 
wages in the United Kingdom. In regression 4 we find a one standard 
deviation increase in a plant's domestic sales growth increases 
employment growth by about half a standard deviation. Assuming that a 
plant's sales abroad are directly proportional to its parent firm's exports 
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allows us to include a proxy for foreign sales growth. When we do not 
condition on finn characteristics in regression 2, foreign sales growth is 
only significant at the 10 percent level. Although highly significant in 
regressions 3 and 4 the growth in a plant's foreign sales has an 
economically small effect on plant employment growth. 
Bernard and Jensen (1995) find exporting to potentially affect 
employment. Although we do not find a significant relationship between 
plant employment growth and finn exporting status, we find that importers 
and multinationals reduce employment growth among their plants. This 
may reflect off shoring and outsourcing. However, the effects are small. 
The coefficient estimate on the importer and foreign MNE dummy is -0.01 
while for the domestic MNE dummy it is -0.02. 
Finally in regression 4 we include an interaction term between plant TFP 
growth and import penetration. Morrison Paul and Siegel (2001) note that 
the effect of trade on employment growth may be mitigated through 
technological upgrading. For example, greater import penetration may 
lead plants to invest more in computers or capital. This would further 
'hurt' low skill workers since the effect of openness to trade and 
technology upgrading is interrelated. However, the interaction term enters 
insignificantly suggesting that this is not the case in Japan. This is 
primarily a consequence of the long tail of finns with low productivity 
which fail to catch-up with the industry leader even when confronted by 
import competition. This explains why import penetration does not reduce 
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x-efficiency and increase the speed of convergence as has been found in 
other contexts. 
Employment Growth across Firm Types 
In Table 5.11 we observed that while multinationals, multi plant firms and 
single plant firms all reduced the number of people employed, the 
reduction was far from uniform. We re-run regression 4 using an OLS 
estimator but split the sample according to firm type. The results are 
unreported (but are available on request) since they are similar and suggest 
broadly similar patterns across firm types. The only difference across 
firms is that importing firms significantly reduce employment growth at 
plants belonging to single-plant firms. At multinational and multiplant 
firms the importer dummy is insignificant. 
5.6 Why has the rate of TFP growth within fU'ms been so low? 
Table 5.1 suggests slow within plant productivity growth to be one of the 
key restraints on aggregate productivity growth in Japan. Using a model 
similar to that in Griffith et al. (2003) we investigate the determinants of 
productivity growth within plants. A similar model is used by Bernard 
and Jones (1996) to investigate productivity convergence in industries 
across 14 OEeD countries. The model begins with a neoclassical 
production technology, 
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(5.6) 
where i represents a given plant, j indexes the industry in which the plant 
operates and t denotes time. Aijt represents plant productivity, K is a shift 
parameter and A ~ ~ represents total factor productivity at the frontier plant. 
A general dynamic relationship between plant and frontier productivity 
may be expressed as, 
(5.7) 
To arrive at the error correction model we must see when (5.7) would be 
consistent with (5.6). This requires that all factors which would cause 
divergence from equilibrium are equal to zero. Through rearranging (5.7) 
we obtain the error correction model, 
The terms on the right hand side capture the effect of productivity transfer. 
The term t1ln A ~ ~ allows plant productivity growth to depend directly 
upon productivity growth at the frontier plant. The frontier is assumed to 
be the plant with the highest TFP in the plant's 3-digit industry at time t. 
Plant productivity growth also depends on how far the plant lies behind 
frontier. The larger is (In A ~ _ I I -In Aij,_I) the greater the potential for 
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technology transfer or productivity upgrading. Hence, PI denotes the 
strength of the link between productivity growth at the frontier 
establishment and non-frontier plants while r captures the speed of 
productivity convergence. 
We then estimate the relationship posited above using OLS. A full set of 
time dummy variables are included to capture the effect of 
macroeconomic and stochastic shocks on productivity. The results show 
that Japanese plants behave in similar fashion to those in other countries. 
As in Griffith et al. (2003) we find a positive and significant effect of the 
growth in the frontier establishment on non-frontier plant's productivity 
growth. In regression 1 of Table 5.13 a one standard deviation increase in 
productivity at the frontier establishment causes a 0.91 percentage point 
increase in plant i's productivity growth. As in the United Kingdom there 
is also evidence of productivity convergence. Plants operating behind the 
productivity frontier have, on average, 1.38 percentage points higher 
productivity growth. 
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Table 5.13: Productivity Catch-up 
Variable 
flTFPFjt .14*** .15"* .15*** .14*** .14"* .15*" 
(31.25) (28.54) (28.44) (30.37) (31.71) (28.22) 
TFPGAPijt_t .31*** .31*** .29*** .31*** .30"* .28*" 
(35.01) (13.32) (12.31) (30.94) (24.71) (8.99) 
L W P E N ~ _ t t -.16*** -.18*** 
(-6.49) (-6.81) 
OTHPENjt_t -.10*** -.03 
(-3.61) (-.93) 
GLjt_t .02 .07*** 
(1.28) (3.28) 
FIRM R&D INTENSITYijt_t .05"* .05*** 
(3.75) (3.46) 
Interaction lenns 
TFPGAPijt_t 
x L W P E N ~ _ t t -.01 .06 
(.44) (1.60) 
x O T H P E N ~ _ t t -.04 -.08** 
(-1.29) (-2.20) 
xGLjt_t -.01 -.04** 
(-.49) (-2.25) 
x FIRM R&D INTENSITY,t_t -.02 -.02 
(-1.61) (-1.39) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 141975 118715 118715 141975 141975 118342 
R2 
.06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 
Notes: Beta coefficients reported. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. * .. , .. and 
* indicate significance at the I, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
In regressions 2 to 6 we examine the effect imports, intra-industry trade 
and finn R&D intensity have on plant-level productivity growth. 
International trade has been shown elsewhere to affect productivity (see 
for example Keller and Yeaple, 2003 for evidence from the United States). 
232 
Of interest here, given the earlier results for the closure of firms and 
plants, we find import penetration to be a negative detenninant of within 
plant productivity growth. A one standard deviation increase in imports 
from low-wage countries reduces plant productivity growth by 0.01 
percentage points. Imports from other countries have a smaller effect: the 
point estimate is -0.001. Building on the evidence above that import 
penetration has not had a strong effect on the exit of firms or plants this 
would suggest that more firms have lower productivity growth because of 
increased import penetration than might otherwise have been the case. 
The industrial structure of Japan would appear to be part of the 
explanation behind the low rate of productivity improvement within 
Japanese firms. Despite this, the effect of import competition on 
productivity growth remains small. 
Intra-industry trade is not found to affect productivity growth but we find 
that a one standard deviation increase in firm R&D intensity raises the 
productivity of its plants by 5 percentage points. When all four variables 
and their interactions with the TFP Gap variable are included in column 6 
we continue to find that low-wage imports reduce productivity growth 
while firm R&D intensity increases it. However, the variable measuring 
imports from other countries is now insignificant but the coefficient on 
intra-industry trade estimate of 0.07 is robust. We now observe that intra-
industry trade and imports from other countries reduce the speed of 
convergence by 4 and 8 percentage points, respectively. 
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In spite of these findings we continue to find convergence in TFP. It 
could be that Japan lay close to the productivity frontier and consequently 
the scope for improvement was limited. However, during this period 
productivity growth in the United States averaged between 2 and 3 percent 
per annum. It is worth noting that the elasticity on the TFP Gap variable 
(0.008) implies that the half life of the productivity gap between the 
average frontier productivity and the average plant productivity is 
approximately 87 years. This implies that the reason for the low rate of 
within plant change is not explained by a low elasticity on the TFP Gap 
variable rather country-specific factors are responsible. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to understand the reasons for Japan's 'Lost 
Decade' using a micro economic approach. In so doing we have addressed 
some of the anecdotal theories that have grown up surrounding the decline 
of the manufacturing sector and in particular those related to 
multinationals. Many of the results appear contrary to the arguments 
embodied within the 'Hollowing Out' hypothesis. Specifically, plant 
closure in Japan proceeds along similar lines as in other countries with the 
weakest establishments tending to exit. However, the core difference is 
that exit in Japan is rare and high barriers to entry prevent the death of 
underperforming plants which consequently chokes off potential 
productivity improvements. 
It is also found that while multinationals close plants which are, on 
average, more productive relative to the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
they tend to close the weakest elements of the firm. However, it is not 
clear why these firms have attracted a disproportionate level of attention 
since similar patterns are found among multiplant firms that do not have 
foreign affiliates. Another accusation levelled against multinationals is 
that their off shoring strategies have been one of the fundamental causes of 
the contraction in manufacturing employment. We find that employment 
growth is slower among multinationals though the coefficient estimate is 
small. 
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Globalisation, in the fonn of imports, is not found to affect plant survival 
or employment. This is surprising since the incidence and level of imports 
do not differ substantially from the United States where low wage imports 
in particular increase plant death and switching. For Japan the effect of 
imports is mitigated through productivity declines suggesting that since 
plant death is rare imports affect productivity through losses in market 
share. Finally, when we investigate the factors underlying the slow rate of 
productivity growth during the period we find that the contributions from 
the entry, exit and within plant components are exceptionally low by 
international standards. Despite this, evidence of productivity 
convergence is found but due to country-specific factors the rate of 
convergence is slow. 
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5.8 Appendix 5 
The data we use in this paper is from the Japanese "Census of 
Manufacturers" and the "Basic survey on Overseas Business Activities" 
conducted annually by MET!. The "Census of Manufacturers" comprises 
169,590 plant-level observations from 1994 to 2005. This longitudinal 
plant data set covers all establishments with more than 4 employees. 
Establishments with less than 10 employees do not report information on 
tangible assets, necessary for estimating TFP. This places a restriction on 
the plants that are included in the regression when investigating the causes 
of productivity change in Section 3 and should be born in mind when 
interpreting the results generated. Information is provided on the three-
digit industry in which a plant operatesS3 • The plant-level variables 
include size (measured by the number of employees), capital per worker, 
sales, TFP (measured relative to the industry and in logs), wage rates and 
the volume of intermediate inputs used. Summary statistics of the plant-
level variables are provided in Table AS.l. 
53 A list of industries is included in Appendix Table A4 
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Table A5.1: The Plant·Level Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Capital 169590 5119 23240 .07 1052705 
Millions of Japanese Yen 
Exit 169590 .02 .14 0 
1 if the plant exits 
Entry 169590 .01 .11 0 
1 if the plant enters 
Intermediate Inputs 169590 6669 39879 .10 4276681 
Millions of Japanese Yen 
Plant Size 169590 225 489 10 21309 
Number of Employees 
Sales 169590 11321 54454 2.88 5855928 
Millions of Japanese Yen 
TFP 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36 
Total Factor Productivity 
Wages 169590 4.84 1.79 .03 90.55 
Millions of Japanese Yen 
This data on plants is matched with that on finns from the "Basic survey 
on Overseas Business Activities" also conducted annually by MET!. 
Finns with less than 50 employees are not required to submit infonnation. 
Again this restricts the finns that can be used within the more fonnal 
econometric analysis. From this dataset we draw infonnation on finn age, 
size, capital-labour ratios, whether it has multiple plants and whether the 
finn has any overseas investments (FDI). Summary statistics of the finn-
level variables are shown in Table A5.2. 
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Table A5,2: The Firm-Level Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 114334 43 15.77 0 161 
In years 
Size 114334 501 2056 50 80500 
Number of workers 
Capital per Worker 114334 15.74 26.42 ,00 2151 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Firm TFP 114334 .97 .15 -3.53 2.80 
Total Factor Productivity 
R&D Complexity 114334 .01 .03 0 6.84 
R&D divided by firm sales 
Intermediate Inputs 114334 20100 133073 8210527 
Millions of Japanese yen 
Foreign Ownership Dummy 114334 .01 .09 0 
1 if foreign firm holds more than 50% of capital 
FDI 114334 .20 .40 0 
1 if outward loans and investment >0 
Multiplant Dummy 114334 .25 .43 0 
1 if the firm has more than one plant 
Export Dummy 114334 .31 .46 0 
1 if the firm exports 
Import Dummy 114334 .26 .44 0 
1 if the firm imports 
The manufacturing establishments are split into 48 industries and TFP is 
calculated for each plant relative to the industry average. Following Aw et 
al. (1997), we define the TFP level of establishment p in year t in a certain 
industry in comparison with the TFP level of a hypothetical representative 
establishment in year 0 in that industry as follows 
InTFPpI = (InQft -lnQ,)- i !(Sift + Sit XlnXift -In X;, ) 
;=1 2 
+ ± (In Qs -lnQs_I)- ±t(Sis +Sis_JlnXis -lnXis_J 
s=1 s=1 ;=1 
(AS.I) 
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where Qft, Sift and }(ft denote the gross output of plant f in year t, the cost 
share of factor i for establishment p's input of factor i in year t. Variables 
with an upper bar denote the industry average of that variable. We use 
1994 as the base year. Capital, labour and real intermediate inputs are 
used as factor inputs. 
The representative establishment for each industry is defined as a 
hypothetical establishment whose gross output as well as input and cost 
share of all production factors are identical with the industry average. The 
first two terms on the right hand side of equation (A5.1) denote the gap 
between plant Is TFP level in year t and the representative 
establishment's TFP level in year t and the representative establishment's 
TFP level in the base year. InTFPft in equation (A5.1) constitutes the gap 
between establishment Is TFP level in year t and the representative 
establishment's TFP level in the base year. 
Industry-Level Variables 
In the empirical section we investigate how both firm and industry level 
variables affect the decision to close a plant. Globalisation has been 
shown to cause exit. The source of import competition in the US affects 
plant survival and causes firms to adjust their product mix (Bernard and 
Jensen, 2002; Bernard et aI., 2006). We disaggregate import penetration 
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into low-wage import penetration (L WPEN) and import penetration from 
all other countries (OTHPEN)54. These measures are calculated as: 
where L WPENit represents low-wage country import competition in 
industry i at time t, M;/W is the value of imports from low-wage countries 
in industry i at time t, Mit and Xii represents the value of total imports and 
exports in industry i at time t and Yj/ denotes output in industry i during 
year t. OTHPENi/ denotes imports from all countries except low-wage 
economIes. 
Bernard et a1. (2006) find that both fonns of import competition raise the 
probability of closure. A one standard deviation increase in L WPEN 
increases the probability of plant exit by 2.2 percentage points which is 
considerably greater than the effect ofOTHPEN. Similar results are found 
by Greenaway et a1. (2008b) for Sweden. In their results, the estimated 
coefficient on imports from outside the DECD is twice as large as that for 
OECD imports. Both sources of competition have a positive and 
significant effect on closure. 
Intra-industry trade is often found to have a positive effect upon finn exit. 
As international trade grows finns diversify their product range which 
54 Countries are deemed to be low-wage where they have a GDP less than 5% that of 
Japan. 
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may lead them to enter new industries and exit sectors they operate in 
currently. It has been established by Greenaway et al. (2008) that firms do 
not just closedown their operations, they switch to new industries too. 
Using Swedish manufacturing data they find that intra-industry trade leads 
to exit through plant closure, and, mergers and acquisition. This is also 
found by Bernard et al. (2006) for the United States, firms which are 
confronted by low-wage import competition sometimes switch to more 
capital intensive sectors. 
Our measure of intra-industry trade is constructed using the Grubel-Lloyd 
index 
where GLijt is the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry i 
in year t, Xi are exports in industry i during year t and Mit are imports in 
industry i during year t. 
The industry variables mentioned so far capture the influence of 
globalisation upon plant exit. We also include a measure of sunk costs. 
The empirical literature has identified sunk costs as being an important 
factor in shaping exit. For example, Aw et al. (2003) find that the nature 
of sunk costs result in very different productivity distributions in South 
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Korea and Taiwan. Sunk costs also playa key role in detennining 
exporting behaviour (Roberts and Tybout, 1997). 
Since exit rates tend to be highly correlated with the sunk costs of entry 
and exit we use the same measure as Bernard and Jensen (2002) and 
Greenaway et al. (2008b). For each industry and year, sunk costs are 
calculated as the minimum of either the entry or exit rate. In steady-state 
equilibrium, entry and exit rates should be equal and should vary with 
sunk costs. An increase in sunk costs would mean that the entry rate 
should fall, in eqUilibrium. However, to focus solely on entry rates could 
he misleading as an industry characterised by high sunk costs could 
experience a high entry rate due to high expected profits. By using the 
minimum of entry or exit, we circumvent this problem. 
Summary statistics for the industry-level variables are provided in Table 
A5.3. Intra-industry trade accounts for approximately half of all trade 
over the sample. Sunk costs have an average value of 1 percent, that is, 
the average of the minimum of the entry and exit rates in an industry is 1 
percent of the total number of operating plants. Imports represent 9% of 
Japanese output with a third of this coming from low-wage countries. 
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Table A5.3: Industry-level Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grubel-Lloyd Index 157273 .50 .26 .01 1.00 
Trade that is intra-industry 
Sunk Costs 169590 .01 .01 .00 .05 
Minimum of entry and exit rates 
Import Penetration 131669 .09 .09 .00 .67 
Imports divided by apparent consumption 
LWPEN 131669 .03 .05 .00 .28 
Low-wage imports 
OTHPEN 131669 .06 .06 .00 .55 
Imports from all other countries 
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Table A5.4: Three Digit Plant Industries in the Dataset 
Basic inorganic chemicals 
Basic organic chemicals 
Beverages 
Cement and its products 
Chemical fertilizers 
Chemical fibres 
Coal products 
Communication equipment 
Electrical generating, transmission, distribution and industrial apparatus 
Electronic data processing machines, digttal and analog computer equipment and accessories 
Electronic equipment and electric measuring instruments 
Electronic parts 
Fabricated constructional and architectural metal products 
Flour and grain mill products 
Furntture and fixtures 
General industry machinery 
Glass and its products 
Household electric appliances 
Leather and leather products 
Livestock products 
Lumber and wood products 
Miscellaneous ceramic, stone and clay products 
Miscellaneous electrical machinery equipment 
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products 
Miscellaneous food and related products 
Miscellaneous food and related products 
Miscellaneous iron and steel 
Miscellaneous machinery 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories 
Motor vehicles 
Non-ferrous metal products 
Office and service industry machines 
Organic chemicals 
Other transportation equipment 
Paper products 
Petroleum products 
Pharmaceutical products 
Pig iron and crude steel 
Plastic products 
Pottery 
Precision machinery and equipment 
Prepared animal foods and organ fertilizers 
Printing, plate making for printing and bookbinding 
Pulp, paper, and coated and glazed paper 
Rubber products 
Seafood products 
Semiconductor devices and integrated circuits 
Smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals 
Special industry machinery 
Textile products 
Tobacco 
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Chapter Six 
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Conclusions 
The productivity growth triggered by the industrial revolution and 
sustained since the mid-18th century has translated into per capita income 
growth of the like never seen before, with the richest modem economies 
now ten to twenty times wealthier than the 1800 average (Clark, 2007). 
The entry and exit of firms has been a key component of this productivity 
growth through the introduction of new products and processes which 
replace inferior and outmoded ones. Creative destruction also fosters 
competition within the market forcing incumbents to become more 
productive as entrants strive to capture market share. 
Globalisation has been found to affect the creation and death of firms by 
opening new opportunities abroad as well as generating competition from 
foreign firms. Melitz (2003) shows that this causes welfare gains as 
competition from foreign firms causes a Darwinian sorting that leads to the 
weakest firms exiting the market. Reallocations of market share towards 
'better' firms result in productivity gains at the aggregate level. 
The first contribution of this thesis is to examine the link between 
globalisation and institutional factors and entry and exit. To date the 
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literature has focussed primarily upon the role of plant, firm and industry 
variables in shaping exit using microdatasets. This has generally shown 
various measures of globalisation such as trade liberalisation (Pavcnik, 
2002), low-wage import competition (Bernard et aI., 2006) and intra-
industry trade (Greenaway et aI., 2008) to increase the probability that a 
plant or firm will die. However, through the use of a cross-country 
industry-level dataset we are able to investigate the extent to which 
globalisation causes creative destruction relative to country-specific 
institutions. We find that the rate of entry is positively related to 
globalisation as exporting opportunities raise the expected profits of 
entering. Simultaneously, the profits accruing through greater market 
integration serve to reduce the probability that a firm will die. This result 
is in contrast to many findings in the literature (see Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott, 2006; Pavcnik, 2002; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). However, it 
may be explained by the fact that we are measuring all of globalisation' s 
components rather than specific facets such as import penetration. 
A unique feature of our analysis is the use of an error correction model 
which captures the short- and long-term consequences of globalisation on 
the Schumpeterian process. We find that market integration only has a 
short-run effect on entry and exit. This confirms broad patterns observed 
across countries: entry and exit rates have remained fairly constant while 
globalisation has persistently increased through time. An explanation for 
variations in churning rates for which we find greater evidence are 
country-specific institutions. Unlike most existing studies we are able to 
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exploit variation in country-specific factors to examine the link between 
policy environments and chum. Countries where the share of the 
governmental sector in GDP is high tend to be characterised by net exit. 
This is predominantly due to governmental consumption which causes 
crowding out. Regulatory burdens are found to act in similar fashion 
however macroeconomic stability allows entrepreneurs to form more 
accurate profit expectations causing net entry. 
A second contribution this thesis has made to our understanding of entry 
and exit regards what causes the death of large plants. Entering and 
exiting cohorts tend to be primarily made up of small plants. According to 
Eurostat's FEED dataset up to 95% of exiting firms are small depending 
upon the country under inspection. However, most visible is the death of 
large plants since they frequently account for a large share of employment 
and output within a localised region. Using plant-level microdata from 
Japan we show that the causes of death among large plants are similar to 
those that lead small firms to exit. Unproductive plants, and those with 
low capital intensities, face higher hazard rates. Our analysis also sheds 
light on how firm characteristics affect death among plants within the 
group and yields insights into the process of closure among multi-plant 
firms. 
Recent literature on firms-level adjustment to globalisation has shown 
multinationals to be 'footloose' indicating that plants belonging to such 
firms face higher exit likelihoods (Bandick, 2007; Kimura and Kiyota, 
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2006; van Beveren, 2007; Alvarez and Gorg, 2005). We demonstrate that 
when we control for the process of exit within multiplant multinationals 
the 'footloose' view is no longer tenable. Indeed there appears to be a 
residual effect of multinational ownership that guards against closure. We 
are able to offer more firm conclusions about why multiplant ownership 
has been found in the literature to raise the probability of death (Bernard 
and Jensen, 2007; Bandick, 2007). Specifically, this is due to the firm 
pruning the weakest elements of the group. This has implications for trade 
theory related to Melitz (2003). Plant death is emphasised as one of the 
means through which productivity improvements occur. Although this has 
been shown by Bernard and Jensen (2004), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), 
Baldwin and Gu (2002), Disney et at. (2003a) to be an important source of 
productivity growth, in countries where a large fraction of output is 
produced by multiplant firms the same result may not hold. Multi-plant 
firms may base closure decisions upon profitability within the group rather 
than productivity relative to the industry. Where plants exiting from multi-
plant firms are productive relative to the industry aggregate productivity 
may fall. 
A third contribution this thesis makes is to empirically analyse the 
determinants of entry into export markets. This is motivated by the 
predictions made by recent theoretical models such as Melitz (2003), 
Bernard et at. (2003), Helpman et at. (2004) and Bernard et at. (2007). 
Those models postulate that as barriers to trade fall firms enter the 
domestic market as the expected profits of entry now include expectations 
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about profits that accrue from exporting. Using a cross-country, industry-
level dataset we find that industries that specialise in producing goods 
which are reliant upon imported intermediate inputs capture a greater share 
of exports when located in a country with low endowments of trade costs. 
To date the literature has emphasised the importance of firm productivity 
in determining selection into export markets (Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 
2004; Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2000; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). 
However, the results again emphasise the importance of institutional 
factors in affecting entry into export markets as also demonstrated by 
Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007). The probability of export market 
entry depends upon the country's trade costs as well as the type of good a 
firm produces. In turn the churning rate is affected by these variables: the 
incentive to enter is blunted when firms are confronted by high barriers to 
foreign markets. 
Creative destruction has been shown to play a crucial role in generating 
productivity improvements (Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Disney et aI., 
2003a; Baldwin and Gu, 2002). We have also shown that when this 
process breaks down the aggregate outcomes can be severe. Using plant-
level microdata covering Japan's Lost Decade we find that high barriers to 
entry result in unproductive plants remaining active. The low rates of 
entry and exit (both below 2%) mean that the contribution of creative 
destruction to aggregate productivity growth has been minute: 
approximately 2%. However, this also has implications for productivity 
growth within incumbents. Since they do not face stiff competition from 
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entrants the incentive to innovate is diminished and within plant 
productivity growth has contributed merely 14% of aggregate productivity 
growth throughout the period. 
A criticism of our work on Japan's Lost Decade would be that we are 
unable to distinguish the reasons why multinationals and keiretsu networks 
played such a vital part in the post-WW2 recovery but are now perceived 
as holding back the economy. To investigate these issues we would 
require a longer time series stretching back to at least the early 1980s. 
Regarding the work on the 'footloose' effect we are unable to say what 
explains the residual effect of multinational ownership. In an ideal world 
we would include controls for managerial capabilities and other 
organisational and headquarter features. Cross-country information may 
also shed light on how institutions affect multinationals' location decisions 
and the role played by incentives. It would also be interesting to know 
about the process of plant closure of multinationals' affiliates in foreign 
countries to see whether this has an impact upon closure in the domestic 
country. 
The thesis has generated insights relevant to policy makers. Imports from 
abroad (Bernard et aI., 2006) and competition from multinationals (Hood 
and Young, 1997) have been cited as being responsible for closure among 
domestic firms. However, this source of competition disciplines the 
market forcing firms to innovate. As demonstrated by our analysis of 
252 
Japan raising entry barriers can have a lasting, deleterious effect upon the 
economy's performance. 
Despite the mixed evidence on spillovers, governments often court 
multinationals as a means of reducing regional unemployment and to 
expand the tax base (Devereux and Griffith, 1998). Frequently there is a 
suspicion that multinationals will relocate production to a lower-cost site 
once tax benefits have been phased out. In some instances there may be 
some truth in this but we find that multinationals are well embedded in the 
domestic economy. To form a better judgement would require more 
information on foreign multinationals but our evidence is consistent with 
that found by - ~ ~ (2010) for Sweden. 
Overall, we have demonstrated that the causes of firm creation and death 
are multidimensional. Institutional factors can raise the incentive to enter 
but may also create barriers to doing so. The process of creative 
destruction is shaped by globalisation but the effect is nuanced. 
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